Gaza "Peace Council" - First UN Report
The Trump-led "Peace Council" delivered its first report at the UN and called for participation in an international stabilization force, but the framework, lacking Palestinian representation, expands the legitimacy void and could become a turning point fundamentally reshaping the Middle East's security order.
── Understand in 3 points ─────────
- • On March 24, 2026, a representative of the "Peace Council," which oversees the interim governance of the Gaza Strip, delivered its first status report to the UN Security Council.
- • The Peace Council called on nations to participate in an "international stabilization force" responsible for disarming Islamic organizations such as Hamas.
- • The Peace Council is chaired by US President Trump, making it a US-led governance framework.
── NOW PATTERN ─────────
The "legitimacy void" created by the collapse of Hamas rule, which the US is unilaterally attempting to fill through "power overreach," combined with the international community's "failure of coordination," makes the establishment of sustainable governance difficult.
── Probabilities and Responses ──────
• Base case 50% — The number of participating countries in the stabilization force remains around 10, reconstruction funding contributions stay below $10 billion, sporadic terrorist attacks occur a few times a month, and no new comprehensive resolution is adopted by the Security Council.
• Bull case 20% — Saudi Arabia formally declares support for the Peace Council, reports of secret negotiations with Hamas's political wing, a surge in stabilization force participating countries (15 or more), and an announcement of large-scale contributions to the reconstruction fund.
• Bear case 30% — A large-scale attack on the stabilization force (50+ casualties), participating countries announce withdrawal, evidence of weapons smuggling into Gaza by Iranian proxy forces, statements indicating a reduction in the Trump administration's commitment, and a deepening refugee crisis at the Egyptian border.
📡 THE SIGNAL — What Happened
Why it matters: The Trump-led "Peace Council" delivered its first report at the UN and called for participation in an international stabilization force, but the framework, lacking Palestinian representation, expands the legitimacy void and could become a turning point fundamentally reshaping the Middle East's security order.
- Diplomacy — On March 24, 2026, a representative of the "Peace Council," which oversees the interim governance of the Gaza Strip, delivered its first status report to the UN Security Council.
- Security — The Peace Council called on nations to participate in an "international stabilization force" responsible for disarming Islamic organizations such as Hamas.
- Political Structure — The Peace Council is chaired by US President Trump, making it a US-led governance framework.
- Humanitarian — The Gaza Strip has suffered massive destruction since the military conflict began in October 2023, with the majority of its approximately 2.3 million residents displaced.
- International Law — The report to the UN Security Council is positioned as a crucial step for the Peace Council to gain international legitimacy.
- Regional Affairs — The disarmament of Hamas has been the biggest obstacle in all past peace negotiations.
- Military — The specific troop strength, command structure, and rules of engagement for the international stabilization force have not yet been announced.
- Diplomacy — Many Arab nations have not clarified their stance on the Peace Council and maintain a cautious attitude.
- Domestic Politics — The Palestinian Authority (PA) has been effectively excluded from the Peace Council's framework and is intensifying its opposition.
- Economy — The reconstruction of the Gaza Strip is estimated to require over $50 billion, and securing donor countries is a challenge.
- International Relations — Russia and China have questioned the legitimacy of the Peace Council, and heated debate is expected in the Security Council.
- History — The first report at the UN was conducted as part of the interim governance process following the Israel-Hamas ceasefire agreement in 2025.
To understand the recent "Peace Council" UN report regarding the Gaza Strip, it is necessary to delve deeply into the structural history of the Palestinian issue and the evolution of US Middle East policy.
Originally, the Gaza Strip was placed under Egyptian administration in the 1948 First Arab-Israeli War and occupied by Israel in the 1967 Six-Day War. Although limited autonomy by the Palestinian Authority (PA) was recognized in the 1993 Oslo Accords, Hamas won the Palestinian Legislative Council election in 2006, and in 2007, Hamas seized control of the Gaza Strip by force. Since then, a divided state has been solidified, with Gaza under Hamas rule and the West Bank under PA rule.
This division is also a consequence of the "failure of coordination" by the international community, which has been unable to maintain a consistent strategy regarding the Palestinian issue. Since the Oslo Accords, the US has positioned itself as an "honest broker" for Middle East peace, but in reality, it has consistently maintained a pro-Israel stance. The policies of successive administrations have swung like a pendulum: the Obama administration's two-state solution, Trump's first term's "Deal of the Century," the Biden administration's reduced engagement, and now the Peace Council in Trump's second term.
