Strait of Hormuz Ship Deployment Issue —
As the US pressures its allies to share the burden of securing the Strait of Hormuz, through which approximately 20% of the world's crude oil passes, an attack on a UAE oil export hub has materialized, instantly exposing the vulnerability of energy supply. This is not merely a military issue but a structural turning point that questions the sustainability of the US security umbrella, a cornerstone of the post-war international order.
── Understand in 3 points ─────────
- • President Trump criticized Japan, China, and South Korea by name as "not proactive" regarding naval dispatch to the Strait of Hormuz.
- • The US continues Freedom of Navigation Operations, deploying naval vessels, including a carrier strike group, around the Strait of Hormuz.
- • A world-leading crude oil export hub in the UAE (United Arab Emirates) was attacked, halting crude oil loading operations.
── NOW PATTERN ─────────
US hegemony fatigue and the free-rider structure of its allies have reached their limits, and a "failure of coordination" is materializing at the Strait of Hormuz, a critical choke point for the global economy. "Path dependency" on the post-war 80-year security system hinders change, and alliance fissures are creating a dangerous vacuum.
── Probabilities and Responses ──────
• Base case 50% — Announcement of accelerated increase in Japan's defense spending, expansion of Maritime Self-Defense Force (MSDF) dispatch to the Middle East, revitalization of bilateral security consultations between the US and various countries, stabilization of crude oil prices at $80-90 per barrel.
• Bull case 20% — Japan's proposal of a multilateral maritime security initiative, commencement of joint patrols by multiple countries, announcement of concrete policies for energy procurement diversification, positive US response.
• Bear case 30% — Intensification of Iranian military exercises in the Strait of Hormuz, attacks on multiple Gulf infrastructures, crude oil prices breaking $100, official announcement of reduced US military presence in the Middle East, explicit link between stationing costs and trade negotiations.
📡 THE SIGNAL — What Happened
Why it's important: As the US pressures its allies to share the burden of securing the Strait of Hormuz, through which approximately 20% of the world's crude oil passes, an attack on a UAE oil export hub has materialized, instantly exposing the vulnerability of energy supply. This is not merely a military issue but a structural turning point that questions the sustainability of the US security umbrella, a cornerstone of the post-war international order.
- Diplomacy — President Trump criticized Japan, China, and South Korea by name as "not proactive" regarding naval dispatch to the Strait of Hormuz.
- Military — The US continues Freedom of Navigation Operations, deploying naval vessels, including a carrier strike group, around the Strait of Hormuz.
- Energy — A world-leading crude oil export hub in the UAE (United Arab Emirates) was attacked, halting crude oil loading operations.
- Economy — The Strait of Hormuz is a critical choke point through which approximately 20-21% of the world's seaborne crude oil passes.
- Security — Japan has dispatched a destroyer to the Middle East for intelligence gathering activities, but this does not meet the level requested by the United States.
- Geopolitics — The security environment in the Persian Gulf region is deteriorating amidst ongoing Houthi attacks on merchant vessels in the Red Sea.
- Diplomacy — China is strengthening economic ties with Gulf states through its Belt and Road Initiative but remains reluctant to engage militarily.
- Economy — South Korea depends on the Middle East for about 70% of its crude oil imports, making the security of the Strait of Hormuz a vital interest.
- Market — Reports of the attack on the UAE oil hub caused upward pressure on crude oil futures prices.
- Security — US "burden-sharing" demands are expanding to East Asian allies, following a similar pattern to those made to NATO allies.
- Diplomacy — The Japanese government shows a willingness to contribute to stability in the Middle East but is cautious about expanding military involvement due to constitutional constraints.
- Geopolitics — Regional military tensions have not subsided even after the normalization of relations between Saudi Arabia and Iran (mediated by China in 2023).
The security issue surrounding the Strait of Hormuz is fundamental to the post-World War II international order led by the United States. Since the "Quincy Agreement" signed in 1945 between President Franklin Roosevelt and King Abdulaziz ibn Saud of Saudi Arabia, the US has been responsible for the security of Middle Eastern oil supplies, and in return, has maintained the status of the dollar as the key currency and its hegemony in the energy market. This "oil, dollar, and security" triangle was the economic foundation of Pax Americana.
The Iranian Revolution in 1979 and the outbreak of the Iran-Iraq War the following year brought the first major test to this structure. The "Carter Doctrine," announced by President Carter in 1980, designated any external force's attempt to gain control of the Persian Gulf region as a threat to US vital interests, declaring that the US would use military force if necessary. In response, Central Command (CENTCOM) was established in 1983, and for over 40 years since, the US military has maintained a constant presence in the Persian Gulf.
