Three Hours in Hormuz — The Day 20

Why it matters: On February 17, 2026, Iran closed a portion of the Strait of Hormuz for military exercises for the first time in history. The closure of this choke point, through which 20% of the world's oil shipments (approximately 13 million barrels per day) pass, immediately moved crude oil futures, even for just a few hours, exposing the vulnerability of energy security in Asian countries, including Japan. This was not merely a military exercise—it was a signal of "economic hostage-taking" executed concurrently with the US-Iran nuclear negotiations.

📝 SUMMARY: On February 17, 2026, Iran closed a portion of the Strait of Hormuz for military exercises for the first time in history.

What Happened

• Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Navy launched "Strait of Hormuz Smart Control" exercise — The large-scale live-fire exercise, which began on February 16, was conducted under the direct command of IRGC Commander-in-Chief Major General Mohammad Pakpour. Live missiles from coastal and inland launch sites hit targets within the Strait of Hormuz. Drone units operated in a signal-jamming environment.
• Portion of Strait of Hormuz closed for "several hours" — First such measure in Iran's history — Iran's state-run Fars News Agency announced the closure of "a portion of the Strait of Hormuz for several hours for navigation safety." This marks the first time Iran has officially executed a closure of the Strait since the US intensified military pressure on Iran.
• Crude oil prices rose temporarily then fell back — Brent crude down 1.79% to $67.42 — Immediately after the exercise began, Brent crude rose to around $68.50 but sharply reversed course following reports of progress in nuclear negotiations in Geneva. WTI crude closed down 1.3% at $62.06, and Brent ultimately finished down 2.3% at $67.03. Analysts noted a geopolitical risk premium of $4-7 per barrel was priced in.
• US-Iran indirect nuclear negotiations simultaneously underway in Geneva — A US delegation led by President Trump's envoys Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner, and an Iranian delegation led by Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi, held their second round of indirect negotiations in Geneva, Switzerland. The Iranian side announced that "general agreement on guiding principles has been reached" and stated they would return with detailed proposals within two weeks.
• US Navy bolstered to two-carrier system — USS Gerald R. Ford dispatched to Middle East — President Trump announced the deployment of the world's largest aircraft carrier, USS Gerald R. Ford, from the Caribbean to the Middle East. It will join the USS Abraham Lincoln and its accompanying missile destroyer group, which have been deployed for over two weeks.
• IRGC official makes provocative remarks regarding US aircraft carriers — An IRGC official stated that "US aircraft carriers can't do a damn thing," demonstrating Iran's confidence in its asymmetric warfare capabilities. Iran's naval strategy centers on swarm tactics using fast attack craft.
• President Trump maintains diplomatic tone — "I think they (Iran) want to make a deal. I don't think they want the consequences of not making a deal," President Trump commented. He indicated a preference for negotiations while not ruling out military options.

Overall Picture

Historical Context

The Strait of Hormuz is a waterway just 33 km wide, the sole outlet from the Persian Gulf to the open ocean. This geographical fact has repeatedly threatened global energy security since the Iran-Iraq War in the 1980s.

In 1984, the "Tanker War" began as part of the Iran-Iraq War, with both nations attacking merchant vessels navigating the Persian Gulf. In 1987, the Reagan administration launched "Operation Earnest Will," reflagging Kuwaiti tankers under the US flag and commencing naval escort. This was the largest naval escort operation since World War II.

A new crisis emerged in 2019. In May and June, a total of six tankers were attacked in the Gulf of Oman, with the US attributing responsibility to Iran. In July, Iran seized the British tanker "Stena Impero," and in September, Saudi Arabia's Aramco oil facilities were attacked by drones. This series of incidents demonstrated to the world Iran's willingness and capability to actually use the "Hormuz card."

However, the measure taken in February 2026 differs qualitatively from any previous incident. This is the first time in history that Iran has officially declared the "closure" of the Strait of Hormuz itself. All past incidents were indirect—attacks on tankers, mine-laying, vessel seizures—and no declaration of "closing the Strait itself" was made.

What makes this significant is that it crossed the rhetorical threshold of "closure." Even if it was a partial measure lasting only a few hours, the fait accompli that "Iran closed Hormuz" was established. The next time Iran takes the same measure, both markets and policymakers will treat it as "precedented behavior." A new step has been carved into the escalation ladder.

