Protracted Blockade of the Strait of Hormuz
The de facto blockade of the Strait of Hormuz, through which about 20% of the world's oil transport passes, has been protracted, causing crude oil prices to surge by over 40%. The Trump administration's lack of an exit strategy is making the worst energy crisis since the 1970s a reality.
── Understand in 3 points ─────────
- • Military operations by the United States and Israel against Iran are ongoing, and the Strait of Hormuz is de facto blockaded.
- • On March 11, 2026, President Trump stated, "We don't want to pull out quickly," suggesting long-term involvement.
- • WTI futures prices temporarily rose to over $95 per barrel, a surge of more than 40% compared to before the military operation.
── NOW PATTERN ─────────
The military overstretch of the United States and Iran's asymmetric retaliation are forming a spiral of conflict, establishing a structure where a chain of contagion spreads through the energy market to the entire global economy.
── Probabilities and Responses ──────
• Base case 50% — Changes in statements regarding an "exit" from within the Trump administration, changes in the frequency of military activities by the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps, the scale of increased production by Saudi Arabia and the UAE, and trends in Japan-U.S. energy security consultations.
• Bull case 20% — Reports of indirect contact between President Trump and Iran's Supreme Leader, mediation proposals by China, and shifts in public opinion if U.S. domestic gasoline prices exceed $5 per gallon.
• Bear case 30% — Reports of direct military clashes between the U.S. and Iran in the Strait of Hormuz, signs of Iranian nuclear tests or mass production of highly enriched uranium, intensification of Houthi attacks on Red Sea tankers, and crude oil prices breaking $120.
📡 Signal — What Happened
Why it matters: The de facto blockade of the Strait of Hormuz, through which about 20% of the world's oil transport passes, has been protracted, causing crude oil prices to surge by over 40%. The Trump administration's lack of an exit strategy is making the worst energy crisis since the 1970s a reality.
- Military Operations — Military operations by the United States and Israel against Iran are ongoing, and the Strait of Hormuz is de facto blockaded.
- Political Statement — On March 11, 2026, President Trump stated, "We don't want to pull out quickly," suggesting long-term involvement.
- Crude Oil Prices — WTI futures prices temporarily rose to over $95 per barrel, a surge of more than 40% compared to before the military operation.
- International Cooperation — IEA member countries decided on a coordinated release of oil reserves, but this has not been able to curb the rise in crude oil prices.
- Geographic Chokepoint — The Strait of Hormuz is the most critical chokepoint, through which approximately 20-25% of the world's seaborne oil transport passes.
- Market Sentiment — The fact that prices remain high despite reserve releases suggests that the market is pricing in a long-term supply disruption.
- Exit Strategy — No concrete roadmap or exit strategy has been presented for the conclusion of U.S. military operations.
- International Impact — Countries are taking the unusual step of releasing oil reserves due to concerns about energy security.
- Historical Levels — WTI prices in the $95 range are approaching levels seen during the early stages of the Russia-Ukraine war in 2022.
- Geopolitical Risk — Iran's retaliatory capabilities (missiles, mine-laying, attacks by proxy forces) increase the risk of a prolonged blockade of the strait.
- Economic Ripple Effect — Soaring crude oil prices risk reigniting inflationary pressures and affecting the monetary policies of central banks worldwide.
- Impact on Japan — Japan relies on the Middle East for approximately 90% of its crude oil imports, making a Strait of Hormuz blockade a direct threat to its energy security.
The de facto blockade of the Strait of Hormuz must be understood as the culmination of half a century of Middle Eastern geopolitics and U.S. energy hegemony strategy.
Since the 1979 Iranian Revolution, relations between the United States and Iran have been in a state of "hostile equilibrium." The Carter Doctrine (1980) declared the security of the Persian Gulf a core U.S. interest, and for over 40 years thereafter, the U.S. Navy's Fifth Fleet "managed" this maritime area. However, this equilibrium was beginning to unravel due to several structural changes.