The Hamas attack on Israel on October 7, 2023, and the subsequent large-scale Israeli military operation, brought devastating destruction to the Gaza Strip. The humanitarian crisis, with tens of thousands dead, most infrastructure destroyed, and over 90% of the population displaced, completely collapsed the traditional governance structure. This "legitimacy void" is the direct background for the birth of the Peace Council.
The unusual structure of the Trump administration itself chairing the Peace Council is an extension of the role the US played in the 2025 ceasefire negotiations. President Trump aims to position the ceasefire as his diplomatic achievement and directly involve himself in the subsequent governance process, making it a political asset for the November 2026 midterm elections. Simultaneously, he seeks to integrate the "resolution" of the Gaza issue into the larger strategic goal of expanding the Abraham Accords (particularly the normalization of diplomatic relations between Saudi Arabia and Israel).
However, this framework has fundamental problems. First, it lacks representation from the Palestinians themselves. The PA is excluded, Hamas is targeted for disarmament, and there is no channel for Gaza residents to participate in their own governance. Second, its legitimacy under international law is unclear. Interim governance not based on a Security Council resolution is questioned not only by Russia and China but also by many countries in the Global South. Third, there is the effectiveness of disarmament. There is no successful precedent for disarming Hamas, Islamic Jihad, and other armed groups through external military force, as seen with Hezbollah in Lebanon.
This structure is also a typical example of "power overreach," where the US still attempts to shape regional order through the logic of force amidst the weakening of its unipolar dominance in the post-Cold War international order. A series of precedents—the failure of governance after the Iraq War, the withdrawal from Afghanistan, and the chaos after the Libya intervention—demonstrate how difficult externally-led governance transitions are.
Even more importantly, this development is not merely a Gaza issue. The success or failure of the Peace Council will determine the future of the entire Middle East order, including Israel-Saudi normalization, Iran's regional influence, Turkey's stance, Egypt's security, and the authority of the UN. The first report at the UN was the moment when this US-led framework faced international scrutiny for the first time on a stage where such complex interests intersect.
The delta: With the US-led "Peace Council" overseeing Gaza's interim governance delivering its first official report at the UN, a governance framework lacking Palestinian representation has been brought before international scrutiny. This poses a fundamental question regarding the legitimacy of post-conflict governance and marks a watershed moment for whether the reshaping of the Middle East order will proceed according to the US blueprint.
🔍 BETWEEN THE LINES — What the News Isn't Saying
The timing of the Peace Council's first UN report is designed to align with the Trump administration's political calendar, with an eye on the 2026 US midterm elections. The true aim is not the stabilization of Gaza, but rather to fill the outer moat of a "deal" involving Saudi-Israeli normalization, with Gaza merely a "hostage" in that transaction. The call for nations to participate in the stabilization force is a political performance aimed at securing de facto international recognition by having them "sign on" to the US-led framework, rather than genuinely securing troops. The very fact that the report makes no mention of the structural exclusion of Palestinian voices speaks to the true nature of this framework.
NOW PATTERN
Legitimacy Void × Power Overreach × Failure of Coordination
The "legitimacy void" created by the collapse of Hamas rule, which the US is unilaterally attempting to fill through "power overreach," combined with the international community's "failure of coordination," makes the establishment of sustainable governance difficult.
Intersection of Dynamics
These three dynamics form a mutually reinforcing vicious cycle. The "legitimacy void" arose from the collapse of governance in Gaza, but the absence of international consensus to fill this void ("failure of coordination") creates a situation where the US is compelled to intervene unilaterally ("power overreach"). The US's unilateral intervention, in turn, provokes international backlash, further hindering coordination and weakening the framework's legitimacy.
At the core of this cycle is a structure that could be called the "dilemma of legitimacy." For Gaza's governance to be legitimate, it requires the participation of Palestinians themselves and the approval of the international community. However, Palestinian representation (PA) is weakened, Hamas is targeted for disarmament, and the international community (Security Council) is divided. This "shortage" of legitimacy makes any framework vulnerable.
Historically, cases where these three dynamics have acted simultaneously have almost invariably led to long-term destabilization. The post-Iraq War occupation governance (2003-) is precisely an example where a legitimacy void, US overreach, and a failure of international coordination converged, resulting in over two decades of instability.