This exercise was named "Smart Control." This naming is not accidental. Iran introduced the concept of "smart control"—meaning selective and gradual restrictions on passage—rather than a "complete blockade" of the Strait. This is a strategic framing that avoids an "all or nothing" dichotomy and enables the exercise of influence in a gray zone.

Stakeholder Map

Structure Seen Through Data

• 13 million barrels per day — Volume of crude oil passing through the Strait of Hormuz. Accounts for approximately 31% of global seaborne crude oil.
• 20% — Proportion of global oil consumption accounted for by throughput in the Strait of Hormuz.
• 80% — Proportion of Japan's crude oil imports passing through the Strait of Hormuz. Approximately 1.6 million barrels per day.
• 95% — Japan's dependency on the Middle East for crude oil imports. The highest level among developed nations.
• 84% — Proportion of crude oil passing through the Strait of Hormuz destined for Asian markets (2024).
• $4-7/barrel — Analyst estimate of the geopolitical risk premium currently priced into Brent crude.
• 33km — Width of the narrowest part of the Strait of Hormuz. Navigable channels are only 3.2 km in each direction.
• 2 carriers — Number of US carrier strike groups deployed in the Middle East (Abraham Lincoln + Gerald R. Ford).
• Over 1,500 vessels — Estimated number of fast attack craft held by the IRGC Navy. Mainstay of asymmetric warfare.
• 1,000km range — Maximum range of anti-ship missiles deployed by Iran on islands. Covers the entire Persian Gulf.

The delta: On the surface, it appears to be a "military exercise lasting a few hours," but its essence is the breaking of the forbidden rhetorical threshold of "Hormuz closure." Iran, with the concept of "smart control," created a gray zone between a full blockade and normal operation, transforming it into a card that can be used for nuclear negotiations, military deterrence, and domestic politics. The true risk lies in this "new normal" lowering the escalation threshold for subsequent incidents.

NOW PATTERN

Escalation Spiral × Path Dependency

Escalation Spiral × Path Dependency

The antagonistic relationship between Iran and the United States has self-reinforcingly deepened for over 40 years (Escalation Spiral). Meanwhile, global energy infrastructure is structurally dependent on the single choke point of the Strait of Hormuz, and decoupling from it would require decades of cost and time (Path Dependency). At the intersection of these two dynamics, "three hours of closure" transforms into a structural threat to the global economy.

Escalation Spiral: The "Rational Irrationality" Born from 40 Years of Mutual Hostility

46 years since the 1979 Iranian Revolution and the American embassy hostage crisis, US-Iran relations have been caught in a self-reinforcing loop of conflict, where one side's actions provoke a reaction from the other, and that reaction in turn incites further actions. The February 2026 closure of the Strait of Hormuz is the latest—and most dangerous—step in this spiral.

"I think they (Iran) want to make a deal. I don't think they want the consequences of not making a deal."
— Donald Trump, US President, February 17, 2026

"US aircraft carriers can't do a damn thing."
— IRGC official, Breitbart report, February 17, 2026

"For navigation safety, a portion of the Strait of Hormuz will be closed for several hours."
— Iran's state-run Fars News Agency, February 17, 2026

These three quotes perfectly illustrate the three layers of the escalation spiral.

The first layer is the "exchange of threats." While Trump's statement is diplomatic in phrasing, its essence is a threat: "there will be consequences if no deal is made." The IRGC's statement that "aircraft carriers can't do a damn thing" is a counter-threat to this. Both sides respond to the other's threats with threats—this is the fundamental mechanism of the spiral.

The second layer is "escalation of actions." The US sent two aircraft carriers to the Middle East. In response, Iran conducted live-fire exercises in the Strait of Hormuz and closed a portion of it. Each action is framed as "defensive," but objectively, it is an escalation. Without the deployment of US carriers, the timing of the exercise might have been different, and without the exercise, the deployment of the Ford to the Middle East might have been unnecessary. The causality is circular, and the starting point cannot be identified.