The first change is America's shale revolution. The increase in shale oil and gas production that progressed in the 2010s made the United States the world's largest oil producer. This relatively reduced the strategic importance of the Strait of Hormuz for the United States. While "stable oil supply" was once the primary reason for involvement in the Persian Gulf, for an energy self-sufficient America, the calculation of "costs" and "benefits" of military commitment to the Middle East fundamentally changed. Paradoxically, this change lowered the "hurdle" for military action for the United States. Since its own oil supply is secured, the economic damage from a Strait of Hormuz blockade would be concentrated on its allies (Japan, South Korea, Europe, India).
The second change is Iran's nuclear development and expansion of regional hegemony. Following the 2015 JCPOA (Iran nuclear deal), its abandonment by the first Trump administration (2017-2021), and the stagnation of negotiations under the Biden administration, Iran's nuclear development steadily progressed. According to IAEA reports, Iran has accumulated near-weapons-grade enriched uranium, and its so-called "breakout time" (the time required to produce a nuclear weapon) is said to have shortened to a matter of weeks. Simultaneously, Iran has built a regional network called the "Axis of Resistance" through its influence over Hezbollah in Lebanon, the Houthis in Yemen, Shiite militia groups in Iraq, and its presence in Syria.
The third change is the Hamas attack on Israel in October 2023 and the subsequent Gaza War. This conflict spread throughout the Middle East, escalating into Houthi attacks on merchant vessels in the Red Sea, clashes between Hezbollah and Israel, and direct military exchanges between Iran and Israel. Iran's direct attack on Israel in April 2024 indicated that the "shadow war" between the two countries was transforming into open conflict.
The inauguration of the second Trump administration (January 2025 onwards) pushed these structural tensions to a critical point. The Trump administration revived its "maximum pressure" policy against Iran and, in close coordination with Israel's Netanyahu government, launched attacks on Iran's nuclear facilities and military infrastructure. This decision was backed by Israel's long-standing assertion that Iran's nuclear armament is an "unacceptable red line" and the influence of hawks within the Trump administration.
However, while initiating military operations may be relatively easy, ending them is extremely difficult. As lessons from the Iraq War (2003) and the Afghanistan War (2001) show, U.S. military interventions in the Middle East have always suffered from the structural problem of a "lack of an exit strategy." President Trump's statement, "We don't want to pull out quickly," precisely foreshadows a repetition of this historical pattern.
The blockade of the Strait of Hormuz is Iran's most effective means of "asymmetric retaliation." For Iran, which cannot confront the U.S.-Israel coalition with conventional military force, threatening the safety of navigation in the strait through mine-laying, harassment by small fast boats, and deployment of anti-ship missiles is a militarily rational strategy. The strait, only 33 km wide, becomes an extremely vulnerable chokepoint against modern anti-ship weaponry.
Historically, this situation is a recurrence of the "Tanker War" of the 1980s, while also possessing the structural characteristics of the 1973 oil crisis. That is, a pattern where military conflict and energy supply disruptions are linked, spreading throughout the global economy. The release of reserves by IEA member countries is a historic measure following the 1991 Gulf War, Hurricane Katrina in 2005, and the Libyan Civil War in 2011, but the current situation carries a higher risk of protraction than these precedents. This is because reserve releases are merely a measure to buy time and do not solve the fundamental supply problem (securing the safety of the strait).
The delta: The de facto blockade of the Strait of Hormuz has changed its nature from "temporary military tension" to a "long-term structural crisis." President Trump's statement is tantamount to a public admission of the absence of an exit strategy, and with the "last resort" of IEA reserve releases proving ineffective, the market is beginning to price in a prolonged supply disruption. This is not merely an energy crisis, but a structural turning point for the post-war Persian Gulf security regime itself.
