North Korea Resumes Missile Launches — A Spiral
North Korea's resumption of ballistic missile tests is not merely a provocative act, but a turning point where the very structure of deterrence is being reshaped amidst US-China rivalry, simultaneously accelerating the deepening of the Japan-South Korea-US trilateral alliance and the arms race in Northeast Asia.
── Understand in 3 points ─────────
- • North Korea resumed ballistic missile launch tests towards the Sea of Japan (East Sea) in early 2026.
- • Japan, South Korea, and the United States held emergency trilateral talks following North Korea's missile launch.
- • North Korea has intermittently continued tests since launching a record approximately 70 missiles in 2022.
── NOW PATTERN ─────────
North Korea's missile tests and the strengthening of Japan-US-South Korea cooperation form a typical pattern of a "spiral of conflict," leading to a self-reinforcing security dilemma where each side's defensive actions provoke further military buildup by the other.
── Probability and Response ──────
• Base case 55% — Frequency and degree of North Korea's missile launch technological advancements, South Korea's next presidential candidate's policy towards North Korea, scale and frequency of Japan-US-South Korea joint exercises, trends in China's diplomacy towards North Korea
• Bull case 15% — Changes in President Trump's tone regarding North Korea, reports of unofficial contacts between the US and North Korea, increased mediation activities by China's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the next South Korean administration's willingness for inter-Korean dialogue
• Bear case 30% — Signs of renewed activity at North Korea's Punggye-ri nuclear test site, satellite image analysis by IAEA and 38 North, changes in North Korea's nuclear use doctrine in external propaganda, intelligence agency assessments regarding technology transfer from Russia
📡 The Signal — What Happened
Why it matters: North Korea's resumption of ballistic missile tests is not merely a provocative act, but a turning point where the very structure of deterrence is being reshaped amidst US-China rivalry, simultaneously accelerating the deepening of the Japan-South Korea-US trilateral alliance and the arms race in Northeast Asia.
- Military — North Korea resumed ballistic missile launch tests towards the Sea of Japan (East Sea) in early 2026.
- Diplomacy — Japan, South Korea, and the United States held emergency trilateral talks following North Korea's missile launch.
- Military — North Korea has intermittently continued tests since launching a record approximately 70 missiles in 2022.
- Security — Japan decided to acquire counterattack capabilities (enemy base strike capabilities) at the end of 2022 and is fundamentally strengthening its defense capabilities.
- Economy — Sanctions against North Korea based on UN Security Council resolutions are still ongoing, but their implementation by China and Russia is considered incomplete.
- Diplomacy — South Korea is in the midst of political turmoil following the impeachment and removal of President Yoon Suk-yeol, raising questions about the consistency of its North Korea policy.
- Military — North Korea has deepened military cooperation with Russia, and there are indications it may be receiving technology transfers in exchange for deploying personnel to the war in Ukraine.
- Technology — North Korea's ballistic missile technology includes ICBM-class Hwasong-17 and Hwasong-18, with advancements in solid-fuel rocket technology confirmed.
- Security — Japan, the US, and South Korea activated a real-time North Korean missile warning information sharing system at the end of 2023.
- Regional Situation — China advocates for "resolution through dialogue and negotiation" on the North Korean issue while maintaining strategic ambiguity linked to its own Taiwan Strait issue.
- Economy — Japan's defense budget from fiscal year 2024 onwards is being gradually raised to the 2% of GDP level (approximately 11 trillion yen).
- Diplomacy — North Korea redefined South Korea as "two hostile states" in 2024 and officially abandoned its unification policy.
To understand North Korea's resumption of missile tests, it is necessary to survey how the structural dynamics surrounding the Korean Peninsula have been shaped over the past 70 years.