The third layer is "cognitive lock-in." As the escalation spiral prolongs, policymakers and public opinion on both sides become fixed in perceiving the other as "untrustworthy" and "malicious." This cognitive bias leads to interpreting cooperative signals from the other side as "traps" and antagonistic signals as "true nature revealed." Iran negotiating in Geneva while exercising in Hormuz is not a contradiction—within the escalation spiral, the negotiating table and military demonstration are different expressions of the same strategy.

What makes this Hormuz closure particularly significant in spiral theory is that it involves the phenomenon of "rhetorical threshold breakthrough." In international relations theory, there are stages of escalation in actions: verbal threats → military demonstrations → limited use of force → full-scale conflict. Iran had previously verbally threatened that it "could close Hormuz" but had not moved to "actually close it." This time, it crossed that line.

The danger of a threshold breakthrough lies in the lowering of psychological barriers to the next step. Once the word "closure" is translated into action, the next closure could be executed for a longer duration, over a wider area, and with less hesitation. This is a typical pattern of "salami slicing"—changing the status quo through the accumulation of small faits accomplis—and is structurally analogous to China's artificial island construction in the South China Sea or Russia's gradual pressure intensification before the annexation of Crimea.

Furthermore, the escalation spiral has the characteristic of "disappearing exits." The deeper the spiral, the higher the risk that compromise will be interpreted as "weakness." In Iran's domestic politics, Supreme Leader Khamenei has made "not yielding to the US" an identity of the revolutionary regime. In US domestic politics, President Trump has built a brand as a "strong president against Iran." Both sides are in a structural position where compromise with the other incurs domestic political costs.

The reported "general agreement on guiding principles" in the Geneva nuclear negotiations might, at first glance, appear to be an escape route from the spiral. However, history has repeatedly shown that this kind of "progress" does not stop the spiral. The 2015 JCPOA (Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action) was hailed as a "historic agreement" at the time, but the Trump administration withdrew in 2018, and Iran gradually resumed uranium enrichment. The agreement was a pause button for the spiral, not a power-off button.

What the escalation spiral teaches us is that the "resolution" of individual incidents does not mean the dissolution of the spiral itself. The three hours in Hormuz are over. However, the structure that will produce the next three hours—or three days—remains, in an even more reinforced form.

Path Dependency: Why the World Cannot Bypass Hormuz

The world's energy infrastructure's reliance on the Strait of Hormuz is no accident. Decades of investment, infrastructure development, and accumulated contractual relationships have structurally entrenched this dependency on the choke point. Path dependency theory teaches that initial choices create lock-in, lock-in increases the cost of alternative paths, and rising costs further deepen dependency—a vicious cycle.

"80% of Japan's crude oil imports pass through the Strait of Hormuz, and its dependency on the Middle East reaches 95%."
— IEA (International Energy Agency) Strait of Hormuz Fact Sheet

"84% of crude oil and condensates passing through the Strait of Hormuz are destined for Asian markets, with China, India, Japan, and South Korea accounting for 69%."
— US Energy Information Administration (EIA), 2024 data

These two figures illustrate the "depth" of path dependency.

Japan's case is a textbook example of path dependency. Post-war Japanese energy policy was designed on the premise of inexpensive Middle Eastern crude oil. Refineries were optimized for the quality of Middle Eastern crude (primarily Arabian Light), and long-term contracts were built on relationships with Persian Gulf nations. LNG import infrastructure similarly presumes supplies from Qatar, UAE, and Oman.

The core of path dependency lies in "switching costs." For Japan to break free from Hormuz dependency, all of the following would be necessary: (1) securing alternative supply sources (US shale, Russian Far East, Africa, etc.), (2) refinery modifications (to accommodate different crude oil qualities), (3) changes in transport routes (tanker contracts, insurance, port infrastructure), and (4) a significant increase in strategic petroleum reserves. These costs would amount to trillions of yen and would take over a decade to implement.

Furthermore, path dependency creates a "collective action problem." Not only Japan, but also South Korea (68% Hormuz dependency), India (53%), and China (15% but enormous in volume) all depend on Hormuz. It is inefficient for each country to individually build alternative routes, and coordinated alternatives involve political complexity. As a result, an equilibrium is established where every country waits for "someone else to move first," and no one moves.

