Strait of Hormuz Crisis and Trump's "Bur
The de facto blockade of the Strait of Hormuz, through which approximately 20% of the world's oil transport passes, would shake the entire global economy through a surge in energy prices. President Trump's unusual move of demanding that China and NATO dispatch escort vessels signifies the advent of a "compound crisis" where security burden-sharing issues and an energy crisis erupt simultaneously.
── Understand in 3 points ─────────
- • Iran has de facto blockaded the Strait of Hormuz, causing significant disruption to international maritime transport.
- • President Trump demanded that China dispatch warships to secure the Strait of Hormuz.
- • President Trump also demanded military contributions from NATO member states for vessel escort.
── NOW PATTERN ─────────
The vicious cycle where the U.S.'s "burden sharing" demands accelerate alliance fissures, and these fissures make coordinated responses to the energy crisis difficult, is structurally prolonging the Strait of Hormuz crisis.
── Probabilities and Responses ──────
• Base case 50% — Announcement of small-scale vessel dispatch by NATO member states, increased frequency of "dialogue promotion" statements by the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, continuation of Iran's pattern of selective transit obstruction (not a complete blockade), reports of secret contacts between the U.S. and Iran.
• Bull case 20% — Announcement of a summit-level meeting between China and Iran, Iran's expression of intent to return to nuclear negotiations, statements by the Trump administration regarding "conditional easing" of sanctions, a sharp drop in crude oil prices (below $80 per barrel).
• Bear case 30% — Accidental military clashes in the Strait of Hormuz (e.g., contact incidents between Iranian fast boats and U.S. warships), signs of Iranian mine-laying, attacks on Saudi Arabian oil facilities, a surge in crude oil prices above $130 per barrel, announcement of coordinated release of strategic petroleum reserves.
📡 The Signal — What Happened
Why it matters: The de facto blockade of the Strait of Hormuz, through which approximately 20% of the world's oil transport passes, would shake the entire global economy through a surge in energy prices. President Trump's unusual move of demanding that China and NATO dispatch escort vessels signifies the advent of a "compound crisis" where security burden-sharing issues and an energy crisis erupt simultaneously.
- Military & Security — Iran has de facto blockaded the Strait of Hormuz, causing significant disruption to international maritime transport.
- Diplomacy — President Trump demanded that China dispatch warships to secure the Strait of Hormuz.
- Diplomacy — President Trump also demanded military contributions from NATO member states for vessel escort.
- Energy — The Strait of Hormuz is the most critical chokepoint, through which approximately 20-21% of the world's oil transport passes.
- Economy — The blockade of the strait has caused crude oil prices to surge, expanding its impact on the global economy.
- Geopolitics — China is the largest importer of oil passing through the Strait of Hormuz, importing approximately 9 million barrels of crude oil per day from the Middle East.
- Security — The U.S. maintains its Fifth Fleet permanently stationed in the Persian Gulf, but there are limits to defending the strait alone.
- Diplomacy — Many NATO member states have not met the 2% GDP defense spending target, and the Trump administration has traditionally demanded increased contributions.
- Energy — Japan relies on the Middle East for approximately 80% of its energy imports, almost all of which pass through the Strait of Hormuz.
- Economy — A prolonged blockade of the strait would also affect LNG (liquefied natural gas) supply, impacting gas prices in Europe and Asia.
- Military — Iran has concentrated asymmetric forces such as anti-ship missiles, mines, fast attack craft, and drones around the strait.
- Diplomacy — China has traditionally avoided military involvement in the Middle East and has been criticized as a "free rider."
The strategic importance of the Strait of Hormuz has grown with the rise of oil civilization in the 20th century. This waterway, only about 33 kilometers wide, is the "artery of the global economy," channeling oil and gas from the Persian Gulf's oil-producing nations—Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Kuwait, UAE, and Qatar—to the world market. Approximately 17 to 21 million barrels of crude oil pass through here daily, accounting for about one-third of global seaborne oil transport and about 20% of global oil consumption.
Tensions surrounding this strait are not new. During the "Tanker War" of the Iran-Iraq War in the 1980s, both countries attacked tankers passing through the Persian Gulf, and the U.S. conducted "Operation Earnest Will" in 1987-88, escorting Kuwaiti tankers flying the U.S. flag. The lesson learned then was that securing the strait's safety is difficult for a single nation, and international cooperation is indispensable.
In 2019, a series of tanker attacks, attributed to Iran or its proxies, led to the launch of the U.S.-led "International Maritime Security Construct (IMSC)." However, major NATO member states like France and Germany did not participate in this coalition, quickly exposing the limitations of a "coalition of the willing."