Since the armistice of the Korean War (1950-1953), the Korean Peninsula has remained a frontline of the Cold War structure. The armistice agreement has not been replaced by a peace treaty, and technically, a state of war continues. This structure of "frozen conflict" has defined the core of North Korea's security strategy. Three generations of leaders—Kim Il-sung, Kim Jong-il, and Kim Jong-un—have positioned nuclear and missile development as the ultimate insurance for regime survival.
In the 1990s, after the end of the Cold War, North Korea faced strategic isolation due to the collapse of its biggest patron, the Soviet Union, and China's shift to a reform and opening-up policy. Attempts at diplomatic solutions, such as the 1994 Agreed Framework between the US and North Korea and the Six-Party Talks that began in 2003, were repeated but ultimately failed. North Korea conducted its first nuclear test in 2006 and a total of six nuclear tests by 2017. During this period, ballistic missile technology also advanced dramatically, leading to the development of ICBMs (Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles) theoretically capable of reaching the US mainland.
Summit meetings between former President Trump and Chairman Kim Jong-un from 2018 to 2019 temporarily eased tensions, but diplomatic channels have been virtually closed since the collapse of the Hanoi summit. The Biden administration called for "unconditional dialogue," but North Korea did not respond.
Since 2022, the international security environment has changed dramatically. Russia's invasion of Ukraine fundamentally undermined the effectiveness of UN Security Council sanctions against North Korea. Russia may have proceeded with the transfer of advanced military technology, which even China had previously hesitated to provide, in exchange for weapons and ammunition supplies from North Korea. There are analyses suggesting that North Korea's technological leaps in areas such as satellite technology, submarine technology, and solid-fuel rocket technology are being supported.
Viewing the resumption of missile tests in 2026 in this context reveals the convergence of multiple structural factors. First, the necessity to demonstrate technological advancements through military cooperation with Russia. Second, the exploitation of a strategic opportunity presented by South Korea's political turmoil (President Yoon Suk-yeol's impeachment). Third, the perception that the priority of the North Korean issue has decreased as the US focuses on various diplomatic challenges (Middle East, Ukraine, China) under a second Trump administration. Fourth, a backlash against the strengthening of the Japan-US-South Korea trilateral alliance and an intention to drive a wedge into that alliance.
For Japan, North Korea's missile threat is an existential security issue. The decision to acquire counterattack capabilities and the policy to raise defense spending to 2% of GDP, announced with the revision of the three security documents at the end of 2022, are rooted in the qualitative improvement of North Korea's missile capabilities. The development of irregular trajectory ballistic missiles (such as KN-23) and MIRV (Multiple Independently Targetable Reentry Vehicle) technology raises serious questions about the effectiveness of Japan's Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) system.
In South Korea, the improvement of Japan-South Korea relations and the strengthening of Japan-US-South Korea cooperation promoted under the Yoon Suk-yeol administration are facing a trial amidst the political upheaval of presidential impeachment. If the next administration shifts to a progressive stance, a return to a conciliatory policy towards North Korea could shake the unity of the Japan-US-South Korea trilateral alliance.
For the United States, the North Korean issue is an inseparable challenge from its overall Indo-Pacific strategy of containing China. North Korea's nuclear and missile threats serve as justification for the stationing of US forces in Japan and South Korea, the deployment of missile defense networks, and the deepening of military cooperation with allies. Paradoxically, the greater North Korea's threat, the greater the perceived need for US presence in the Indo-Pacific, thereby strengthening China's strategic encirclement.
The delta: North Korea's resumption of missile tests is the result of a convergence of technological leaps due to deepening military cooperation with Russia and a strategic opportunity presented by South Korea's political vacuum. It is a structural turning point for the East Asian order, simultaneously accelerating the institutionalization of the Japan-US-South Korea alliance and promoting the formation of a de facto security bloc between China, Russia, and North Korea.
