US Military's Risk of Harm in the

📡 Signal — What Happened

Why it matters: As a second Trump administration expands military operations in the Middle East, a certain "threshold" of casualties among US military personnel could fundamentally alter the President's policy decisions. This structure will determine the very future of American involvement in the Middle East.

• Personnel — Grant Rumley, a senior fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, was interviewed by NHK. Rumley is a former senior official who handled Middle East policy at the Department of Defense during the first Trump administration.
• Analysis — Rumley analyzed that the extent of future casualties among US forces could influence President Trump's decisions.
• Military — Since October 2023, the US military has been conducting military operations in the Middle East against Houthi attacks on merchant vessels in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden.
• Military — Since January 2024, US and UK forces have conducted airstrikes against Houthi strongholds in Yemen as part of "Operation Prosperity Guardian," expanding operations through 2025-2026.
• Casualties — In January 2024, an attack on Tower 22 base in Jordan resulted in the deaths of 3 US soldiers and approximately 40 injuries. The attack was confirmed to be by Iran-backed militia groups.
• Politics — Upon assuming office for a second term, President Trump resumed a "maximum pressure" policy against Iran and its proxy forces, emphasizing military deterrence.
• Region — Approximately 40,000 to 50,000 US troops are stationed in the Middle East, deployed in Iraq, Syria, Jordan, Bahrain, Qatar, UAE, and Kuwait.
• Economy — Approximately 12-15% of global trade passing through the Red Sea has been forced to reroute due to Houthi attacks, increasing shipping costs by 200-300%.
• Diplomacy — As of March 2026, the Trump administration is pursuing a "two-front strategy," combining direct negotiations with Iran and military pressure.
• Public Opinion — A Gallup poll (late 2025) showed 62% of Americans oppose additional troop deployments to the Middle East, while 54% support limited military action for "counter-terrorism."
• Strategy — US Central Command (CENTCOM) reinforced Aegis destroyers and carrier strike groups deployed in the Middle East in early 2026, expanding capabilities to counter the Houthis.
• History — During Trump's first term, Iran's retaliatory attack after the killing of Iranian commander Soleimani (January 2020) resulted in over 100 cases of TBI (Traumatic Brain Injury), but significant casualties were denied by reporting "zero fatalities."

To understand the core of this analysis, one must look back at the historical pattern of "at what moment does a US President's Middle East policy fundamentally change?"

In October 1983, a Marine barracks in Beirut, Lebanon, was bombed, killing 241 US service members at once. President Reagan initially insisted on the "indispensable" presence of multinational forces in Lebanon, but decided to withdraw four months after this incident. The justification of "protecting American interests" could not be maintained in the face of 241 coffins. This was the first clear example of a "casualty threshold" in the Middle East — a point at which a president is forced to change policy.

In the 1993 Battle of Mogadishu (Black Hawk Down), images of 18 US soldiers killed were repeatedly broadcast on CNN, forcing President Clinton to withdraw from Somalia. This phenomenon, known as the "CNN effect," established a structure where visual media directly influenced presidential decisions. The key was not the "absolute number" of casualties — whether 241 or 18 — but how those casualties were politically visualized.

In the 2003 Iraq War, US military fatalities continued to rise even after President Bush (son) declared "Mission Accomplished," eventually exceeding 4,500. However, a policy shift did not occur solely due to the death toll. The turning point was the Republican Party's crushing defeat in the 2006 midterm elections — that is, the moment casualties transformed into "electoral costs."

President Obama adopted a "minimal footprint" strategy based on this lesson. With a three-pronged approach of special forces, drone strikes, and reliance on local partners, "zero American casualties" became a de facto policy goal. While this strategy dramatically reduced casualties, it did not resolve the fundamental instability of the Middle East.

During Trump's first term, the killing of Commander Soleimani in January 2020 vividly illustrated this structure. In retaliation, missiles were fired at Iraq's Al-Asad base, injuring over 100 US service members with TBI (Traumatic Brain Injury). However, Trump announced "zero fatalities," politically invisibilizing the casualties to avoid escalation. This paradoxically showed that the "definition of casualties itself" is at the President's discretion. While soldiers with TBI later suffered severe after-effects, the narrative of "zero fatalities" politically prevailed.

Since the Hamas attack on Israel in October 2023, this structure has entered a new phase. The Iran-backed Houthis began attacking merchant vessels in the Red Sea, and the US military dispatched warships as part of "Operation Prosperity Guardian." The Biden administration launched airstrikes in Yemen in January 2024, but in the same month, an attack on Tower 22 base in Jordan killed 3 US service members. This number of "3" was sufficient to prompt Biden to decide on retaliatory strikes against Iran.

What a second Trump administration faces is precisely a repetition of this historical pattern. He is re-imposing sanctions on Iran under the banner of "maximum pressure" and expanding military operations against the Houthis. However, the more he expands, the greater the risk of US forces becoming targets of attack. Rumley points out that if the "extent of casualties" exceeds a certain threshold, Trump's decision — whether to withdraw or to further escalate — could fundamentally change.

The question here is which direction Trump will move in. Will he withdraw like Reagan? Or will he escalate like after the Soleimani killing? Trump's past behavior patterns suggest both possibilities. While he campaigned on "ending endless wars," he has also shown a willingness to retaliate excessively against provocations. In other words, depending on the nature and scale of casualties, Trump could move in diametrically opposite directions. This is the core of the structural uncertainty of this issue.

The delta: The explicit statement by a former Middle East policy official from Trump's first term that "US military casualties could change Trump's judgment" indicates an awareness of the casualty threshold within the current administration. The problem is that for Trump, it is unpredictable from past behavior patterns whether that threshold will lead to "withdrawal" or "escalation" — and this itself is the greatest factor of uncertainty in the Middle East.