Defense of the Strait of Hormuz and Cr
Amid U.S. pressure on allies to dispatch naval vessels for the security of the Strait of Hormuz, through which approximately 20% of the world's crude oil passes, an attack on a UAE oil facility has materialized. The vulnerability of energy supply and the cracks in alliance relationships have simultaneously been exposed, shaking the foundations of the global economy.
── Understand in 3 points ─────────
- • President Trump criticized Japan, China, and South Korea by name regarding the dispatch of naval vessels to the Strait of Hormuz, expressing dissatisfaction that they were "not active."
- • The U.S. maintains a large naval presence, including carrier strike groups, around the Strait of Hormuz, bearing costs of billions of dollars annually.
- • A world-leading crude oil export facility in the UAE (United Arab Emirates) was attacked, halting crude oil loading operations.
── NOW PATTERN ─────────
The "free rider problem" of the U.S.-led maritime security system has reached its limit, and as alliance cracks and coordination failures proceed simultaneously, the overextension of the hegemonic power is destabilizing the entire system.
── Probability and Response ──────
• Base case 55% — Japanese government's decision to expand SDF deployment to the Middle East, South Korean government's announcement of naval vessel dispatch, UAE facility restoration schedule, crude oil prices stabilizing in the $85 range.
• Bull case 20% — Japan's expanded SDF deployment and announcement of participation in a multilateral framework, signals of softening Iranian diplomacy, stable decline in crude oil prices, reports of China considering observer participation.
• Bear case 25% — Additional oil facility attacks, Iranian military escalation (increased threatening actions in the Strait), crude oil prices breaking $100, President Trump's mention of increasing costs for U.S. forces in Japan, increased Chinese military activity in the South China Sea.
📡 Signals — What Happened
Why it matters: Amid U.S. pressure on allies to dispatch naval vessels for the security of the Strait of Hormuz, through which approximately 20% of the world's crude oil passes, an attack on a UAE oil facility has materialized. The vulnerability of energy supply and the cracks in alliance relationships have simultaneously been exposed, shaking the foundations of the global economy.
- Diplomacy — President Trump criticized Japan, China, and South Korea by name regarding the dispatch of naval vessels to the Strait of Hormuz, expressing dissatisfaction that they were "not active."
- Military — The U.S. maintains a large naval presence, including carrier strike groups, around the Strait of Hormuz, bearing costs of billions of dollars annually.
- Energy — A world-leading crude oil export facility in the UAE (United Arab Emirates) was attacked, halting crude oil loading operations.
- Economy — The Strait of Hormuz is the most critical chokepoint, through which approximately 20-21% of the world's seaborne oil transport passes.
- Geopolitics — Japan relies on the Middle East for about 90% of its crude oil imports, with the majority passing through the Strait of Hormuz.
- Security — Japan began information gathering activities by the Self-Defense Forces (SDF) in the Middle East region in 2019, but opted not to dispatch naval vessels directly to the Strait of Hormuz itself.
- International Relations — China is heavily dependent on crude oil imports through the Strait of Hormuz, while also maintaining strategic relations with Iran, putting it in a dilemma.
- Markets — Following reports of the UAE oil facility attack, upward pressure on crude oil prices intensified, raising concerns about its impact on the global economy.
- Diplomacy — South Korea also has a high dependence on Middle Eastern crude oil via the Strait of Hormuz but continues to maintain a cautious stance regarding U.S. requests.
- Security — The Trump administration has made the "free rider" problem among allies a core tenet of its security policy, demanding burden sharing in both NATO and Asia.
- Regional Affairs — As Houthi attacks on merchant vessels in the Red Sea continue, maritime security risks are increasing across the entire Middle East.
- Diplomacy — The U.S. has re-intensified its "maximum pressure" policy on Iran, and tensions in the Strait of Hormuz are directly linked to U.S.-Iran confrontation.
The security issue surrounding the Strait of Hormuz did not suddenly emerge today. The root of this problem dates back to the international order established by the United States after World War II, particularly the Pax Americana system that guaranteed freedom of navigation in the oceans.
Since 1945, backed by its overwhelming naval power, the United States has virtually single-handedly guaranteed the safety of the world's major sea lanes (SLOCs). The defense of strategic chokepoints such as the Strait of Hormuz, the Strait of Malacca, the Suez Canal, and the Panama Canal has been handled by the U.S. Fifth Fleet (headquartered in Bahrain) and the Seventh Fleet (headquartered in Yokosuka), with allies benefiting from this "public good." During the Cold War, this asymmetric burden structure was justified due to the clear threat from the Soviet Union.
