Military Tensions in the Taiwan Strait — A Spiral of Confront

📡 The Signal — What Happened

Why it matters: China's military exercises around Taiwan are becoming normalized, with tensions peaking in early 2026. This crisis could fundamentally challenge the effectiveness of the Japan-U.S. alliance and become a turning point that irreversibly alters the security order in the Indo-Pacific.

• Military Trends — The Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA) has been conducting military exercises around Taiwan at a pace of more than twice a month since the latter half of 2025, reaching an all-time high frequency.
• Military Trends — PLA flights across the Taiwan Strait median line have increased by approximately three times compared to 2024, recording about 1,700 times annually in 2025.
• Military Trends — The Chinese Navy has established a posture capable of deploying three aircraft carrier strike groups, including the aircraft carrier "Fujian," in the Western Pacific.
• Alliance & Diplomacy — The Japanese and U.S. governments agreed to concretize joint operational plans, with a Taiwan contingency in mind, at the "2+2" meeting in December 2025.
• Alliance & Diplomacy — The Japanese government accelerated the deployment of Self-Defense Forces missile units to the Nansei Islands, fully deploying surface-to-ship missile regiments on Ishigaki Island and Miyako Island.
• Defense Budget — Japan's defense budget for FY2026 reached approximately 8.5 trillion yen, increasing to about 1.5% of GDP. The goal is to achieve 2% of GDP by FY2027.
• Economic Impact — Taiwan contingency simulations estimate that a blockade of the Taiwan Strait could reduce global GDP by up to $2.6 trillion.
• Semiconductors — TSMC's Taiwan factories produce approximately 90% of the world's advanced semiconductors (7nm and below), and a supply disruption would have a catastrophic impact on the global economy.
• Public Opinion — In a Japanese domestic public opinion poll, the percentage of respondents who answered "the Self-Defense Forces should be involved in a Taiwan contingency" remained at approximately 38%, indicating that national consensus has not been achieved.
• Chinese Domestic Politics — The Xi Jinping administration faces internal party pressure to achieve concrete results towards "unification" ahead of the 21st Party Congress in 2027.
• U.S. Trends — The United States will conduct approximately $19 billion in arms sales to Taiwan from 2025 to 2026, supporting the strengthening of asymmetric capabilities.
• International Law — China is expanding the activities of its Coast Guard under the guise of "law enforcement patrols" around Taiwan, strengthening its gray zone tactics.

The current tensions surrounding the Taiwan Strait represent the latest phase of the structural problem of an "unfinished civil war" that has persisted since the founding of the People's Republic of China in 1949. However, the peaking of tensions in early 2026 is underpinned by the layered interaction of multiple historical and structural factors.

First, it is necessary to look back at the Taiwan Strait crises during the Cold War. The First Taiwan Strait Crisis in 1954-55, the Kinmen Bombardment (Second Crisis) in 1958, and the Third Taiwan Strait Crisis in 1995-96 all occurred during periods of heightened U.S.-China tensions. Particularly in the 1996 crisis, China conducted missile exercises in response to President Lee Teng-hui's visit to the U.S., and the U.S. dispatched two aircraft carriers to confront them. This crisis imprinted on both sides the understanding that "the Taiwan issue is at the core of U.S.-China relations," but at the same time, it made China acutely aware of its "military inferiority," becoming the starting point for its rapid military expansion over the subsequent 30 years.

Second, there is a structural change in China's military power. Since the 2015 military reforms, the PLA has dramatically improved its joint operational capabilities. The Eastern Theater Command (formerly the Nanjing Military Region) is responsible for operations facing Taiwan and has established a posture to integrate and operate the core A2/AD (Anti-Access/Area Denial) capabilities, including DF-21D and DF-26 anti-ship ballistic missiles, a large number of cruise missiles, and a rapidly expanding naval force. According to the U.S. Department of Defense's annual report, the PLA's capability to invade Taiwan is assessed to reach a certain level of maturity around 2027, and this "2027 problem" forms the temporal backdrop of the current tensions.

Third, there is the deepening of Taiwan's democracy and changes in its international status. In Taiwan's presidential election in January 2024, Lai Ching-te of the Democratic Progressive Party was elected, confirming the continuation of the Tsai Ing-wen line. While advocating "maintaining the status quo," the Lai administration has clearly emphasized Taiwan's identity, which is accelerating Beijing's impatience. Furthermore, the "international visibility of Taiwan" since the COVID-19 pandemic has increased international support for Taiwan on an unprecedented scale.

Fourth, there is the technology hegemony competition centered on semiconductors. Taiwan, where TSMC is concentrated, is called the "silicon shield," and Taiwan's indispensability in the advanced semiconductor supply chain has paradoxically transformed Taiwan into an epicenter of geopolitical risk. While the diversification of the semiconductor supply chain through the U.S. CHIPS Act is progressing, replacing Taiwan's factories is estimated to take at least 5 to 7 years, and this "window of vulnerability" complicates strategic calculations.

Fifth, there is the structural transformation of the Japan-U.S. alliance. With the 2015 amendment to the security legislation, the concept of "situations threatening Japan's existence" was introduced, providing a legal basis for Japan's involvement in a Taiwan contingency. The 2022 revision of the National Security Strategy explicitly stated the possession of "counterstrike capabilities," and Japan's defense posture is undergoing its most significant transformation since the war. Concrete strengthening of capabilities, such as troop deployment to the Nansei Islands, development of standoff defense capabilities, and establishment of a joint operations command, is rapidly progressing. However, these changes have not undergone sufficient domestic political debate, and the fragility of national consensus in the event of a contingency remains a potential risk.

Sixth, there is the fluidity of the international order. Russia's invasion of Ukraine set a precedent for "changing the status quo by force," raising concerns about the possibility of China applying this precedent to Taiwan. At the same time, the prolonged war in Ukraine has diverted U.S. attention and resources, potentially opening a "window of opportunity" for China. Furthermore, instability in the Middle East is also affecting the allocation of U.S. military resources, raising questions about the sustainability of multi-front commitments.

With these factors acting simultaneously, 2026 is a year where tensions in the Taiwan Strait are structurally bound to rise, representing a historical juncture where the true value of the Japan-U.S. alliance will be tested.

The delta: The core of the change in early 2026 lies in the qualitative shift of China's military pressure on Taiwan from "exercises" to "normalized presence." This transition moves the military balance in the Taiwan Strait from traditional "stability through deterrence" to "unstable equilibrium under pressure," forcing the Japan-U.S. alliance to shift from theoretical joint defense to practical joint operational readiness.