🔍 Between the Lines — What the Reports Aren't Saying
The swiftness with which the Japan-US-South Korea "emergency talks" were immediately held reflects a test of the effectiveness of the institutional framework established between the three countries since the 2023 Camp David agreement. Although not mentioned in official statements, the biggest concern is whether North Korea's missile technology leap stems from technology transfer from Russia; if confirmed, this would fundamentally alter the context of sanctions against Russia. Furthermore, the occurrence of this situation during South Korea's political vacuum is likely not coincidental, suggesting that North Korea is intentionally testing the "weakest link" in the trilateral cooperation. What is truly being questioned is whether South Korea, after a change in administration, will maintain the Yoon Suk-yeol administration's Japan-US-South Korea cooperation line, and North Korea's missiles are serving as a "litmus test" for this.
NOW PATTERN
Spiral of Conflict × Alliance Fissures × Overextension of Power
North Korea's missile tests and the strengthening of Japan-US-South Korea cooperation form a typical pattern of a "spiral of conflict," leading to a self-reinforcing security dilemma where each side's defensive actions provoke further military buildup by the other.
Intersection of Dynamics
The three structural dynamics of "spiral of conflict," "alliance fissures," and "overextension of power" are interconnected, destabilizing the East Asian security environment in a complex manner.
The more the spiral of conflict progresses, the greater the pressure on allies to strengthen their unity, but at the same time, the increasing burden on each country reveals fissures within the alliance. South Korea's political turmoil creates a "weak link" in responding to the spiral, providing North Korea with an opportune moment to exploit these fissures.
US overextension constrains the US's response capabilities in the spiral of conflict, prompting allies to strengthen their self-defense. However, the strengthening of allies' self-defense (especially Japan's counterattack capabilities) gives North Korea a new perception of threat, further accelerating the spiral. Simultaneously, Japan's military buildup evokes historical caution within South Korea, complicating trust-building between Japan and South Korea—this acts to further widen alliance fissures.
At the intersection of these three dynamics lies China's strategic calculation. For China, the spiral of conflict is undesirable as it promotes the strengthening of Japan-US-South Korea missile defense networks (especially the expansion of THAAD deployment), but alliance fissures work to China's advantage in its divide-and-conquer strategy. US overextension increases China's freedom of action on the Taiwan issue. In other words, China may perceive "maintaining moderate tension" on the North Korean issue as the most rational equilibrium point—too much escalation would lead to military alliance strengthening unfavorable to China, while too much de-escalation would not eliminate the pretext for US military presence. On top of this structural equilibrium, the new variable of Russia's entry further complicates the traditional deterrence equation. Russia's technology transfer to North Korea accelerates the spiral of conflict, the dysfunction of the Security Council widens alliance fissures, and the US's multi-front response deepens overextension. The three dynamics do not act in isolation but form a positive feedback loop that amplifies each other.
📚 History of Patterns
1993-1994: First North Korean Nuclear Crisis
North Korea declared its withdrawal from the NPT, and the US considered military action. The Agreed Framework was reached during former President Carter's visit to Pyongyang, but it did not lead to a fundamental resolution.
Structural similarities with the present: Diplomatic solutions bring temporary tension relief, but if an incentive structure for North Korea to completely abandon nuclear and missile development cannot be built, the problem will recur.
2006: North Korea's First Nuclear Test
North Korea conducted a nuclear test, and the UN Security Council adopted sanctions resolutions. Japan imposed its own sanctions against North Korea and accelerated missile defense development.
Structural similarities with the present: Sanctions and military pressure failed to deter North Korea's actions; instead, they strengthened the "spiral of conflict" by providing a pretext to justify the acceleration of nuclear and missile development.
2017: "Fire and Fury" Crisis
North Korea conducted ICBM-class missile (Hwasong-14 and Hwasong-15) and hydrogen bomb tests. President Trump threatened with "fire and fury," and after the crisis of military conflict reached its peak, it transitioned to a summit meeting in 2018.
Structural similarities with the present: Extreme tension can lead to a diplomatic shift, but if the outcomes of summit meetings are not institutionalized, the spiral of conflict will recur. The fragility of "top-down diplomacy" was exposed.