Saudi Arabia's "East-West Pipeline" (also known as Petroline, with a capacity of 5 million barrels per day) is one of the few infrastructures that bypasses Hormuz, but its actual utilization rate is low and entirely insufficient to replace the full volume. The UAE's Habshan-Fujairah pipeline (1.5 million barrels per day) is similar. The existence of these "bypass routes" rather proves the depth of path dependency—even after decades and billions of dollars, the dependency has not been significantly reduced.

Another characteristic of path dependency is the "trap of incremental improvement." Countries declare strengthened energy security with each crisis, but what is implemented is always incremental improvement (slight increases in reserves, partial diversification of supply sources), not structural transformation (fundamental decoupling from Hormuz dependency). This is rational behavior—the cost of structural transformation always exceeds the cost of current "stability," so a status quo bias is at play. However, this rational incrementalism entrenches dependency in the long run.

In Japan's case, a shift in energy policy was discussed after the 2011 Fukushima nuclear accident, but the increased reliance on fossil fuels due to nuclear plant shutdowns further deepened Middle East dependency. Even after the 2019 Hormuz crisis, the government advocated "diversification of energy supply sources," but Middle East dependency has not substantially changed from 95%. With each crisis, "learning" is declared, and once the crisis passes, "forgetting" begins. This is also one of the mechanisms of path dependency—a cycle of "shock → declaration → incremental improvement → forgetting → next shock" continuously postpones fundamental change.

The most terrifying consequence of path dependency is that "irreplaceability" directly translates into geopolitical leverage. Iran can "smart control" Hormuz precisely because the world cannot bypass it. The depth of dependency determines the effectiveness of the threat. For Iran, Hormuz is a weapon that "functions even without being used"—simply by demonstrating the possibility of closure, even without actually closing it, crude oil futures move, insurance rates rise, and national policy calculations change. This is structurally analogous to the "deterrence by existence" of nuclear weapons.

Intersection of Dynamics

The essence of this incident lies precisely at the intersection of these two dynamics.

The escalation spiral governs the dynamics of US-Iran relations. However, the spiral alone cannot explain "why Hormuz becomes a weapon." While Iran has numerous locations to launch missiles and conduct military exercises, doing so in the Strait of Hormuz carries significantly greater meaning. It is path dependency that creates this disparity.

Conversely, path dependency alone cannot explain "why now." Global reliance on Hormuz has existed for decades. Its "weaponization" on February 17, 2026, occurred because the escalation spiral reached a specific stage—the nuclear negotiation deadline, increased US carrier deployments, and heightened Israel-Iran tensions.

The most dangerous structure created by this intersection is "asymmetry of commitment." For Iran, a partial closure of Hormuz is a relatively low-cost action. It can be achieved with a few hours of exercises, a few fast boats, and a few missiles. On the other hand, the impact of this action on the world is enormous—fluctuations in the crude oil market, rising insurance rates, and anxiety over energy security in various countries. This asymmetry between input cost and impact makes Hormuz the "highest form of asymmetric warfare."

Furthermore, the escalation spiral and path dependency reinforce each other. As conflict intensifies, the risk premium for Hormuz rises, and the costs of dependency (i.e., vulnerability) become apparent. However, the manifestation of these costs, in the short term, does not prompt the dissolution of dependency but rather triggers a military response, namely, "Iran must be deterred." Military responses further accelerate the escalation spiral, further increasing the risks in Hormuz. Path dependency provides the "stage" for the escalation spiral, and the escalation spiral makes the "costs" of path dependency apparent—this self-reinforcing mechanism makes structural solutions extremely difficult.

Ultimately, this intersection suggests that the "Hormuz problem" cannot be solved individually through energy policy, diplomatic policy, or military policy. Resolving path dependency requires decades of energy transition, and stopping the escalation spiral requires a fundamental restructuring of US-Iran relations. Neither is feasible in the short term, and in the interim, the world must continue to coexist with the risk that "three hours of closure become three days, and three days become three weeks."

History of Patterns

1987: The Tanker War and Operation Earnest Will — The Prototype of the Hormuz Card

The Iran-Iraq War, which began in 1980, entered a new phase in 1984. Iraq began attacking Iran's oil export terminal, Kark Island, and Iran retaliated by targeting all merchant vessels navigating the Persian Gulf. This was the "Tanker War."

