Fed Skips Rate Cut for Second Straight Meeting — Middle

Fed Skips Rate Cut for Second Straight Meeting — Middle
⚡ FAST READ1 min read

The world's largest central bank's continued pause in its rate-cutting cycle signifies a shift from the easing trend that began in late 2025, marking a structural turning point that will ripple through global financial markets, exchange rates, and emerging economies. The uncertainty surrounding the Middle East situation, and its risk of reigniting inflationary pressures through energy prices, fundamentally constrains the FRB's policy decisions.

── Understand in 3 points ─────────

  • • The FRB decided to keep the policy interest rate (FF rate) unchanged at the FOMC meeting on March 18, 2026.
  • • This marks the second consecutive meeting without a rate cut, following the decision to keep rates unchanged at the previous meeting in January 2026.
  • • FRB Chair Powell stated that "the impact of the Middle East situation on the U.S. economy is uncertain."

── NOW PATTERN ─────────

The FRB's decision to postpone a rate cut reflects a situation where the "path dependency" of the fight against inflation is reinforced by geopolitical risks, making a return to monetary easing structurally difficult. The "chain of contagion" — Middle East situation → crude oil prices → inflation → monetary policy — continues to erode policy flexibility.

── Probabilities and Responses ──────

Base case 55% — CPI year-over-year decelerates month-over-month for three consecutive months. Middle East situation remains stalemated. FOMC members' dot plot indicates two rate cuts within the year. Increased frequency of the term "progress" in Powell's press conferences.

Bull case 20% — Substantive agreement on an Israel-Hamas ceasefire. Reports of resumed Iran nuclear negotiations. Crude oil prices fall below $75. CPI year-over-year clearly drops below 2.5%. Increase in dovish remarks from FOMC members' speeches.

Bear case 25% — Reports of military conflict between Israel and Iran. Crude oil prices exceed $95. CPI month-over-month acceleration for two consecutive months. Some FOMC members mention rate hikes. Sharp decline in regional bank stock prices. VIX (fear index) exceeds 30.

📡 Signal — What Happened

Why it matters: The world's largest central bank's continued pause in its rate-cutting cycle signifies a shift from the easing trend that began in late 2025, marking a structural turning point that will ripple through global financial markets, exchange rates, and emerging economies. The uncertainty surrounding the Middle East situation, and its risk of reigniting inflationary pressures through energy prices, fundamentally constrains the FRB's policy decisions.
  • Policy Decision — The FRB decided to keep the policy interest rate (FF rate) unchanged at the FOMC meeting on March 18, 2026.
  • Policy Decision — This marks the second consecutive meeting without a rate cut, following the decision to keep rates unchanged at the previous meeting in January 2026.
  • Statement — FRB Chair Powell stated that "the impact of the Middle East situation on the U.S. economy is uncertain."
  • Statement — Chair Powell indicated his intention to closely monitor future economic trends, reiterating a data-dependent approach.
  • Background - Inflation — Caution against a re-acceleration of inflation is cited as the primary reason for the FRB's cautious stance.
  • Geopolitics — Concerns are rising that the escalating tensions in the Middle East could impact the U.S. economy through upward pressure on energy prices.
  • Interest Rate Level — The current target range for the FF rate remains at 4.25-4.50% (the level after the December 2025 rate cut).
  • Market Reaction — Market expectations for a resumption of rate cuts in the first half of 2026 have receded, and the outlook for the number of rate cuts this year has diminished.
  • Economic Indicators — U.S. CPI (Consumer Price Index) has hovered in the 2.8-3.0% range year-over-year through early 2026, still exceeding the FRB's 2% target.
  • Employment — The U.S. labor market remains robust, with the unemployment rate stable around 4.0%.
  • Energy — Crude oil prices (WTI) are trading in the high $80s per barrel due to the Middle East risk premium.
  • Exchange Rate — The USD/JPY exchange rate has shifted towards a weaker yen and stronger dollar following the FRB's decision to postpone rate cuts, trading in the 150 yen range.