🔍 Reading Between the Lines — What the News Isn't Saying
The biggest structural factor not being reported is the possibility that the Trump administration is strategically tolerating the "damage" from the Hormuz blockade. The U.S. has established self-sufficiency through shale oil, and soaring crude oil prices bring enormous profits to its domestic shale industry. In other words, an asymmetric structure exists where the more allies (Japan, Europe, South Korea) suffer from an energy crisis, the more competitive U.S. LNG exports and shale oil become. While IEA reserve releases are reported as "ineffective," it should be noted that the U.S., as the largest oil producer, has not seriously committed to increasing production to drive down prices. The Hormuz crisis is a "cost-free pressure" for the U.S., and this is the true reason for the absence of an exit strategy.
NOW PATTERN
Overstretch of Power × Spiral of Conflict × Chain of Contagion
The military overstretch of the United States and Iran's asymmetric retaliation are forming a spiral of conflict, establishing a structure where a chain of contagion spreads through the energy market to the entire global economy.
Intersection of Dynamics
The three dynamics of "Overstretch of Power," "Spiral of Conflict," and "Chain of Contagion" form a self-amplifying system that mutually reinforces itself.
First, the overstretch of power drives the spiral of conflict. By projecting excessive military force, the United States compels Iran to respond with asymmetric escalation (Hormuz blockade), which in turn justifies further U.S. military involvement. The Trump administration's stance of "not pulling out quickly" signifies the absence of a brake on this spiral.
Next, the spiral of conflict amplifies the chain of contagion. Each stage of military escalation pushes up risk premiums in the energy market, increases financial market volatility, and expands the damage to the real economy. The limited effectiveness of IEA reserve releases is precisely because the market anticipates further escalation of the spiral of conflict.
Furthermore, the chain of contagion accelerates the overstretch of power. Soaring crude oil prices benefit the U.S. shale industry, creating an incentive for some stakeholders to maintain the status quo. Simultaneously, the economic distress of allies strengthens a dependency structure where they "have no choice but to rely on America," seemingly increasing U.S. influence in the short term. However, this is not sustainable. Allies will accelerate the diversification of energy procurement and reduce reliance on the Middle East in the medium to long term, ultimately undermining the legitimacy of the U.S.-led security system.
The most dangerous aspect at the intersection of these three dynamics is the emergence of a situation where "no one has an incentive to stop the spiral." The U.S. cannot withdraw due to domestic political considerations, Iran continues its resistance for regime survival, oil-producing nations welcome high prices, and energy companies profit. The consumers in oil-importing countries and developing nations bear the losses, but they lack the power to stop the conflict. This structural "failure of coordination" makes the protraction of the crisis inevitable.
📚 History of Patterns
1973: First Oil Crisis (OAPEC Oil Embargo)
Military conflict in the Middle East (Fourth Middle East War) led to the weaponization of energy supply, dealing a severe blow to the global economy. The oil embargo by oil-producing countries was the first large-scale instance of energy being used as a "weapon" for political purposes.
Structural similarities with the present: Disruptions in energy supply, even if short-lived, have the power to fundamentally alter the global economy. After the oil crisis, developed nations responded by establishing the IEA and creating reserve systems, but the fundamental structure of Middle East dependence was not resolved.
1980-1988: Iran-Iraq War "Tanker War"
Military conflict in the Persian Gulf escalated into attacks on merchant ships and tankers, threatening the safety of navigation in the Strait of Hormuz. The U.S. Navy's escort operation (Operation Earnest Will) permanently entrenched American military involvement in the Gulf.
Structural similarities with the present: Military intervention in the Persian Gulf tends to become protracted even if it begins as a "temporary measure." The Tanker War lasted eight years and led to the establishment of a permanent U.S. Navy presence. Once a military commitment begins, it cannot be easily disengaged.
1990-1991: Gulf War and Kuwaiti Oil Field Fires
The multinational coalition's intervention against Iraq's invasion of Kuwait brought swift military victory, but the Iraq problem remained "unresolved" until a renewed intervention 12 years later (2003). The IEA's first reserve release was implemented but did not lead to a fundamental solution.