However, after the end of the Cold War, particularly since the 2000s, several cracks began to appear in this structure. First, there was a growing public sentiment within the U.S. asking, "Why are we the only ones serving as the world's police?" The Iraq War (2003) and the prolonged war in Afghanistan created a sense of fatigue among Americans towards "endless wars." Second, the U.S. shale revolution (2010s) dramatically reduced America's own dependence on Middle Eastern crude oil. By 2019, the U.S. became a net energy exporter, diminishing the economic rationale for guaranteeing the security of the Strait of Hormuz at its own expense.
It is in this context that President Trump's logic of "burden sharing" emerged. Even during his first term in 2019, Trump questioned, "Why is the U.S. protecting the Strait when China imports 91% of its crude oil through it, and Japan depends on it for 62%?" At the time, the U.S. launched a "coalition of the willing" (Operation Sentinel), with the UK and Australia participating, but Japan, citing constitutional constraints, opted out of dispatching vessels directly to the Strait of Hormuz itself, instead limiting its activities to information gathering in the Gulf of Oman and the Gulf of Aden.
As of 2026, the situation has become even more complex. Iran's nuclear development has progressed, and Houthi (Yemen's pro-Iranian armed group) attacks on merchant vessels in the Red Sea have intensified since late 2023, severely impacting logistics via the Suez Canal. In addition to this, a new escalation has occurred with a direct attack on a UAE oil facility. As the vulnerability of global energy supply is once again exposed, President Trump is further intensifying pressure on allies.
What is noteworthy here is that Trump has mentioned not only Japan but also China. While China is a strategic competitor of the U.S. and not an ally, it is effectively a "free rider" in the security of the Strait of Hormuz. China has signed a 25-year comprehensive strategic partnership agreement with Iran, purchasing Iranian crude oil at a discount, while contributing nothing to the defense of the Strait. By highlighting this contradiction, Trump is attempting to construct a new logic that transcends the traditional "allies vs. non-allies" framework, asserting that "all beneficiaries of the Strait should bear the burden."
However, this logic contains a significant contradiction. The security of the Strait of Hormuz is itself the foundation supporting U.S. hegemony. The dollar's status as a key currency is closely linked to oil transactions being conducted in dollars (the petrodollar system), and entrusting Middle East security to other nations could undermine America's own strategic interests. Trump's "transactional diplomacy" carries the risk of eroding the long-term foundation of hegemony in exchange for short-term burden reduction.
For Japan, this is a juncture where two paramount imperatives — energy security and the maintenance of the Japan-U.S. alliance — collide. Expanding the dispatch of the Self-Defense Forces (SDF) to the Middle East would meet U.S. demands but would come with costs such as constitutional interpretation issues and deteriorating diplomatic relations with Iran. On the other hand, continuing a passive stance risks damaging the trust in the Japan-U.S. alliance and putting Japan in a disadvantageous position in trade negotiations and security matters.
The delta: The new escalation of an attack on a UAE oil facility, occurring simultaneously with President Trump's "burden sharing" pressure on allies, has transformed the Strait of Hormuz security issue from a "theoretical risk" to a "real crisis." The unsustainability of the U.S.'s unilateral security provision model has been concretely exposed, making it difficult for Japan, China, and South Korea to continue their traditional ambiguous responses.
🔍 Reading Between the Lines — What the News Isn't Saying
President Trump's true aim in criticizing Japan, China, and South Korea equally regarding the Strait of Hormuz is not maritime security itself, but rather to secure leverage in other issues such as trade negotiations, currency policy, and increased defense spending. The demand for naval vessel dispatch is a "negotiating card," and the ultimate compromise lies in economic concessions such as raising defense spending to over 2.5% of GDP or additional purchases of U.S. LNG and defense equipment. The timing of the UAE facility attack coinciding with this U.S. pressure campaign presents an opportune moment for the Trump administration to "capitalize on the crisis," revealing an intention to use security crises as an accelerator for trade and economic negotiations.
NOW PATTERN
Alliance Strain × Coordination Failure × Overextension of Power
The "free rider problem" of the U.S.-led maritime security system has reached its limit, and as alliance cracks and coordination failures proceed simultaneously, the overextension of the hegemonic power is destabilizing the entire system.
Intersection of Dynamics
The three dynamics of "alliance strain," "coordination failure," and "overextension of power" mutually reinforce each other, forming a negative feedback loop. First, U.S. overextension generates demands for burden sharing, which then widens cracks with allies. The widening of these cracks further complicates multilateral coordination, ultimately reproducing a situation where the U.S. is forced to maintain the burden alone. In other words, a cycle of overextension → cracks → coordination failure → sustained overextension continues.