To understand the background of the FRB's decision to postpone rate cuts for two consecutive meetings, it is necessary to review the broader context of U.S. monetary policy since 2022.

In March 2022, the FRB began a rate-hiking cycle from zero interest rates in response to the post-pandemic surge in inflation. Policy rates were raised at a historic pace of 525 basis points in just 16 months, reaching a 22-year high of 5.25-5.50% in July 2023. During this period, inflation gradually began to decline from its peak of 9.1% year-over-year in June 2022 (a 40-year high).

From July 2023, the FRB kept interest rates unchanged for approximately one year, establishing a "period of patience" to confirm a sustained decline in inflation. Then, in September 2024, it finally shifted to a rate-cutting cycle, initiating an easing phase with a substantial 50 basis point cut. Subsequent cuts of 25 basis points each in November and December brought the FF rate down to 4.25-4.50%.

However, this easing cycle entered a pause as early as January 2025. This was due to a slowdown in the pace of inflation decline, with service sector inflation proving particularly sticky. Throughout 2025, the FRB maintained a "data-dependent" stance, adopting an irregular easing pattern of alternating between rate cuts and pauses.

From late 2025 to early 2026, a new variable emerged: escalating tensions in the Middle East. In addition to the prolonged Israel-Gaza conflict, geopolitical tensions around Iran heightened, reigniting concerns about energy supplies via the Strait of Hormuz. Crude oil prices began an upward trend from late 2025, reaching the high $80s per barrel in early 2026. This rise in energy prices brought widespread upward pressure on prices through transportation and production costs, beginning to materialize the risk of a "second wave of inflation" that the FRB most feared.

This scenario is reminiscent of the "stop-and-go" monetary policy of the 1970s. The FRB at that time (under Chair Burns) eased policy prematurely when inflation began to decline, ultimately failing to eradicate inflation. With the two oil shocks of 1973 and 1979, inflation became uncontrollable. It is still fresh in memory that Chair Powell, in his 2022 Jackson Hole speech, referred to "lessons from history" and declared that the mistakes of the 1970s would not be repeated.

The dilemma currently facing the Powell FRB lies precisely between these historical lessons and present political and economic pressures. The Trump administration (returning in January 2025) has prioritized promoting economic growth and job creation, intensifying pressure on the FRB for rate cuts. Meanwhile, strengthened tariff policies and expanded fiscal spending are acting to increase inflationary pressures. The FRB faces the dual challenge of maintaining political independence while safeguarding the credibility of its inflation target.

Furthermore, the global context is also crucial. The European Central Bank (ECB) and the Bank of Japan are in different policy cycles, and policy divergences among major central banks are mutually influencing each other through the foreign exchange market. A strong dollar, in particular, increases the debt burden of emerging economies and heightens capital outflow pressures. The FRB's every move continues to literally dictate the direction of the global economy.

The Middle East situation, an exogenous variable beyond the FRB's control, is making the "last mile" of monetary policy — the final stage of converging inflation to 2% — significantly difficult. This is the essence of the situation Chair Powell described as "uncertainty," and the true reason why the FRB cannot act.

The delta: The FRB's decision to postpone rate cuts for two consecutive meetings suggests that the easing cycle, which began in September 2024, is transitioning from a de facto "temporary pause" to a "prolonged pause." What has fundamentally changed is that the uncertainty surrounding the Middle East situation has materialized the risk of a "second wave" of inflation through energy prices. Chair Powell's explicit mention of the Middle East situation signifies that the FRB has formally recognized uncontrollable geopolitical risks as a key variable in monetary policy, fundamentally increasing the uncertainty of future policy paths.

