North Korea Resumes Missile Launches — Japan'
North Korea's resumption of missile launches in early 2026 has forced Japan into a situation where it must make a historic decision: its first combat interception since the war. This development could irreversibly alter the security architecture of East Asia.
── Understand in 3 points ─────────
- • North Korea resumed ballistic missile launches in early 2026, with impacts confirmed in the Sea of Japan (East Sea).
- • Japan's Ministry of Defense is rushing to strengthen its interception system, replacing Aegis Ashore.
- • Adjustments are underway to further strengthen security cooperation among Japan, the U.S., and South Korea.
── NOW PATTERN ─────────
The dominant pattern is an "escalation spiral" where North Korea's missile launches and the strengthening responses of Japan, the U.S., and South Korea mutually amplify each other. This spiral is being rendered uncontrollable by "path dependency," where past policy choices narrow current options, and "coordination failure," where the international community fails to act in concert.
── Probabilities and Responses ──────
• Base case 55% — Regular launches, about 1-3 times a month, primarily impacting outside the EEZ; expanded scale of Japan-U.S.-South Korea joint exercises; reactions limited to UN Security Council statements.
• Bull case 15% — Reports of secret contacts between the U.S. and North Korea; China's active mediation stance; decrease in North Korea's launch frequency; changes in Kim Jong Un's diplomatic statements.
• Bear case 30% — Impact points close to Japanese territory; missiles passing over the Japanese archipelago; reports of destruction order execution; emergency press conferences by the Minister of Defense and Prime Minister; U.S. military DEFCON level raised.
📡 The Signal — What Happened
Why it matters: North Korea's resumption of missile launches in early 2026 has forced Japan into a situation where it must make a historic decision: its first combat interception since the war. This development could irreversibly alter the security architecture of East Asia.
- Military — North Korea resumed ballistic missile launches in early 2026, with impacts confirmed in the Sea of Japan (East Sea).
- Military — Japan's Ministry of Defense is rushing to strengthen its interception system, replacing Aegis Ashore.
- Diplomacy — Adjustments are underway to further strengthen security cooperation among Japan, the U.S., and South Korea.
- Military — North Korea has a precedent of launching a record approximately 70 missiles in 2022.
- Technology — North Korea's missile technology has qualitatively improved through the development of solid-fuel and hypersonic glide vehicles.
- Diplomacy — The complete stagnation of U.S.-North Korea dialogue since 2024 is the backdrop to the resumption of launches.
- Politics — Japan's defense spending continues to increase towards the 2% GDP target, with the FY2026 budget estimated at approximately 8 trillion yen.
- Military — Japan is proceeding with the construction of two Aegis System Equipped Vessels, scheduled to enter service from FY2027 onwards.
- Regional — South Korea's political instability (turmoil since the martial law incident at the end of 2024) casts a shadow over Japan-U.S.-South Korea cooperation.
- Economy — Part of North Korea's nuclear and missile development funds is financed by cryptocurrency theft through cybercrime.
- Diplomacy — China consistently maintains a passive stance on additional UN Security Council sanctions regarding the North Korean issue.
- Technology — Japan has already decided to introduce Tomahawk cruise missiles as a counterattack capability (enemy base attack capability).
To understand North Korea's resumption of missile launches, it is necessary to look back at the structural patterns of the Korean Peninsula's nuclear and missile crises over the past three decades.
In 1993, North Korea declared its withdrawal from the NPT (Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons), triggering the First North Korean Nuclear Crisis. This crisis temporarily subsided with the 1994 Agreed Framework between the U.S. and North Korea, but North Korea secretly pursued a uranium enrichment program behind the agreement. When this fact came to light in 2002, the Second Nuclear Crisis began, and the Six-Party Talks were held from 2003, but no fundamental resolution was achieved.
Since its first nuclear test in 2006, North Korea has repeated a cycle of "provocation → sanctions → dialogue → agreement → violation → provocation." The essence of this pattern lies in the Kim regime's positioning of nuclear weapons and missiles as the "ultimate insurance" for its survival. The 2011 case of the collapse of Libya's Gaddafi regime after abandoning its nuclear program made it a decisive lesson for Pyongyang that nuclear abandonment means regime collapse.