Structural similarities with the present: The "success" of military operations creates new problems. The Iraq sanctions regime after the Gulf War lasted 12 years, ultimately leading to further overstretch in the form of the Iraq War (2003). Short-term military success can be the gateway to long-term strategic failure.
2003-2011: Iraq War and Prolonged Occupation
The preemptive attack based on "weapons of mass destruction" succeeded in regime change in a short period, but the subsequent occupation and nation-building took over eight years, incurring trillions of dollars in costs and hundreds of thousands of casualties. The absence of an exit strategy was pointed out from the very beginning.
Structural similarities with the present: Military intervention in the Middle East proved the iron rule that "it's easy to start, difficult to end." Intervention without a clear exit strategy becomes a quagmire, imposing costs far exceeding the initial objectives. This lesson directly applies to the current Iran operation.
2019: Saudi Aramco Oil Facility Attack
Drone and missile attacks by Iran-backed Houthis directly hit Saudi Arabian oil facilities, temporarily disrupting about 5% of global oil supply. Crude oil prices surged 15% in a single day, exposing the vulnerability of Middle Eastern energy infrastructure.
Structural similarities with the present: Modern asymmetric weapons (drones, cruise missiles) have the capability to disrupt global energy supply at low cost. This was a precedent demonstrating that Iran possesses sufficient technical capability to "blockade" the Strait of Hormuz.
Patterns Revealed by History
The history of military conflicts and energy crises in the Persian Gulf over the past 50 years reveals a surprisingly consistent pattern. First, military interventions are always conceived as "short, decisive battles" but in reality become protracted. Second, international responses to energy supply disruptions (reserve releases, calls for increased production) are merely temporary mitigation measures and do not solve structural problems. Third, each crisis leaves behind lessons of "never again," but these lessons are forgotten by the next generation of policymakers.
Particularly noteworthy is that technological evolution is not changing this pattern, but rather exacerbating it. As the 2019 Aramco attack demonstrated, inexpensive drones and cruise missiles can easily destroy billions of dollars worth of energy infrastructure. The asymmetric weapons possessed by Iran enable it to maintain a blockade of the Strait of Hormuz at low cost.
History suggests that the current crisis could last for at least several months, and in the worst case, several years. Its resolution will not be achieved through military victory, but only through some form of political compromise, yet the preconditions for such a compromise are lacking in the current U.S.-Iran relationship.
🔮 Next Scenarios
Military operations will continue until the summer of 2026, with the full resumption of navigation in the Strait of Hormuz delayed until autumn 2026 or later. The United States will continue limited airstrikes against Iranian nuclear facilities and military infrastructure but will not conduct a ground invasion. Iran will continue sporadic disruptive activities through mine-laying and proxy forces, and the safety of the strait will not be fully restored. Crude oil prices will fluctuate in the WTI $85-$100 range. IEA member countries will conduct an additional 1-2 rounds of reserve releases by the end of Q2, but the price-depressing effect will be limited. Saudi Arabia and the UAE will respond with increased production, but export routes that bypass the Strait of Hormuz (such as Red Sea pipelines) have capacity constraints. As for the impact on the global economy, global GDP growth for 2026 will be pushed down by 0.3-0.5 percentage points, and inflation rates in major countries will rise by 1-2 percentage points. The Japanese economy will face a worsening trade balance and downward pressure on the yen, forcing the Bank of Japan to reconsider the pace of monetary policy normalization. Politically, ceasefire negotiations will begin discreetly around summer 2026, but the Trump administration's political calculation of "not wanting to show weakness" and Iran's stance of "not yielding" will delay negotiations. Ultimately, escalation will gradually de-escalate through some implicit understanding (a package of certain restrictions on Iran's nuclear development and sanctions relief), but this will be a matter for late 2026 or beyond.
Implications for Investment/Action: Changes in statements regarding an "exit" from within the Trump administration, changes in the frequency of military activities by the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps, the scale of increased production by Saudi Arabia and the UAE, and trends in Japan-U.S. energy security consultations.