However, this structure underwent a fundamental transformation in the 2010s. The Shale Revolution made the US the world's largest oil producer, dramatically reducing its dependence on Middle Eastern oil. By 2019, the US became a net energy exporter, and its direct economic interest in the security of the Strait of Hormuz significantly receded. Meanwhile, major Asian economies such as Japan, South Korea, China, and India continued to increase their dependence on Middle Eastern oil. Japan relies on the Middle East for approximately 90% of its crude oil imports, most of which pass through the Strait of Hormuz. South Korea also depends on the Middle East for about 70%, and China for about 50%.
This asymmetry is the structural background to President Trump's current dissatisfaction. The question, "Why don't the countries that benefit the most bear the cost of security?" holds a certain legitimacy from an economic rationality perspective. President Trump has consistently pointed out the "free-rider" problem among allies since his first term (2017-2021), but this is not merely his personal ideology; it reflects a structural shift in perception increasingly shared across the US strategic community.
Since the "Pivot to Asia (rebalance)" policy during the Obama administration, US strategic interest has shifted from the Middle East to the Indo-Pacific. The Biden administration also carried out the withdrawal from Afghanistan and prioritized strategic competition with China. A second Trump administration would further accelerate this trend, intensifying demands for burden-sharing from allies under the "America First" principle.
Further complicating the issue are the geopolitical changes in the Middle East itself. The normalization of diplomatic relations between Saudi Arabia and Iran in 2023, mediated by China, symbolized the relative decline of US influence in the Middle East. At the same time, destabilizing factors in the region continue to increase, including Houthi attacks on merchant vessels in the Red Sea, the prolonged Israel-Gaza conflict, and Iran's nuclear development program.
The attack on the UAE's oil export hub is a symbolic event where this structural vulnerability materialized as a real risk. UAE's Fujairah port and Ruwais industrial complex play crucial roles as loading points for crude oil and petroleum products worldwide, and an attack here would directly impact the global energy supply chain. There have been precedents, such as sabotage against merchant vessels off Fujairah in 2019 and drone attacks on Saudi Arabia's Abqaiq oil facilities.
For Japan, this issue presents a profoundly serious dilemma. The triple challenge of maintaining the alliance with the US, not harming good relations with Middle Eastern countries, and expanding military contributions within constitutional constraints is a recurrence of a fundamental dilemma in post-war Japanese diplomacy. When the Abe administration decided to dispatch the Maritime Self-Defense Force to the Middle East in 2019-2020, it used the pretext of "survey and research" to maintain a distinction from the exercise of collective self-defense, but the gap with the level requested by the US was clear.
The delta: As US demands for burden-sharing from allies shift from rhetoric to substantive pressure, the attack on the UAE oil hub dramatically heightened its urgency. This transformed the question of "who protects the sea lanes" from a hypothetical discussion into a real policy challenge.
🔍 BETWEEN THE LINES — What the News Isn't Saying
The true intention behind President Trump's criticism of Japan, China, and South Korea "in the same breath" is not a security demand on allies, but rather to build leverage in trade negotiations. The Strait of Hormuz issue is subtly linked to semiconductor and automobile tariff negotiations, where the implicit threat of "removing the security umbrella" is used to raise trade terms. The timing of the UAE oil hub attack coinciding with intensified US pressure on Japan is not accidental; there is a structural dynamic where regional instability itself enhances US negotiating power. Although not officially stated, for the US, "moderate instability" in the Strait of Hormuz can also be an effective tool to keep allies compliant.
NOW PATTERN
Alliance Strain × Failure of Coordination × Path Dependency
US hegemony fatigue and the free-rider structure of its allies have reached their limits, and a "failure of coordination" is materializing at the Strait of Hormuz, a critical choke point for the global economy. "Path dependency" on the post-war 80-year security system hinders change, and alliance fissures are creating a dangerous vacuum.
Intersection of Dynamics
The three structural dynamics of "alliance strain," "failure of coordination," and "path dependency" mutually reinforce each other, making the current crisis even more severe. First, "path dependency" structurally entrenches the "failure of coordination." Japan and South Korea's 80-year reliance on US security has left them without independent Middle East security capabilities to this day. This lack of capability makes it difficult to substantively respond to US demands for burden-sharing, thus entrenching the failure of coordination. In other words, a classic pattern of path dependency is at work, where past rational choices narrow current options.