In the 2017 "fire and fury" crisis, Kim Jong Un and Trump escalated tensions to the brink of nuclear war before turning to dramatic summit diplomacy in 2018. However, since the collapse of the Hanoi summit in 2019, U.S.-North Korea dialogue has completely stalled. While the Biden administration has prioritized the North Korean issue, it has failed to achieve substantial diplomatic progress, and North Korea launched a record approximately 70 missiles in 2022.
Since 2024, the situation has become even more complex. Triggered by Russia's invasion of Ukraine, North Korea has rapidly deepened its military cooperation with Russia. Information that North Korea is supplying artillery shells and ballistic missiles to Russia in exchange for satellite technology, food, and energy assistance indicates that the post-Cold War East Asian security order is fundamentally transforming. The de facto alignment of China, Russia, and North Korea is beginning to function as a counterbalance to the Japan-U.S.-South Korea alliance structure.
For Japan, the resumption of missile launches in 2026 in this context is not merely a case of "North Korea launched missiles again." Since the three security documents (National Security Strategy, National Defense Strategy, and Defense Buildup Program) were approved by the Cabinet in December 2022, Japan has been pursuing a fundamental shift in its post-war defense policy. The increase in defense spending to 2% of GDP, the acquisition of counterattack capabilities, and the construction of Aegis System Equipped Vessels are all concrete manifestations of this shift, but the framework for the political decision to actually exercise these capabilities remains ambiguous.
Particularly important is the qualitative change in North Korea's missile technology. Conventional liquid-fueled missiles required significant preparation time for launch, making pre-detection by satellites relatively easy. However, solid-fueled missiles have drastically reduced launch times, enabling surprise launches from TELs (Transporter Erector Launchers). Furthermore, the development of hypersonic glide vehicles (HGVs) fundamentally challenges the interception capabilities of existing missile defense systems. Japan's Aegis BMD system is designed to intercept missiles flying on ballistic trajectories, and dealing with HGVs flying on irregular trajectories is considered technically extremely difficult.
In 2026, where these technological changes and the transformation of the geopolitical environment converge, North Korea's resumption of missile launches could become a watershed moment, shifting Japan's security posture from "deterrence theory" to "the reality of combat." If Japan intercepts, it will be executing its first military action since the war; if it does not, the reliability of its missile defense system will be fundamentally questioned. Either choice will have an irreversible impact on Japan's security policy and the strategic balance in East Asia.
The delta: The qualitative change in North Korea's missile technology (solid-fuel and hypersonic capabilities) and the deepening China-Russia-North Korea cooperation are rendering the traditional "provocation → sanctions → dialogue" cycle dysfunctional, creating a situation where Japan is forced to make its first post-war combat decision: "to intercept or not to intercept."
🔍 Between the Lines — What the News Isn't Saying
The biggest point that official statements don't address is that it is unverified whether Japan's interception system is technically effective against North Korea's latest missiles (hypersonic glide vehicles and irregular trajectory types). While the Ministry of Defense emphasizes "perfect readiness," in reality, the gaps in the defense system after the withdrawal of Aegis Ashore have not been filled, and doubts about interception capabilities are shared internally. Furthermore, the timing of North Korea's resumption of missile launches has an aspect of "demonstration" of new capabilities acquired through military-technical cooperation with Russia, and the true audience is not Japan, the U.S., and South Korea, but potential third-country customers who might order weapons from North Korea.
NOW PATTERN
Escalation Spiral × Path Dependency × Coordination Failure
The dominant pattern is an "escalation spiral" where North Korea's missile launches and the strengthening responses of Japan, the U.S., and South Korea mutually amplify each other. This spiral is being rendered uncontrollable by "path dependency," where past policy choices narrow current options, and "coordination failure," where the international community fails to act in concert.
Intersection of Dynamics
The three dynamics of "escalation spiral," "path dependency," and "coordination failure" form a dangerous structure that mutually reinforces itself. First, the escalation spiral automatically escalates the actions of each actor, but international coordination mechanisms are needed to stop this escalation. However, due to "coordination failure," neither the UN Security Council nor the Six-Party Talks are functioning, meaning there is no external brake to control the spiral.
Next, "path dependency" makes policy shifts difficult for each actor. Japan has invested enormous sums in its BMD system, and choosing "not to intercept" would negate the justification for that investment. North Korea has staked the legitimacy of its regime on nuclear weapons and missiles, and stopping their development would mean losing the very reason for the regime's existence. This rigidity narrows the room for compromise within the escalation spiral.