What is even more serious is that the addition of external shocks (UAE facility attacks and Houthi maritime attacks) to this vicious cycle non-linearly increases the instability of the entire system. Alliance cracks that might be manageable in peacetime rapidly deepen when an actual crisis occurs. A situation where the U.S. signals "we will no longer protect," allies respond with "we are still considering our response," and attacks continue in the interim, creates a deterrence vacuum.
This structure is also a variation of the "security dilemma" in international relations. If the U.S. withdraws, Japan and South Korea would need to strengthen their own military capabilities, which could become a threat to China and trigger an arms race across the region. On the other hand, maintaining the status quo perpetuates U.S. overextension and increases the risk of long-term hegemonic decline. This structural stalemate of "problem whether you act or not" is the inherent difficulty of the Strait of Hormuz issue. A solution requires the construction of a new multilateral security mechanism that transcends traditional bilateral alliance frameworks, but such institutional design is extremely difficult in the current international environment of intensifying U.S.-China rivalry.
📚 Patterns of History
1987: Tanker War (Kuwaiti reflagging operation during the Iran-Iraq War)
The security crisis in the Strait of Hormuz led to U.S. military intervention, with allies providing only limited support.
Structural similarity to the present: Crises in the Strait induce unilateral U.S. action, but the debate over "fair share of burden" for allies is repeated every time without resolution.
1990-91: Criticism of Japan's "Checkbook Diplomacy" in the Gulf War
Japan contributed $13 billion but was severely criticized by the U.S. for its lack of human contribution.
Structural similarity to the present: Financial contributions alone are not considered fulfilling an ally's responsibility; the demand for "boots on the ground" (presence on site) remains unchanged.
2001-03: Indian Ocean Refueling Activities during the Post-9/11 Wars in Afghanistan and Iraq
Japan attempted to meet U.S. demands with limited logistical support, specifically refueling activities in the Indian Ocean.
Structural similarity to the present: Japan consistently seeks a compromise of "maximum contribution within constitutional limits," but U.S. expectations rise with each iteration.
2019: Tanker Attacks in the Strait of Hormuz and the Formation of the Coalition of the Willing (Operation Sentinel)
The first Trump administration demanded allies dispatch naval vessels, and Japan responded with "independent information gathering activities," avoiding direct participation.
Structural similarity to the present: Each time a crisis occurs, the U.S. presses for burden sharing, but Japan repeats its "displacement tactic" of responding within its own framework. However, U.S. patience has its limits.
2023-24: Houthi Attacks on Red Sea Merchant Vessels and Operation "Prosperity Guardian"
Japan and South Korea did not directly participate in the U.S.-UK-led Red Sea security operation, and European involvement remained limited.
Structural similarity to the present: The collective action problem of maritime security shows no signs of resolution; instead, the problem is becoming more complex due to the diversification of threats (Hormuz + Red Sea).
Pattern Revealed by History
The pattern over the past 40 years is clear. Each time a crisis occurs in the Strait of Hormuz (or surrounding waters), the U.S. demands a "fair share of burden" from its allies, and allies, including Japan, respond with limited measures citing constitutional constraints or domestic politics, ultimately leading to the U.S. bearing the primary burden. This cycle has been repeated.
However, there are significant changes. First, the frequency and intensity of crises are increasing. From the 1987 Tanker War to the 2019 tanker attacks, the 2023 Houthi attacks, and now the 2026 UAE facility attack, the escalation ladder is steadily climbing. Second, U.S. patience is nearing its limit. For the post-shale revolution U.S., Middle East security is an activity "for others," not "for itself," making its justification increasingly difficult. Third, the international environment is becoming multipolar. With the rise of China, the Strait of Hormuz issue is no longer solely a matter for "the U.S. and its allies," yet a multipolar cooperation framework has not been established. The historical pattern suggests that if the same cycle continues, a discontinuous change where "the U.S. finally withdraws" could occur at some point, and 2026 could well be that turning point.
🔮 Next Scenarios
Diplomatic tensions temporarily rise following the UAE facility attack but do not escalate into full-scale military conflict. The Trump administration continues its pressure on Japan and South Korea, and both countries gradually expand their maritime presence in the Middle East, but do not fully meet U.S. demands, maintaining their "independent frameworks." Japan expands the scale of SDF information gathering activities in the Middle East (increasing to a two-destroyer system, expanding the scope of activities to near the Strait of Hormuz), and South Korea implements similar limited naval vessel dispatches.