2010: Cheonan Sinking and Yeonpyeong Island Shelling
North Korea's military provocations concentrated during a period of political transition in South Korea (the shift to a hardline policy towards North Korea under the Lee Myung-bak administration). This prompted the strengthening of Japan-US-South Korea cooperation while simultaneously creating fissures in China-South Korea relations.
Structural similarities with the present: North Korea assesses the political vulnerabilities of its adversaries and chooses the timing of its provocations accordingly. The period of government transition in South Korea particularly increases the risk of provocation.
1998: Taepodong-1 Launch and Japan's Security Policy Shift
North Korea's missile passed over the Japanese archipelago, dramatically raising security awareness within Japan. This became a turning point in Japan's defense policy, leading to the introduction of intelligence-gathering satellites and serious consideration of missile defense.
Structural similarities with the present: North Korea's missile launches have served as the biggest catalyst for strengthening Japan's defense capabilities. The pattern of external threats materializing and shifting the Overton window of domestic security discourse is recurring.
Patterns Revealed by History
The history of North Korea's nuclear and missile crises over the past 30 years shows a surprisingly consistent pattern. North Korea provokes, the international community responds with sanctions and pressure, temporary diplomatic solutions are sought, but the fundamental structural issues remain unresolved, and the cycle of provocation begins again—this "provocation → sanctions → dialogue → breakdown → provocation" cycle has been repeated at least three times from the 1994 Agreed Framework to the 2019 Hanoi summit.
However, the situation in 2026 includes elements qualitatively different from past cycles. First, North Korea's nuclear and missile capabilities have reached a practical stage, shifting negotiations from "stopping development" to "how to manage existing capabilities." Second, the emergence of Russia as a new patron enables strategic diversification, moving away from sole reliance on China. Third, the international order itself is in a process of multipolarization and fragmentation, leading to the dysfunction of multilateral responses through the UN Security Council. Historical patterns suggest that a stage of extreme military tension is necessary before a window for diplomatic resolution opens, but "brinkmanship" between nuclear-armed states carries risks incomparable to the past.
🔮 Next Scenarios
North Korea will continue intermittent missile tests throughout 2026 but will not resume nuclear tests. Missile launches will be around 10-20 per year, including technical demonstrations of irregular trajectory missiles and SLBMs (Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missiles). Japan, the US, and South Korea will maintain and strengthen trilateral cooperation, advancing larger-scale joint military exercises, improved interoperability of missile defense systems, and deeper information sharing. In the UN Security Council, no additional sanctions resolutions will be adopted due to opposition from China and Russia, but Japan, the US, and South Korea will respond with strengthened unilateral sanctions. South Korea's next administration is likely to be progressive, but continued North Korean provocations will impose certain constraints on public opinion, preventing a rapid retreat from Japan-US-South Korea cooperation. The US will reiterate its call for "unconditional dialogue" with North Korea, but no concrete diplomatic progress will be seen. China will maintain "strategic patience," and its exercise of influence over North Korea will remain limited. Japan will proceed with its planned defense budget increase and accelerate the deployment of standoff defense capabilities (long-range missiles). Regional tension levels will remain high, but an "unstable equilibrium" will be maintained without leading to military conflict.
Implications for Investment/Action: Frequency and degree of North Korea's missile launch technological advancements, South Korea's next presidential candidate's policy towards North Korea, scale and frequency of Japan-US-South Korea joint exercises, trends in China's diplomacy towards North Korea
North Korea's resumption of missile tests paradoxically becomes an opportunity for a diplomatic shift. A Trump administration signals its intention to resume direct negotiations with North Korea, raising the possibility of a third summit with Kim Jong-un. This is underpinned by President Trump's inclination towards "deal diplomacy" and a desire for diplomatic achievements ahead of the 2026 midterm elections. China, as part of stabilizing US-China relations, also exerts influence over North Korea, encouraging a return to dialogue. If South Korea's next administration is progressive, the momentum for resuming negotiations within a multilateral framework could increase in conjunction with the resumption of inter-Korean dialogue. However, even if this scenario materializes, the likelihood of it leading to North Korea's denuclearization is extremely low. Instead, an "arms control type" agreement—exchanging a freeze on missile tests for partial sanctions relief—that tacitly accepts North Korea's nuclear possession is the most probable outcome. While this would be a setback for the non-proliferation regime, it would lead to a reduction in regional tensions. For Japan, progress on the abduction issue would be an indispensable condition.