Even more serious is how these dynamics create a "lock-in effect" on each other. As long as coordination failure persists, countries are forced to strengthen their own military responses (reinforcing path dependency), which in turn heightens the adversary's perception of threat and accelerates the escalation spiral. This acceleration of the spiral further rigidifies each country's stance, further reducing the possibility of coordination. Within this vicious cycle, the risk of an accidental collision (missile trajectory miscalculation, interception system malfunction, communication misunderstanding, etc.) escalating into a full-blown crisis is significantly higher than before. The year 2026 marks a transitional period where Japan's Aegis System Equipped Vessels are incomplete, leaving gaps in its defense posture, while the legal and technical foundations for counterattack capabilities are being developed. This "asymmetry of capabilities" widens the margin for error in judgment.
📚 Pattern History
1994: First North Korean Nuclear Crisis and U.S.-North Korea Agreed Framework
Escalation Spiral → Diplomatic Compromise → Non-Compliance → Re-escalation
Structural Similarity to Present: Diplomatic compromise is merely a temporary stalling tactic; if fundamental conflicts of interest remain unresolved, crises will inevitably reignite.
2006: North Korea's First Nuclear Test and UN Security Council Resolution 1718
Military Provocation → International Sanctions → Decreased Effectiveness of Sanctions → Further Provocation
Structural Similarity to Present: Sanctions are ineffective without the coordination of major powers; sanctions without China's cooperation taught North Korea that "endurance leads to victory."
2017: "Fire and Fury" Crisis (U.S.-North Korea Nuclear Brinkmanship)
Escalation → Brinkmanship → Dramatic Diplomatic Shift → Stagnation Without Agreement
Structural Similarity to Present: Brinkmanship diplomacy relies on the personal judgment of leaders, and the lack of institutional crisis management mechanisms increases the risk of accidental conflict.
2022: North Korea's Record Missile Launches (Approx. 70)
Dialogue Stagnation → Mass Launches → International Community's "Habituation" → Decreased Crisis Perception
Structural Similarity to Present: Frequent missile launches create "habituation" in the international community, and the normalization of crisis increases the risk of overlooking truly dangerous situations.
1962: Cuban Missile Crisis (U.S.-Soviet Nuclear Brinkmanship)
Missile Deployment → Naval Blockade → Brinkmanship → Hotline Establishment
Structural Similarity to Present: Nuclear crises are unmanageable without direct communication channels between the parties involved, and no such channel exists between Japan and North Korea.
Patterns Revealed by History
The most important lesson revealed by historical patterns is that nuclear and missile crises do not "resolve themselves." The cycles repeated in 1994, 2006, 2017, and 2022 have invariably led to a re-escalation of tensions to a higher level after temporary de-escalation. With each cycle, North Korea's technological capabilities have improved, and the international community's response options have been depleted. Particularly dangerous is the phenomenon of "crisis normalization." Even with 70 missile launches in 2022, the international community's reaction was not as strong as during the first nuclear test in 2006. This "habituation" psychologically weakens preparedness for truly dangerous situations (e.g., impacts on Japanese territory or interception events). Furthermore, as the Cuban Missile Crisis taught us, a hotline between the parties involved is indispensable for managing a nuclear crisis, but no such direct communication channel exists between Japan and North Korea. The U.S.-North Korea channel is also virtually non-functional, and the risk of miscalculation or accidental events escalating uncontrollably is at a level comparable to the eve of the Cuban Missile Crisis during the Cold War.
🔮 Next Scenarios
North Korea will continue intermittent missile launches throughout 2026, maintaining a "managed escalation" approach that avoids trajectories posing a direct threat to mainland Japan. Launches will likely be around 20-40 per year, with repeated impacts inside and outside Japan's Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), but without crossing the "red line" that would prompt the Japanese government to decide on interception. Japan will continue to strengthen its interception posture but will not undertake actual interception actions. Destruction orders will remain constantly issued, but responses will be limited to J-Alert activations and evacuation advisories for residents. Joint military exercises with the U.S. and South Korea will expand in scale, and the Japan-U.S.-South Korea missile warning data sharing system will be further strengthened. Diplomatically, Japan will seek condemnation statements at the UN Security Council, but no new sanctions resolution will be adopted due to opposition from China and Russia. Covertly, various countries will explore unofficial contacts with North Korea, but substantive dialogue will not resume. This state of "elevated tension" will remain unstable but manageable, taking the form of "strategic patience" while awaiting the commissioning of Aegis System Equipped Vessels from 2027 onwards.