Next, the "failure of coordination" accelerates "alliance strain." If countries continue free-rider behavior, US dissatisfaction will accumulate and escalate into public criticism and more substantive retaliatory measures (trade pressure, conditional security commitments). This further erodes the reliability of alliance relationships, leading allies to perceive the US security umbrella as "unreliable." However, due to path dependency, these countries lack alternatives, leaving them in a state of uncertainty.
Furthermore, a vicious cycle exists where "alliance strain" creates new "failures of coordination." If the US unilaterally reduces its burden, competition among regional countries will intensify over the resulting security vacuum. Iran will strengthen its control over the Strait of Hormuz, Saudi Arabia and the UAE will accelerate their own military buildup, and China will seek to position itself as an "alternative security provider." In this multipolar security environment, bilateral transactional relationships will replace multilateral coordination mechanisms, making the maintenance of sea lane security as a public good even more difficult.
The most dangerous scenario is when these three dynamics simultaneously reach a critical point. If alliance fissures become irreparable, coordination frameworks completely collapse, and the Strait of Hormuz is actually blockaded in a state where no alternatives are prepared due to path dependency, the impact on the global economy would be immeasurable. The attack on the UAE oil hub should be understood as a "preview" of such a scenario.
📚 PATTERN HISTORY
1956: Suez Crisis
Withdrawal of external powers (UK, France) and regional security vacuum
Structural similarities with the current situation: After the UK and France withdrew from the Suez Canal, regional security was reorganized along the lines of US-Soviet rivalry. The withdrawal of a hegemonic power creates a vacuum, and the search for a new power balance is accompanied by long-term instability.
1973: First Oil Crisis (OAPEC Oil Embargo)
Geopolitical weaponization of energy supply and vulnerability of dependent nations
Structural similarities with the current situation: Middle Eastern oil-producing countries used oil as a political weapon, and developed countries, including Japan, faced a severe energy crisis. While Japan developed an oil stockpiling system based on this lesson, the fundamental structural dependence on the Middle East remained unchanged.
1987-88: Tanker War ("Operation Earnest Will" during the Iran-Iraq War)
US escort of merchant vessels and burden-sharing demands on allies
Structural similarities with the current situation: In response to attacks on merchant vessels in the Persian Gulf, the US escorted Kuwaiti-flagged tankers under the US flag. Even then, allied military contributions were limited, and the US effectively bore the burden of maritime security alone.
2019: Strait of Hormuz Tanker Attacks and Coalition of the Willing Concept
US call for multilateral coordination and limited allied participation
Structural similarities with the current situation: Despite attacks on Japan-related tankers, Japan responded not as part of a coalition of the willing but with its own intelligence gathering activities. The pattern of coordination failure was repeated.
2024-25: Houthi Attacks on Red Sea Merchant Vessels and "Operation Prosperity Guardian"
Sea lane attacks by non-state actors and delayed international response
Structural similarities with the current situation: The international community's response to Houthi attacks was fragmented, forcing commercial shipping in the Red Sea to reroute significantly. It demonstrated that multilateral deterrence against non-state actor attacks is not functioning.
Patterns Revealed by History
Historical patterns reveal three structural lessons. First, the "exhaustion and withdrawal of hegemonic powers" in sea lane security is a recurring phenomenon, each time leading to a security vacuum and regional instability. Just as the UK and France withdrew from the Suez Crisis in 1956 and the US and Soviet Union stepped in, the succession of hegemony does not proceed peacefully. Second, the pattern of path dependency, where energy-dependent nations declare "de-dependence" during crises but fail to achieve structural transformation, has been repeated for over 50 years since the 1973 oil crisis. Japan promoted energy conservation and nuclear power after the oil crisis, but its dependence on the Middle East has ultimately not changed significantly from the 1970s. Third, the pattern of US demands for burden-sharing from allies and the limited response from those allies has fundamentally remained unchanged from the Tanker War in the 1980s to the present. What has changed is the US's own declining interest in the Middle East and the accompanying increased urgency of its demands. History teaches that this type of structural imbalance is unsustainable in the long term and will, at some point, lead to a rapid adjustment (crisis).