A diplomatic breakthrough is found unexpectedly early (April-May 2026). Potential catalysts for this include active mediation by China or India, a shift in U.S. domestic public opinion towards anti-war sentiment (especially voter dissatisfaction with soaring gasoline prices), or the rise of moderates within Iran. The possibility that President Trump will exercise his "dealmaker" instincts and make a dramatic shift cannot be ruled out. Like the U.S.-North Korea summit in 2018, Trump has a surprising willingness to engage in direct negotiations with adversarial nations. If a "grand bargain" with Iran (a package agreement on nuclear development restrictions, sanctions relief, and regional stabilization) is achieved, navigation in the Strait of Hormuz would normalize relatively quickly. Crude oil prices would plummet to the WTI $70s, and the impact on the global economy would remain limited. IEA reserves would be preserved, maintaining preparedness for future crises. Energy security for Asian countries, including Japan, would recover, but the experience of this crisis would irreversibly accelerate policy shifts towards decoupling from Middle East dependence. However, the realization of this scenario requires multiple favorable conditions to align simultaneously, making it unlikely at present. In particular, as long as the influence of hawks within the Trump administration (especially national security advisors) remains strong, an early diplomatic solution will be difficult.
Implications for Investment/Action: Reports of indirect contact between President Trump and Iran's Supreme Leader, mediation proposals by China, and shifts in public opinion if U.S. domestic gasoline prices exceed $5 per gallon.
Military escalation further intensifies, and the crisis protracts beyond 2027. Specifically, Iran actually completely blockades the Strait of Hormuz with mines, and military clashes (attacks on vessels or casualties among U.S. personnel) occur during U.S. Navy mine-sweeping operations. This would raise public sentiment for "retaliation" within the U.S., leading to an expansion of the operation's scale. Attacks by Iran's proxy forces also intensify. The Houthis escalate tanker attacks in the Red Sea, Hezbollah carries out large-scale attacks on northern Israel, and Shiite militias in Iraq attack U.S. military bases. The entire Middle East takes on the appearance of a "multi-front conflict," and energy supply disruptions expand to multiple chokepoints. Crude oil prices surge to WTI $120-$150, and the global economy falls into stagflation (inflation during a recession). Central banks worldwide are forced to raise interest rates, and financial markets decline significantly. Japan, South Korea, India, and Europe, which are highly dependent on energy imports, suffer severe economic damage. In Japan, the current account balance could fall into deficit, leading to a vicious cycle of yen depreciation and import-driven inflation. In an even worse scenario, Iran could embark on the "final stage" of nuclear weapons development, attempting to establish nuclear possession as a fait accompli. This could lead to a fundamental transformation of the international security order, including nuclear proliferation across the Middle East (Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Egypt considering nuclear armament).
Implications for Investment/Action: Reports of direct military clashes between the U.S. and Iran in the Strait of Hormuz, signs of Iranian nuclear tests or mass production of highly enriched uranium, intensification of Houthi attacks on Red Sea tankers, and crude oil prices breaking $120.
Key Triggers to Watch
- Official statement from the Trump administration regarding the objectives and timeline of military operations: March-April 2026
- Decision by IEA member countries on additional reserve releases or reports of sharp declines in reserves: April-June 2026
- Direct military clashes between the U.S. Navy and the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps in the Strait of Hormuz: March-June 2026
- WTI futures prices breaking $100 or plummeting to the $70s: March-May 2026
- Mediation proposals between Iran and the U.S. by China or India: April-August 2026
🔄 Tracking Loop
Next Trigger: IEA Extraordinary Ministerial Meeting (scheduled for April 2026) — The scale of additional reserve releases and the cooperative stance of member countries will be a watershed moment determining market direction.
Continuation of this pattern: Tracking Theme: Hormuz Strait Crisis and Crude Oil Price Trends — The next milestones are whether WTI breaks $100 and signs of U.S.-Iran ceasefire negotiations (continuous monitoring until summer 2026).
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