In Gaza's case, it is further complicated by the fact that these three dynamics are intertwined with the broader reshaping of the Middle East order—the expansion of the Abraham Accords, Iran's sphere of influence, and Turkey's regional ambitions. The success or failure of the Peace Council will determine not only Gaza's fate but also the balance of power in the Middle East itself. If the failure of coordination persists, the void risks being filled by other actors (Iranian proxy forces, jihadist organizations), and US overreach will deepen further, completing a structural trap with no exit.
📚 PATTERN HISTORY
2003-2011: CPA (Coalition Provisional Authority) Governance after the Iraq War
Legitimacy Void × Power Overreach
Structural similarities with the current case: External forces conducted occupation governance without legitimate backing, leading to intensified sectarian conflict and the rise of ISIS. Formal legitimization through elections did not bring substantial stability.
1999-2008: UNMIK (UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo) Governance in Kosovo
Legitimacy Void × Failure of Coordination
Structural similarities with the current case: Even governance based on a UN Security Council resolution saw the determination of final status delayed by Russian opposition, creating a 9-year "frozen conflict" state. A typical example where the source of legitimacy is nullified by great power rivalry.
2011-Present: State Collapse after Libya Intervention
Power Overreach × Failure of Coordination
Structural similarities with the current case: After the NATO-led military intervention, the lack of a governance transition plan and sporadic international involvement led to long-term chaos with dual governments and warring militias. A lesson in "easy to break, hard to build."
1993-2000: Collapse of the Oslo Peace Process
Legitimacy Void × Failure of Coordination
Structural similarities with the current case: The divergence between Palestinian expectations and actual outcomes led to the Second Intifada. A foundational example demonstrating that formal agreements do not guarantee substantive legitimacy.
2001-2021: US Nation-Building in Afghanistan
Power Overreach × Legitimacy Void × Failure of Coordination
Structural similarities with the current case: Nation-building efforts spanning 20 years and over $2 trillion were undone within days of US troop withdrawal, with the Taliban regaining power. The most dramatic example of how fragile externally-led governance can be.
Pattern Revealed by History
The pattern consistently shown by historical precedents is clear. When external forces lead governance without securing genuine representation from local residents, short-term stabilization may be possible, but in the long term, the lack of legitimacy becomes a seed for new violence and destabilization. Iraq's CPA held elections but could not prevent sectarian conflict; Kosovo's UNMIK, despite being backed by a Security Council resolution, became deadlocked by great power rivalry; and in Afghanistan, even after 20 years and over $2 trillion, sustainable governance could not be built.
Common to these cases is the fact that "procuring legitimacy" is the most difficult challenge. While it is technically possible to maintain security with military force and rebuild infrastructure with funds, it is inherently almost impossible to externally inject the legitimacy that makes residents feel governance is "theirs." For the Gaza Peace Council to overcome this historical pattern, a mechanism to ensure Palestinian political participation is essential, but it is missing from the current framework. Furthermore, the risk of a US administration change always exists, and there is no guarantee that a post-Trump administration will maintain the same commitment. History has repeatedly proven that the cost of withdrawal often exceeds the cost of intervention.
🔮 NEXT SCENARIOS
In the base case scenario, the Peace Council functions partially, but the fundamental issue of legitimacy remains unresolved. The international stabilization force will be formed with a limited number of participating countries (around 10), primarily led by the US, and deployed in major cities of Gaza. Hamas's disarmament will proceed "officially," but sporadic guerrilla resistance from hidden weapons and remnant forces will continue. The security situation will settle into a state of "managed instability," avoiding large-scale combat but with ongoing terrorist attacks and assassinations.
Reconstruction funds will be partially contributed, mainly by Saudi Arabia and the UAE, but will fall far short of the $50 billion required for comprehensive reconstruction. International community support will be limited due to concerns about the Peace Council's legitimacy. Palestinian political participation will be considered incrementally, but the granting of substantial autonomy will be postponed.
In the UN Security Council, Russia and China will continue their criticism but will not go as far as to directly block the Peace Council by exercising their veto power. A state of coexistence between "de facto acceptance" and "principled opposition" will persist. This halfway state can be maintained for 2-3 years, but the accumulation of structural contradictions will eventually lead to some crisis acting as a turning point. The expansion of the Abraham Accords will be delayed but not completely derailed, and Saudi-Israel normalization talks will continue behind the scenes.