🔮 WHAT'S NEXT
The US maintains its military presence in the Strait of Hormuz while gradually intensifying pressure on allies. Japan responds by accelerating defense spending increases and expanding MSDF activities in the Middle East (upgrading from intelligence gathering to patrol activities), and South Korea also agrees to limited naval dispatch. China continues to refuse military involvement but seeks "invisible contributions" (economic aid, diplomatic mediation) through bilateral negotiations. The attack on the UAE oil hub is identified as being carried out by the Houthis or their supporting forces, leading to international condemnation but no full-scale military retaliation. Crude oil prices temporarily rise but stabilize due to Saudi Arabia's spare production capacity and SPR (Strategic Petroleum Reserve) releases. However, the fundamental security structural issues remain unresolved, serving only as a temporary reprieve until the "next crisis." In Japan, discussions on reviewing security legislation reignite, but no significant policy changes occur before the 2027 House of Councillors election. In this "gradual response" scenario, countries continue to postpone structural problems while making minimal concessions, and risks slowly accumulate.
Implications for Investment/Action: Announcement of accelerated increase in Japan's defense spending, expansion of MSDF dispatch to the Middle East, revitalization of bilateral security consultations between the US and various countries, stabilization of crude oil prices at $80-90 per barrel.
The attack on the UAE oil hub functions as "shock therapy," prompting concerned countries to seriously move towards establishing a multilateral maritime security framework. An "Asia-version Maritime Security Initiative" is proposed, led by Japan, and a multilateral escort system involving naval vessels from Japan, South Korea, India, and Australia is realized. Even without formal participation, China establishes de facto cooperation through its own merchant vessel escort activities. The US welcomes this development, deeming it a success in balancing its own burden reduction with alliance strengthening. Simultaneously, Japan seizes this crisis as an opportunity to accelerate the diversification of its energy procurement sources, gradually reducing its dependence on the Middle East. This includes expanding GX (Green Transformation) investments, securing long-term contracts for LNG procurement from Australia and Canada, and accelerating the restart of nuclear power plants. Across the region, a culture of "self-help efforts" begins to take root in both energy security and military security. For this scenario to materialize, political leaders in each country need the resolve to accept short-term political costs, and the US needs the flexibility to shift from zero-sum pressure to win-win cooperation.
Implications for Investment/Action: Japan's proposal of a multilateral maritime security initiative, commencement of joint patrols by multiple countries, announcement of concrete policies for energy procurement diversification, positive US response.
Alliance fissures and failures of coordination accelerate, further deteriorating the security environment in the Strait of Hormuz. As the US hints at a gradual withdrawal from the Persian Gulf, Iran or its proxy forces intensify demonstrative actions in the Strait of Hormuz, leading to frequent harassment and inspections of merchant vessels. The attack on the UAE oil hub is revealed to be merely the first in a series, with other critical infrastructures such as Saudi Arabia's Ras Tanura oil terminal also targeted. Crude oil prices exceed $120 per barrel, and the global economy faces the risk of stagflation (inflation during a recession). The Japanese economy is hit by a double whammy of high crude oil prices and yen depreciation, leading to a sharp increase in its trade deficit. President Trump criticizes allies' "inaction" even more strongly, linking it to the issue of stationing costs for US forces in Japan and South Korea, and applying comprehensive pressure. In the worst-case scenario, the US explicitly links security provision with trade access, proposing a blatant deal: "impose additional tariffs on countries that do not increase defense spending." In this scenario, the principle of "separation of economy and security," a foundation of the post-war liberal international order, collapses, forcing countries to adapt to an era of "transactions based on power." Japan faces a simultaneous crisis in economic security and military security, potentially leading to political and social turmoil.
Implications for Investment/Action: Intensification of Iranian military exercises in the Strait of Hormuz, attacks on multiple Gulf infrastructures, crude oil prices breaking $100, official announcement of reduced US military presence in the Middle East, explicit link between stationing costs and trade negotiations.
Key Triggers to Watch
- Deliberation trends of bills in the US Congress to review military presence in the Persian Gulf: April-June 2026
- Agenda setting of the Strait of Hormuz issue and content of the joint statement at the Japan-US summit: April-May 2026 (at the next summit meeting)
- Identification of the perpetrator of the UAE oil hub attack and the international community's response: March-April 2026
- Whether crude oil prices (WTI, Brent) break through $100 per barrel: March-June 2026
- Presence or absence of a cabinet decision by the Japanese government to expand MSDF dispatch to the Middle East: April-September 2026
🔄 TRACKING LOOP
Next Trigger: Japan-US Summit (scheduled April-May 2026) — How the Strait of Hormuz issue and trade issues are packaged will determine the future direction of the alliance.
Continuation of this Pattern: Tracking Theme: Future of Multilateral Framework for Strait of Hormuz Security — The next milestone is the agenda setting of maritime security at the G7 Summit in summer 2026.
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