🔍 Reading Between the Lines — What the News Isn't Saying

Powell's explicit mention of the Middle East situation is a strategic move to signal to the market that the "true culprit" of inflation is an exogenous variable—energy—rather than domestic factors (wages, housing costs). The FRB's true sentiment is "we want to cut rates, but we can't," and by attributing the responsibility for the pause to geopolitical risks, an intention to avoid political criticism becomes apparent. Furthermore, it is highly probable that, with Powell's term ending (May 2026), he is performing a "neutral act" to avoid leaning too hawkish or too dovish, considering his relationship with the White House, which will influence his successor's appointment. The "non-decision" of keeping rates unchanged is, for Powell, currently the most politically safe option.


NOW PATTERN

Path Dependency × Coordination Failure × Chain of Contagion

The FRB's decision to postpone a rate cut reflects a situation where the "path dependency" of the fight against inflation is reinforced by geopolitical risks, making a return to monetary easing structurally difficult. The "chain of contagion" — Middle East situation → crude oil prices → inflation → monetary policy — continues to erode policy flexibility.

Intersection of Dynamics

The three dynamics of path dependency, coordination failure, and chain of contagion are deeply intertwined, compressing the FRB's policy space from three directions.

Path dependency forms the structural constraint that makes the FRB "unable to act even if it wants to," coordination failure closes off the possibility of externally lifting that constraint, and the chain of contagion acts as a risk amplification device. Specifically, due to past errors in inflation judgment (path dependency), the FRB cannot abandon its cautious stance; because coordination with fiscal authorities and the international community is dysfunctional (coordination failure), it must address inflationary pressures solely through monetary policy; and the chain of contagion from the Middle East situation further increases this burden.

At the intersection of these three dynamics stands Chair Powell himself. Powell must simultaneously contend with the failure of his "transitory inflation" statement in 2021 (the origin of path dependency), the strained relationship with the Trump administration (a symbol of coordination failure), and the uncontrollable exogenous shock from the Middle East (the entry point of the chain of contagion).

The most dangerous scenario is when all three dynamics deteriorate simultaneously. This would be a negative spiral: rapid worsening of the Middle East situation (acceleration of the chain of contagion) → crude oil exceeding $100 → surging inflation → FRB forced to hike rates (extreme manifestation of path dependency) → economic recession → fiscal stimulus needed but difficult due to expanding deficits (deepening of coordination failure). While the probability of this worst-case scenario is low at present, the intersection of these three dynamics undoubtedly structurally increases uncertainty. The FRB's "pause" is both an optimal response under these complex constraints and a postponement of the problem, possessing a dual nature.


📚 History of Patterns

1973-1974: First Oil Shock and the Burns FRB's Policy Response

Middle East geopolitical risk → Soaring crude oil prices → Surging inflation → FRB's policy dilemma

Structural similarities with the present: Chairman Arthur Burns, fearing recession, did not tighten sufficiently, ultimately leading to stagflation. When a central bank takes an half-hearted approach to an exogenous energy shock, there is a risk of inflation becoming structural.

1979-1982: Volcker Shock and Second Oil Shock

Legacy of insufficient response by predecessor → Drastic tightening to restore credibility → Deep recession

Structural similarities with the present: Chairman Volcker raised the FF rate to 20% to curb inflation, but unemployment exceeded 10%. Once inflation expectations become unanchored, restoring them comes with immense economic costs. This is the fundamental reason why Powell prefers a "preemptive pause."

1994-1995: Greenspan FRB's Preemptive Rate Hike

Preemptive tightening at the nascent stage of inflation → Temporary market disruption → Soft landing achieved

Structural similarities with the present: Greenspan began raising rates before inflation actually accelerated, successfully achieving a soft landing. This is one of the few successful examples where "preemptive action" paid off, and it represents Powell's ideal scenario, but a key difference from the present is that geopolitical risks were low at the time.

2018-2019: Powell FRB's Rate Hikes → Abrupt Rate Cuts

Excessive tightening → Market crash → Policy reversal → Doubts about credibility

Structural similarities with the present: Powell continued rate hikes on "autopilot" in late 2018, leading to a sharp decline in the stock market. He abruptly reversed course with rate cuts in 2019, but faced criticism that the FRB was providing a "put option" to the market. This experience ingrained in Powell the lesson that "abrupt policy reversals come at a high cost."