The direct background to the current crisis lies in the Trump administration's Iran policy. During his first term in 2018, President Trump withdrew from the Iran nuclear deal (JCPOA) and launched a "maximum pressure" campaign. In his second term, he continued and intensified this approach, imposing sanctions that effectively brought Iran's oil exports to zero. In response, Iran chose to blockade the Strait of Hormuz as a "trump card" for its own survival. Ali Fadavi, commander of the IRGC Navy, had warned for years, "If we cannot export oil, no one can," and his words have now become reality.
There are multiple structural factors behind President Trump's pressure on China and NATO. First, the improvement in U.S. energy self-sufficiency. The shale revolution has made the U.S. the world's largest oil producer, dramatically reducing its dependence on the Strait of Hormuz. Only about 10% of the crude oil imported by the U.S. originates from the Middle East. In contrast, China relies on Persian Gulf nations for approximately 40% of its crude oil imports, with about 9 million barrels per day passing through the Strait of Hormuz. The Trump administration's logic is that "the biggest beneficiaries should bear the biggest burden."
Second, there is President Trump's consistent philosophy of "alliance burden sharing." Since his first term, he has argued that "NATO is freeloading" and that "Japan and South Korea should bear more of the costs of stationed U.S. forces." The Strait of Hormuz crisis presents an excellent opportunity to apply this philosophy to Middle East security as well. Many NATO member states, despite their reliance on energy imports from the Middle East, have limited military presence in the Persian Gulf.
Third, there is the structural rivalry in U.S.-China relations. The Trump administration has positioned China as a "strategic competitor" and has intensified pressure through trade wars, technology regulations, and the Taiwan issue. The demand on China regarding the Strait of Hormuz is not merely a maritime security issue; it is also a geopolitical maneuver to compel China to assume the role of a "responsible great power" while simultaneously testing the capabilities and intentions of the Chinese navy.
However, this strategy contains an inherent paradox. If the Chinese navy advances into the Persian Gulf, it could challenge the U.S.'s maritime hegemony in the Middle East, which has been maintained for over 70 years. Furthermore, moves to test NATO's cohesion risk widening alliance fissures amidst Russia's ongoing invasion of Ukraine. President Trump's "transactional diplomacy" may elicit short-term concessions from allies, but in the long term, it carries the danger of undermining the U.S.-led security order itself.
The delta: The point where President Trump is attempting to shift the responsibility for securing the Strait of Hormuz from "U.S. sole responsibility" to "responsibility of all beneficiaries" marks a decisive change from traditional U.S. Middle East policy. This is a fundamental redefinition of U.S. maritime hegemony in the Middle East since 1945, and the unprecedented demand for military contributions even from non-allied nations, including China, questions the nature of the security order in the post-hegemonic era.
🔍 Between the Lines — What the News Isn't Saying
The true aim of the Trump administration's demand for NATO and China to dispatch warships is not the security of the Strait of Hormuz itself. The U.S.'s dependence on the Strait of Hormuz has dramatically decreased due to the shale revolution; in fact, a surge in crude oil prices due to a strait blockade would benefit the U.S. energy industry. The Trump administration's true intention is to leverage this crisis to achieve concrete results on NATO's burden-sharing issue and to confront China with its "energy security vulnerability," thereby extracting concessions in trade negotiations and technology regulations. In other words, it is highly probable that the Strait of Hormuz crisis is perceived by the Trump administration not as a "problem to be solved" but as an "opportunity to be exploited."
NOW PATTERN
Alliance Fissures × Spiral of Conflict × Failure of Coordination
The vicious cycle where the U.S.'s "burden sharing" demands accelerate alliance fissures, and these fissures make coordinated responses to the energy crisis difficult, is structurally prolonging the Strait of Hormuz crisis.
Intersection of Dynamics
The three dynamics of "alliance fissures," "spiral of conflict," and "failure of coordination" form a vicious cycle that amplifies each other. First, the spiral of conflict between the U.S. and Iran creates the Strait of Hormuz crisis, which then brings to light the burden-sharing issue among allies. President Trump's coercive demands for burden sharing widen alliance fissures, and these fissures make international coordinated responses difficult. The failure of coordination leads to the prolongation of the crisis, and a prolonged crisis puts escalation pressure on both the U.S. and Iran, further accelerating the spiral of conflict.