Implications for Investment/Action: Changes in President Trump's tone regarding North Korea, reports of unofficial contacts between the US and North Korea, increased mediation activities by China's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the next South Korean administration's willingness for inter-Korean dialogue
North Korea conducts its 7th nuclear test in 2026, dramatically worsening the regional security environment. The nuclear test is conducted to demonstrate the miniaturization and practical application of tactical nuclear warheads, thereby shifting North Korea's nuclear threat to a qualitatively new stage. The credibility of nuclear blackmail against Japan and South Korea increases, fundamentally questioning the reliability of US extended deterrence. In this scenario, arguments for South Korea's independent nuclear armament rapidly gain traction, shaking the foundation of the NPT regime. In Japan, discussions about "nuclear sharing" emerge as a realistic policy option. The US strengthens the visible forward deployment of strategic nuclear forces (dispatch of nuclear-capable B-52s and SSBNs) to reaffirm its commitment to extended deterrence for South Korea and Japan, but this provokes further backlash from North Korea and China. In the worst case, a North Korean missile test accidentally lands within or near Japan's exclusive economic zone, materializing the risk of accidental military escalation. No hotline exists between Japan, the US, South Korea, and the DPRK, and the absence of crisis management mechanisms makes the situation even more dangerous. If Russia's technology transfer to North Korea accelerates and MIRV technology or reentry vehicle technology is demonstrated, the effectiveness of existing missile defense systems will be fundamentally re-examined.
Implications for Investment/Action: Signs of renewed activity at North Korea's Punggye-ri nuclear test site, satellite image analysis by IAEA and 38 North, changes in North Korea's nuclear use doctrine in external propaganda, intelligence agency assessments regarding technology transfer from Russia
Key Triggers to Watch
- Confirmation of the direction of South Korea's presidential election and the next administration's North Korea policy: Late 2025 – Early 2026
- Satellite image confirmation of preparatory activities at North Korea's Punggye-ri nuclear test site: Throughout 2026 (constant monitoring)
- Holding of Japan-US-South Korea summit and progress in institutionalizing trilateral security cooperation: Early 2026 (possible timing aligned with G7 summit, etc.)
- Trends in voting on UN Security Council sanctions resolutions against North Korea (presence or absence of China/Russia veto): Within 2-4 weeks after missile launch
- Reports on unofficial contacts/back-channel negotiations between the US and North Korea: Late 2026
🔄 Tracking Loop
Next Trigger: Confirmation of the results of South Korea's next presidential election and the new administration's initial statements on North Korea and Japan policy — Early 2026. Whether the new administration inherits the Japan-US-South Korea Camp David agreement will determine the direction of East Asian security.
Continuation of this pattern: Tracking theme: Interlinkage of North Korea's missile/nuclear development and Russia's military cooperation — The next milestone is the technical analysis results of additional missile launches in 2026 (presence or absence of Russian-derived technology)
🎯 Oracle Declaration
Prediction Question: Will North Korea conduct its 7th nuclear test by December 31, 2026?
Deadline for Judgment: 2026-12-31 | Criteria for Judgment: YES if North Korea conducts an underground nuclear test by December 31, 2026, confirmed by seismic wave observation data from the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO), or detection of an artificial earthquake by the Korea Meteorological Administration or the U.S. Geological Survey (USGS). Missile tests or satellite launches are not included. Preparatory activities at the nuclear test site alone do not qualify.
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