2021-2022: Failure of "Transitory Inflation" Judgment and Rapid Rate Hikes

Underestimation of inflation → Delayed policy response → Erosion of credibility → Overcorrection

Structural similarities with the present: The Powell FRB judged inflation in 2021 as "transitory," leading to a delayed response. Consequently, it was forced into a historic pace of rate hikes starting in 2022. This experience is the direct cause of the current FRB's extreme caution, embedding an organizational bias to "choose overestimation over underestimation."

Patterns Revealed by History

These five historical precedents illustrate a structural pattern: "central banks conduct an asymmetric risk assessment regarding inflation." The costs of underestimating inflation (erosion of credibility, stagflation, and subsequent aggressive tightening) significantly outweigh the costs of overestimating it (unnecessary economic suppression). This asymmetry biases the FRB towards a hawkish stance, and particularly in phases with exogenous geopolitical shocks, "inaction" becomes a rational choice.

In Powell's personal career, the two experiences of "overdoing it" in 2018 and "being too late" in 2021 define his current "wait until the data is clear" approach. However, history also shows that a "waiting" strategy carries risks. Preemptive actions like Greenspan's in 1994 succeed only when the external environment is relatively stable. With the uncontrollable variable of the Middle East present, the FRB's "waiting" strategy relies on an optimistic assumption that the situation will improve, and the question is whether it is adequately prepared if that assumption fails.


🔮 Next Scenarios

55%Base case
20%Bull case
25%Bear case
55%Base case

The FRB will postpone rate cuts throughout the first half of 2026, resuming a 0.25% rate cut at the June or July 2026 FOMC meeting. The Middle East situation will remain tense but will not escalate to a large-scale military conflict or a blockade of the Strait of Hormuz, with crude oil prices trading in the $80-90 range. U.S. CPI year-over-year will gradually decline within the 2.5-3.0% range, but convergence to the FRB's 2% target will not be achieved within the year. In this scenario, the FRB will implement a total of two rate cuts (50 basis points in total) throughout 2026, with the FF rate ending the year at 3.75-4.00%. The U.S. economy will grow at a pace slightly below its potential growth rate (approx. 2%), but a recession will be avoided. The labor market will cool gradually, but the unemployment rate will not exceed 4.5%. USD/JPY will trade in the 145-155 yen range, and the stock market will continue to move sideways. For market participants, this will be a "boring but stable" environment, with volatility decreasing, but stress on commercial real estate and small and medium-sized enterprises gradually accumulating due to the prolonged high-interest-rate environment. For the FRB, it will be a "barely successful" outcome, with the appointment of Powell's successor after his term ends (May 2026) becoming the next focal point.

Investment/Action Implications: CPI year-over-year decelerates month-over-month for three consecutive months. Middle East situation remains stalemated. FOMC members' dot plot indicates two rate cuts within the year. Increased frequency of the term "progress" in Powell's press conferences.

20%Bull case

The Middle East situation stabilizes unexpectedly. A ceasefire agreement between Israel and Hamas begins to function effectively, and the risk of direct military conflict with Iran significantly decreases. Crude oil prices fall to the low $70s, resolving energy-driven inflationary pressures. As a result, CPI rapidly declines, and the FRB resumes rate cuts as early as May 2026. In this case, the FRB will implement 3-4 rate cuts (75-100 basis points in total) throughout 2026, with the FF rate falling to 3.25-3.50% by year-end. Mortgage rates will drop below 6%, and signs of recovery will begin to appear in the housing market. The stock market will rise on rate cut expectations, with the S&P500 potentially breaking above 6,000. The exchange rate will shift towards a weaker dollar and stronger yen, with USD/JPY possibly falling below 140 yen at times. This would also be a tailwind for emerging economies, with capital inflows recovering and creating room for rate cuts by their respective central banks. Global risk appetite would improve, and the latter half of 2026 would approach a "Goldilocks" (just right economy) environment. However, the realization of this scenario hinges on an improvement in the uncontrollable variable of the Middle East situation, making its probability limited.