This triple vicious cycle is particularly dangerous because each dynamic has a "self-reinforcing" nature. Once alliance fissures emerge, it takes a long time to restore trust, making it easier for fissures to widen further in subsequent crises. The spiral of conflict lowers the escalation threshold at each stage, cumulatively increasing the risk of small incidents developing into major military clashes. The failure of coordination creates negative feedback, such as "if other countries don't participate, our country won't either," which tends to lead to the number of participating countries converging to zero.
Furthermore, this structure exposes the limits of traditional "hegemonic stability theory"—where order is maintained by a single hegemonic power providing international public goods. The U.S. is abandoning that role, but there is no new order provider to replace it. China lacks both the will and the capacity, and NATO has limitations in its out-of-area operational capabilities. This "vacuum of legitimacy and capability" is accelerating the vicious cycle of the three dynamics. Solving the problem requires simultaneously approaching all three dynamics, which is extremely difficult in the current international political environment.
📚 Pattern History
1956: Suez Crisis
The U.S. prevented British and French military intervention in the Suez Canal, leading to a shift in hegemony in Middle East security.
Structural similarities with the present: Conflicts between great powers over the management of international transport chokepoints have the power to fundamentally reshape existing alliance structures. Britain and France were forced to withdraw due to U.S. opposition, decisively losing their influence in the Middle East.
1987-88: Tanker War and "Operation Earnest Will"
Maritime security in the Persian Gulf became an international issue, and a U.S.-led escort operation was implemented.
Structural similarities with the present: While international cooperation is essential for securing the Strait of Hormuz, only a limited number of countries (primarily the U.S.) actually deploy military force, and the imbalance of burden continues to be a structural problem.
2003: Iraq War and the "Coalition of the Willing"
The U.S. organized a coalition of the willing and conducted military action without UN Security Council approval, leading to serious fissures among allies.
Structural similarities with the present: U.S. demands for unilateral military action force allies into a "participate or oppose" dilemma, weakening NATO's cohesion. Opposition from France and Germany exposed deep fissures within the alliance.
2019: Tanker Attacks and the Launch of IMSC (International Maritime Security Construct)
In response to Iranian attacks around the strait, a U.S.-led coalition of the willing was organized, but many major countries opted out of participation.
Structural similarities with the present: The "coalition of the willing" approach creates an appearance of international cooperation, but there are limits to securing substantial military commitment, and full participation is not achieved until the crisis deepens.
2022-26: Russia's Invasion of Ukraine and Increased NATO Burden
Europe's security crisis absorbed NATO's resources, depriving it of the capacity for military involvement in other regions.
Structural similarities with the present: When multiple security crises occur simultaneously, alliance resources are dispersed, risking "strategic overstretch" where no single crisis can be adequately addressed.
Patterns Revealed by History
Historical patterns indicate that issues surrounding the security of international chokepoints (Suez, Hormuz) are not merely military and security challenges but can be turning points for the international order itself. The 1956 Suez Crisis solidified the shift of Middle East hegemony from Britain and France to the U.S., and the current Hormuz crisis suggests the beginning of the end of the U.S.'s hegemonic role. In past cases, the transition from a structure where a hegemonic power solely bore maritime security to multilateral burden-sharing has always been accompanied by friction, and a security "vacuum" has emerged during transitional periods. Furthermore, as comparisons between 1987 and 2019 show, while coalitions of the willing are formed during each crisis, their effectiveness has declined over time. This reflects the international community's "crisis fatigue" and the U.S.'s own diminishing willingness to engage. The most crucial lesson is that chokepoint crises are not resolved in the short term but rather prolong for years, ultimately culminating in either political compromise or military resolution. The current crisis is highly likely to follow this pattern.
🔮 Next Scenarios
The partial blockade of the Strait of Hormuz continues until late 2026, with crude oil prices remaining high at $90-120 per barrel. In response to pressure from the Trump administration, NATO member states demonstrate "formal cooperation" by dispatching small-scale vessels (around 1-2 frigates) but do not form a full-fledged multinational maritime force. China avoids direct military involvement, instead engaging Iran through diplomatic channels and negotiating individually for the security of its own tankers.
Iran maintains its negotiating leverage with the international community by continuing selective transit obstruction (inspection and delay of tankers from specific countries) rather than a complete blockade. The U.S. Fifth Fleet intensifies escort activities, but direct military conflict with Iran is avoided due to mutual restraint. This state of "tense equilibrium" depresses global economic growth by approximately 0.5-1% through sustained high energy prices. Japan initiates an urgent review of its energy policy to reduce Middle East dependence, but securing short-term alternative sources is difficult, intensifying competition in the LNG spot market. Ultimately, from late 2026 to early 2027, indirect U.S.-Iran negotiations (mediated by Oman or Switzerland) begin behind the scenes, and a path toward gradual de-escalation starts to emerge.