By 1987, hundreds of merchant vessels had been attacked. Kuwait requested US escort for its tankers. The Reagan administration "reflagged" 11 Kuwaiti tankers under the US flag and commenced naval escort. This was "Operation Earnest Will"—the largest naval escort operation since World War II.

On May 17, 1987, the USS Stark was hit by an accidental Iraqi air force missile, killing 37 US servicemen. In October, Iran launched missiles at Kuwait's Sea Island oil terminal, and the US Navy retaliated by destroying an Iranian armed oil platform. In April 1988, "Operation Praying Mantis" saw the US Navy sink an Iranian naval frigate, escalating into direct naval combat.

The Tanker War proved that freedom of navigation in the Strait of Hormuz and the Persian Gulf is an "international public good." Simultaneously, it became the first large-scale example demonstrating how regional conflicts in the Middle East directly impact the global economy through energy supply.

Structural Similarities with Today: There are three structural similarities between 1987 and 2026. First, the basic pattern of regional conflict threatening navigation safety in Hormuz. Second, the reactive pattern of the US responding with increased military presence. Third, the tactical pattern of Iran attempting to offset US conventional military superiority using asymmetric warfare capabilities (mines then, missiles and drones now). What differs is that Iran in 2026 possesses far more advanced asymmetric warfare capabilities than in 1987, and has actually crossed the behavioral threshold of "Hormuz closure."

2019: Tanker Attacks and Aramco Drone Attack — Limits of Escalation Control

In May 2018, the first Trump administration withdrew from the JCPOA (Iran nuclear deal) and initiated a "maximum pressure" policy. The escalation spiral rapidly accelerated.

On May 12, 2019, four vessels, including two Saudi Arabian tankers, were attacked off Fujairah. On June 13, the Japanese-operated tanker "Kokuka Courageous" was attacked in the Gulf of Oman—an incident that occurred while Prime Minister Abe was visiting Tehran, at a timing that seemed to mock Japan's diplomatic efforts.

In July, Iran seized the British tanker "Stena Impero" in the Strait of Hormuz. This was in retaliation for the UK seizing an Iranian tanker in Gibraltar, demonstrating a typical pattern of the escalation spiral.

Then, on September 14, Aramco oil facilities in eastern Saudi Arabia were attacked by drones and cruise missiles. Approximately 5% of the world's oil supply was temporarily halted, and Brent crude surged by about 15% in a single day. Yemen's Houthis claimed responsibility, but the US asserted direct Iranian involvement. The failure of Saudi air defense systems, despite including state-of-the-art Patriot missiles, to intercept the attacks demonstrated the effectiveness of asymmetric warfare with shock to the world.

The first Trump administration considered military retaliation but ultimately decided against it. The official reason was that "it was not a proportional response," but the difficulty of escalation control is believed to be the true factor.

Structural Similarities with Today: The continuity between 2019 and 2026 is clear. In 2019, Iran demonstrated Hormuz's vulnerability through "indirect use of force" (tanker attacks, seizures). In 2026, it escalated this to a "direct declaration" (partial closure of the Strait). The escalation spiral is climbing one step at a time. Furthermore, the imbalance shown by the 2019 Aramco attack—"inexpensive asymmetric weapons threatening expensive infrastructure"—is structurally analogous to the 2026 imbalance of "a few hours of exercises shaking the global crude oil market."

Patterns Revealed by History

The history of the Tanker War (1987) and the 2019 crisis reveals three patterns.

First, the "Hormuz card" is deeply embedded in Iran's strategic culture. For 40 years, Iran has leveraged Hormuz's geopolitical value with each crisis. Far from being "worn out," this card has been refined and its effectiveness increased with each use.

Second, the US response has consistently been an "increase in military presence," which has a short-term deterrent effect but, in the long term, promotes the enhancement of Iran's asymmetric warfare capabilities. From mine warfare in 1987 to drone attacks in 2019 and "smart control" in 2026, Iran's capabilities continue to evolve in a direction that offsets US conventional military superiority.

Third, "learning" after each crisis is always incomplete. After 1987 and after 2019, the international community discussed ending Hormuz dependency, but the power of path dependency prevented structural change. In 2026, the same pattern will likely repeat. Policy discussions intensify while the memory of the crisis is fresh, but return to "business as usual" once the crisis passes. This "failure of learning" is the most insidious manifestation of path dependency.