Implications for Investment/Action: Regular launches, about 1-3 times a month, primarily impacting outside the EEZ; expanded scale of Japan-U.S.-South Korea joint exercises; reactions limited to UN Security Council statements.
A scenario where an unexpected diplomatic breakthrough occurs, leading to a temporary halt in missile launches. The most likely path is if a new U.S. administration (or a policy shift by the current administration) resumes direct dialogue with North Korea, leading to a provisional "freeze-for-freeze" agreement (exchange of nuclear/missile development freeze for reduced scale of U.S.-South Korea military exercises). Several conditions are necessary for this scenario to materialize. First, Kim Jong Un needs a "narrative of victory" that can domestically justify resuming dialogue, which has some basis given his declared status as a nuclear-armed state. Second, the U.S. side needs an incentive to invest diplomatic resources in the North Korean issue, which could arise if stabilizing the Korean Peninsula serves U.S. interests in the context of strategic competition with China. Furthermore, China needs to demonstrate its willingness and capability to play a mediating role. If this scenario materializes, Japan would continue to develop its interception system while also gaining diplomatic room to explore the resumption of Japan-North Korea negotiations, including the abduction issue. However, as past lessons show, this type of agreement is inherently fragile and does not guarantee long-term stability.
Implications for Investment/Action: Reports of secret contacts between the U.S. and North Korea; China's active mediation stance; decrease in North Korea's launch frequency; changes in Kim Jong Un's diplomatic statements.
A scenario where a North Korean missile flies on a trajectory extremely close to Japanese territory, and Japan attempts an interception. In this scenario, North Korea either intentionally or due to technical failure causes a missile to impact a point significantly close to Japanese territory within Japan's Exclusive Economic Zone, or Japan executes destruction measures for the first time against a missile passing over Japanese airspace. If the interception succeeds, Japan is likely to gain international support, but relations with North Korea will decisively worsen, and the risk of retaliatory additional launches will rapidly increase. If the interception fails, the reliability of Japan's missile defense system will be severely questioned both domestically and internationally, leading to a political crisis. In either case, military tensions in the Sea of Japan will reach their highest post-Cold War level, and the risk of accidental armed conflict will become manifest. Increased U.S. military involvement and China's defense of North Korea would embed the situation within the context of U.S.-China rivalry, moving it beyond a bilateral Japan-North Korea issue. This scenario is also expected to have significant impacts on financial markets, including a sharp rise in the yen (as a safe-haven asset), a steep decline in Japanese stocks, and a surge in defense-related stocks. Capital outflow from the Japanese stock market could reach trillions of yen.
Implications for Investment/Action: Impact points close to Japanese territory; missiles passing over the Japanese archipelago; reports of destruction order execution; emergency press conferences by the Minister of Defense and Prime Minister; U.S. military DEFCON level raised.
Key Triggers to Watch
- North Korea launches a missile passing over the Japanese archipelago: April-December 2026 (especially around U.S.-South Korea joint exercises)
- Vote on a UN Security Council resolution sanctioning North Korea (presence or absence of China/Russia veto): First half of 2026
- Launch and sea trials of Japan's Aegis System Equipped Vessels: Second half of 2026 - first half of 2027
- Resumption of secret contacts or official dialogue between the U.S. and North Korea: Throughout 2026 (especially after the U.S. midterm elections)
- North Korea conducts a nuclear test (7th test): Throughout 2026 (technically possible at any time)
🔄 Tracking Loop
Next Trigger: Next North Korean missile launch (especially one passing over the Japanese archipelago) — Provocation during the U.S.-South Korea joint military exercise period in April-June 2026 is most probable.
Continuation of this pattern: Tracking Theme: North Korea Missile Crisis 2026 — Next milestones are the launch of Japan's Aegis System Equipped Vessels (scheduled for late 2026) and whether North Korea conducts its 7th nuclear test.
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