Investment/Action Implications: Announcement of small-scale vessel dispatch by NATO member states, increased frequency of "dialogue promotion" statements by the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, continuation of Iran's pattern of selective transit obstruction (not a complete blockade), reports of secret contacts between the U.S. and Iran.
The crisis significantly de-escalates by summer 2026 due to an unexpected diplomatic breakthrough. The most probable scenario is China mediating a "comprehensive deal" where it exercises its economic influence over Iran to restore free passage through the Strait of Hormuz in exchange for a partial easing of sanctions on Iran. China has a track record of mediating the Saudi-Iran rapprochement in 2023 and has motivation to follow this pattern again—as China itself is the biggest victim of a Hormuz blockade.
In this scenario, President Trump's pressure on China paradoxically triggers China's diplomatic initiative, and the "burden sharing" desired by the U.S. is realized in a diplomatic rather than military form. Iran gains a gradual easing of sanctions on oil exports in exchange for a partial freeze of its nuclear development. Crude oil prices return to the $70-80 per barrel range, and the global economy shows a rapid recovery. Energy security for Asian countries, including Japan, improves in the short term, but the fundamental structure of Middle East dependence remains unchanged. This scenario is only possible if all major players fully recognize the "costs of the crisis" and can compromise while saving face, a condition that has historically been rare.
Investment/Action Implications: Announcement of a summit-level meeting between China and Iran, Iran's expression of intent to return to nuclear negotiations, statements by the Trump administration regarding "conditional easing" of sanctions, a sharp drop in crude oil prices (below $80 per barrel).
The crisis escalates, and actual military conflict occurs in the Strait of Hormuz. Potential triggers include damage to U.S. naval vessels or allied tankers by Iranian mines or drone attacks. If a conflict occurs, the Trump administration is likely to carry out limited military retaliation against Iran (precision bombing of missile bases or naval facilities).
However, the premise that "limited" military action is controllable is dangerous. In retaliation, Iran could attack oil facilities in Gulf states (especially Saudi Arabia's Ras Tanura oil terminal), attack Israel through proxy forces in Iraq and Lebanon, or even disrupt financial infrastructure through cyberattacks. In this case, crude oil prices would surge to over $150-200 per barrel, leading to global stagflation (inflation during economic recession).
Alliance fissures would deepen further. NATO would be internally divided over involvement in "conflicts outside the North Atlantic region," and China would choose hostile neutrality towards the U.S. Japan would face a severe dilemma between constitutional constraints and its obligations under the Japan-U.S. alliance. In the worst-case scenario, the entire Persian Gulf would become a conflict zone, oil exports from Saudi Arabia and the UAE would completely cease, and the global economy would plunge into its worst crisis since 2008. While the probability of this scenario is estimated at 30%, there is a risk of it rapidly materializing due to "black swan" events (accidental military clashes, political upheaval within Iran).
Investment/Action Implications: Accidental military clashes in the Strait of Hormuz (e.g., contact incidents between Iranian fast boats and U.S. warships), signs of Iranian mine-laying, attacks on Saudi Arabian oil facilities, a surge in crude oil prices above $130 per barrel, announcement of coordinated release of strategic petroleum reserves.
Key Triggers to Watch
- Occurrence of accidental contact incidents between U.S. and Iranian forces in the Strait of Hormuz: March-May 2026 (within the next 2 months)
- Official discussion of Persian Gulf deployment at an extraordinary NATO Foreign Ministers' Meeting or Defense Ministers' Meeting: April-May 2026
- Presence or absence of additional Chinese naval fleet deployment to the Gulf of Aden/Persian Gulf region: April-June 2026
- Decision by IEA member states for coordinated release of strategic petroleum reserves: If crude oil prices exceed $120 per barrel (focus on Q2 2026)
- Reports of secret or indirect diplomatic contacts between the U.S. and Iran: Late 2026 (3-6 months after the crisis began)
🔄 Tracking Loop
Next Trigger: NATO Defense Ministers' Meeting (scheduled for April 2026) — Whether the dispatch of warships to the Persian Gulf becomes an official agenda item will be a litmus test for the alliance's substantive response.
Continuation of this pattern: Tracking Theme: Strait of Hormuz Crisis and the Future of "Burden Sharing" — Next milestones are the NATO Defense Ministers' Meeting (April 2026) and the holding of an emergency IEA Ministerial Meeting.
>How do you read it? Participate in Prediction →