Investment/Action Implications: Substantive agreement on an Israel-Hamas ceasefire. Reports of resumed Iran nuclear negotiations. Crude oil prices fall below $75. CPI year-over-year clearly drops below 2.5%. Increase in dovish remarks from FOMC members' speeches.

25%Bear case

The Middle East situation rapidly deteriorates. Direct conflict between Israel and Iran, or military tensions around the Strait of Hormuz, pose a direct threat to crude oil supply, causing crude oil prices to break above $100. A surge in energy prices re-accelerates inflation to over 3.5%, forcing the FRB to discuss not just postponing rate cuts, but even the possibility of rate hikes. In this scenario, the FRB will not implement any rate cuts throughout 2026, and the FF rate will remain at 4.25-4.50% through the year-end. Excessive tightening of financial conditions will lead to an increase in commercial real estate defaults and heightened pressure on regional banks. The stock market will experience a 15-20% correction, with the S&P500 falling below 4,800. The unemployment rate will begin to exceed 5%, marking the onset of a recession. USD/JPY will break above 160 yen, and the Japanese government will intervene in the foreign exchange market, but with limited effect. Currency crises will begin to emerge in emerging economies, with stress becoming apparent particularly in Turkey, South Africa, and Brazil, which have large dollar-denominated debts. The FRB will face the dilemma of "taming inflation" versus "avoiding recession," and the risk of 1970s-style stagflation will become tangible. Chair Powell's final term will be in the worst possible environment, and the appointment of his successor will become a political issue.

Investment/Action Implications: Reports of military conflict between Israel and Iran. Crude oil prices exceed $95. CPI month-over-month acceleration for two consecutive months. Some FOMC members mention rate hikes. Sharp decline in regional bank stock prices. VIX (fear index) exceeds 30.

Key Triggers to Watch

  • Policy interest rate decision and dot plot update at the next FOMC meeting (May 2026): May 6-7, 2026
  • Significant change in the Middle East situation (direct military conflict between Israel and Iran, or an incident of vessel attack in the Strait of Hormuz): Within the next 3-6 months
  • U.S. CPI (Consumer Price Index) year-over-year clearly falls below 2.5%, or rises above 3.5%: Upon release of monthly data for April-June 2026
  • FRB Chair Powell's term expiration and White House movements regarding his successor's appointment: May 2026 (term expires end of May 2026)
  • Crude oil prices (WTI) break above $100, or fall below $70: March-September 2026

🔄 Tracking Loop

Next Trigger: Next FOMC: May 6-7, 2026 — Chair Powell's final FOMC. Whether rate cuts resume or rates are held for a third consecutive meeting will determine his policy legacy for his successor.

Continuation of this pattern: Tracking Theme: The Future of the FRB's Rate-Cutting Cycle — Will the easing cycle that began in September 2024 be completely halted or resumed? The next milestones are the May 2026 FOMC + Powell's term expiration.

🎯 Oracle Declaration

Prediction Question: Will the FRB implement a rate cut (reduction of the FF rate) at the FOMC meeting on June 18, 2026?

NO — Will Not Occur40%

Judgment Deadline: 2026-06-18 | Judgment Criteria: Based on the policy interest rate decision announced after the FOMC meeting on June 17-18, 2026, if the FF rate target range is lowered from the current 4.25-4.50%, the answer is YES; if it is kept unchanged or raised, the answer is NO. Judgment will be based on the FRB's official statement (FOMC Statement).

⚠️ Failure Scenario (pre-mortem): If the Middle East situation unexpectedly stabilizes and crude oil prices plummet, and CPI decelerates for three consecutive months, creating room for the FRB to cut rates, the prediction will be incorrect.

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