Future Outlook

Base Scenario (Probability: 55-65%)

Iran will maintain leverage in nuclear negotiations by demonstrating its "smart control" capability over Hormuz, while refraining from an actual full blockade. Geneva negotiations will continue intermittently for several months, slowly progressing towards a partial agreement (setting limits on uranium enrichment and gradual easing of sanctions). The crude oil market will maintain a geopolitical risk premium of $4-7/barrel, without sharp surges or drops. Iran will continue to conduct regular exercises in Hormuz, normalizing "closure" and further lowering the threshold for using this card. For Japan's energy security, this "normalization of low-intensity risk" will be the most probable challenge.

Implications for Investment/Action: The risk premium for energy stocks will be maintained. Consider medium- to long-term investments in infrastructure related to Hormuz bypass routes (pipelines, alternative LNG supply sources). Option strategies to prepare for increased crude oil futures volatility will be effective.

Optimistic Scenario (Probability: 15-25%)

Geneva negotiations progress more than expected, and a framework for a comprehensive agreement, dubbed a "Trump Deal," is reached between the Trump administration and Iran. In exchange for Iran significantly limiting uranium enrichment, the US provides gradual sanctions relief and security assurances. Tensions in Hormuz significantly ease, and the risk premium shrinks to $2-3/barrel. Iran's crude oil exports normalize, and global oil supply stabilizes. However, as the precedent of the 2015 JCPOA shows, structural uncertainties regarding the sustainability of the agreement remain.

Implications for Investment/Action: Focus on Iran-related sanctions-lifting stocks (refiners capable of sourcing Iranian crude, companies with access to the Iranian market). Adjust energy sector positions in preparation for a decline in crude oil prices.

Pessimistic Scenario (Probability: 15-25%)

Nuclear negotiations collapse, and the Trump administration executes military strikes on Iran's nuclear facilities. Iran retaliates with a full blockade of the Strait of Hormuz, with the IRGC Navy conducting mine-laying, swarm attacks by fast boats, and anti-ship missile attacks. Hormuz becomes virtually impassable for weeks to months, and crude oil prices break $100/barrel. Oil exports from Saudi Arabia, UAE, and Iraq are severely restricted, leading to a global energy crisis. Japan begins releasing strategic petroleum reserves, but its reserves, approximately 200 days' worth, would be insufficient to cope with a long-term blockade. The entire Asian economy suffers a severe blow.

Implications for Investment/Action: Increase commodity-related asset allocation as a hedge against soaring energy prices. Stocks related to crude oil supply sources with low Hormuz dependency (US shale, Brazilian deepwater, West Africa) would benefit. Defense-related stocks would see short-term gains, but also carry high long-term risks.

Key Triggers to Watch

• Date and content of the 3rd round of Geneva negotiations: Iran stated it would "return with detailed proposals within two weeks." The specifics of the 3rd round of negotiations in early March will be a branching point between the base and optimistic scenarios.
• Deployment location and operational activities of USS Gerald R. Ford: Whether the two-carrier system deployment in the Middle East is prolonged, or if additional military assets are dispatched, will be a signal for a shift to the pessimistic scenario.
• Iran's uranium enrichment activities (IAEA report): Whether Iran continues to accumulate uranium enriched above 60% or freezes it will be an objective indicator of the seriousness of negotiations.
• Scale and frequency of the next IRGC naval exercise: Whether "Smart Control" exercises become regular or expand in scale will be a leading indicator of the escalation trajectory.
• Utilization rate of Saudi Arabia/UAE bypass pipelines: If Gulf states begin to increase the utilization rate of bypass infrastructure, it will be a signal that preparations for the "worst-case scenario" have begun.
• Japanese government's energy security review discussions: Whether concrete policy discussions regarding Hormuz risk become active in the Diet and the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry will measure the depth of the path dependency's "learning cycle."

Sources:

• CNBC: Iran partially closes Strait of Hormuz
• UPI: Iran partially closes oil route for military drills
• OilPrice.com: Oil Prices Rise as Iran Closes Parts of Hormuz