Implications for Investment/Action: The number of participating countries in the stabilization force remains around 10, reconstruction funding contributions stay below $10 billion, sporadic terrorist attacks occur a few times a month, and no new comprehensive resolution is adopted by the Security Council.
In the optimistic scenario, the Peace Council gains unexpected international support, accelerating Gaza's stabilization. The key to this development is Saudi Arabia formally declaring full support for the Peace Council and a "grand bargain" being realized, linking it to the normalization of diplomatic relations with Israel. Saudi participation would encourage active involvement from other Arab nations (UAE, Egypt, Jordan), enabling large-scale mobilization of reconstruction funds.
Hamas's disarmament would progress through a "political deal" brokered by Qatar and Turkey, where parts of Hamas as a political organization participate in the interim governance process in exchange for dismantling its military wing. This is similar to the IRA (Irish Republican Army) disarmament model, bringing substantial, though not complete, progress.
The international stabilization force would reach a size of 20,000 personnel with participation from over 20 countries, effectively deployed under NATO or multinational command. Improved security conditions would allow humanitarian aid and reconstruction efforts to fully commence, and the gradual return of displaced persons would begin.
The realization of this scenario requires three conditions to be met simultaneously: the Trump administration demonstrating flexibility to accept Palestinian political participation, Israel exercising restraint in settlement expansion, and Iran refraining from obstruction through proxy forces. While the probability is not high given historical precedents, unexpected diplomatic breakthroughs can occur in the Middle East, as demonstrated by the success of the Abraham Accords.
Implications for Investment/Action: Saudi Arabia formally declares support for the Peace Council, reports of secret negotiations with Hamas's political wing, a surge in stabilization force participating countries (15 or more), and an announcement of large-scale contributions to the reconstruction fund.
In the pessimistic scenario, the Peace Council quickly becomes dysfunctional, and the situation in Gaza further deteriorates. The trigger for this scenario would be a large-scale attack on the international stabilization force by remnant Hamas forces or other armed groups. If numerous casualties occur, participating countries would face domestic pressure to withdraw their troops, leading to the "collapse of the coalition of the willing." This would be a repeat of scenarios like Mogadishu in Somalia (1993) or the Multinational Force in Lebanon (1983).
Furthermore, Iran could actively promote the destabilization of Gaza through Hezbollah and other proxy forces. For Iran, the failure of US-led governance in Gaza is a strategic benefit, leading to the strengthening of the "Axis of Resistance." Indirect intervention through weapons smuggling, funding, and training support would significantly complicate the stabilization force's mission.
On the domestic political front, if President Trump determines that the Gaza issue becomes a political liability in the 2026 midterm elections, he could rapidly reduce commitment. An "exit without a strategy" similar to the withdrawal from Afghanistan would plunge Gaza into further chaos.
In this scenario, Gaza would become a "failed state," transitioning into Libya-style long-term chaos with multiple armed factions vying for control. The humanitarian crisis would deepen further, accelerating the outflow of refugees to neighboring countries (especially Egypt). The expansion of the Abraham Accords would completely collapse, and the Middle East security environment would deteriorate even further than before 2023.
Implications for Investment/Action: A large-scale attack on the stabilization force (50+ casualties), participating countries announce withdrawal, evidence of weapons smuggling into Gaza by Iranian proxy forces, statements indicating a reduction in the Trump administration's commitment, and a deepening refugee crisis at the Egyptian border.
Key Triggers to Watch
- Announcement of the specific formation and deployment plan for the international stabilization force: April-June 2026
- Saudi Arabia's official statement regarding its stance on the Peace Council: May-August 2026
- Submission and vote on a new Gaza-related resolution at the Security Council: April-September 2026
- The 2026 US midterm elections and their impact on Gaza policy: November 2026
- First report on the progress (or failure) of Hamas's disarmament process: June-December 2026
🔄 TRACKING LOOP
Next Trigger: UN Security Council deliberation on a Gaza-related draft resolution (scheduled for April-May 2026) — Whether Russia and China exercise their veto will determine the fate of the Peace Council's international legitimacy.
Continuation of this pattern: Tracking Theme: Legitimacy of Gaza's Interim Governance and Feasibility of an International Stabilization Force — The next milestone is the announcement of the stabilization force's specific formation plan (around June 2026).
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