Crude oil prices for Brent crude fluctuate in the range of $85-95 per barrel, exerting some downward pressure on the global economy but not leading to a stagflationary crisis. The UAE proceeds with facility repairs and resumes crude oil loading within a few weeks. However, rising insurance costs and reconsideration of transport routes advance, stimulating discussions on energy security in various countries.
China officially maintains "neutrality" on the Strait of Hormuz issue while discreetly urging Iran to refrain from excessive provocations. U.S.-China relations do not improve, but the Strait of Hormuz issue is prevented from sharpening into a new axis of conflict. As a result, the current unstable equilibrium is maintained, but fundamental problems (imbalance in burden sharing, lack of multilateral cooperation) remain unresolved.
Implications for Investment/Action: Japanese government's decision to expand SDF deployment to the Middle East, South Korean government's announcement of naval vessel dispatch, UAE facility restoration schedule, crude oil prices stabilizing in the $85 range.
The UAE facility attack delivers a strong shock to the international community, accelerating moves toward building a multilateral cooperation framework for the security of the Strait of Hormuz. Japan plays a leading role, announcing its participation in patrol activities around the Strait of Hormuz as part of an "Indo-Pacific Maritime Security Initiative" utilizing the Japan-U.S.-Australia-India (Quad) framework. This would alleviate some of the Trump administration's dissatisfaction while simultaneously enhancing Japan's international presence.
Furthermore, in response to the severity of the UAE facility attack, international pressure on Iran intensifies, prompting Iran to move to curb attacks by armed groups with which it is indirectly involved. This gradually eases tensions in the Strait of Hormuz, and crude oil prices converge to the $75-80 range.
The most optimistic development would be for this crisis to serve as a catalyst for discussions on a new international framework for the security of the Strait of Hormuz (e.g., a multilateral maritime security fund based on the beneficiary-pays principle). China and India could also participate as observers, potentially initiating a long-term process toward the "public good-ification of maritime security." However, this scenario requires political will and compromise from all involved nations, and its probability of realization is not high.
Implications for Investment/Action: Japan's expanded SDF deployment and announcement of participation in a multilateral framework, signals of softening Iranian diplomacy, stable decline in crude oil prices, reports of China considering observer participation.
The UAE facility attack triggers further escalation, leading to military clashes around the Strait of Hormuz. The Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps or its proxy forces carry out additional attacks, threatening Saudi Arabia's Ras Tanura oil terminal and Qatar's LNG facilities. The Trump administration hints at military retaliation against Iran, and tensions in the Persian Gulf rapidly escalate.
Crude oil prices for Brent crude exceed $120 per barrel, approaching levels seen during the 2022 Ukraine invasion. The global economy faces a risk of recession due to soaring energy costs, severely impacting the economies of energy-import-dependent Japan, South Korea, and Europe. Japan's inflation rate further rises, and yen depreciation pressure intensifies.
In alliance relations, President Trump threatens to "significantly increase the costs of stationing U.S. forces in Japan and South Korea if Japan and South Korea do not participate in the defense of the Strait of Hormuz," explicitly linking security and trade. The Japan-U.S. alliance faces its greatest post-war challenge, and calls for a fundamental review of security policy (expansion of counter-strike capabilities, acceleration of constitutional amendment discussions) grow louder within Japan. China seizes this chaos to strengthen its presence in the Taiwan Strait and the South China Sea, deteriorating the security environment across the entire Indo-Pacific. In the worst case, the Middle East crisis could link with an Indo-Pacific crisis, realizing a "two-front crisis."
Implications for Investment/Action: Additional oil facility attacks, Iranian military escalation (increased threatening actions in the Strait), crude oil prices breaking $100, President Trump's mention of increasing costs for U.S. forces in Japan, increased Chinese military activity in the South China Sea.
Notable Triggers
- UAE oil facility restoration status and presence of additional attacks: Late March to mid-April 2026
- Formal diplomatic request from the Trump administration to Japan regarding naval vessel dispatch: April to May 2026
- Cabinet decision on the Japanese government's policy for SDF dispatch to the Middle East: May to July 2026
- Crude oil price trends (whether Brent crude settles above $90): April to June 2026
- Trends in U.S.-Iran military escalation (direct conflict, additional sanctions, resumption of negotiations): March to June 2026
🔄 Tracking Loop
Next Trigger: UAE oil facility restoration status report — Official announcements in late March to early April 2026 will clarify the scale of the attack, identification of perpetrators, and restoration outlook, determining the direction of escalation.
Continuation of this pattern: Tracking Theme: Strait of Hormuz Security Burden Sharing Issue — The next milestone is a formal diplomatic request from the Trump administration to Japan (April-May 2026) and the Japanese government's decision on its response policy (Summer 2026).
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