North Korea Resumes Missile Launches — Spiral of Confrontation N

📡 THE SIGNAL — What Happened

Why it matters: The resumption of ballistic missile launches in early 2026 is not merely a repetition of provocations. Japan is approaching a threshold where it may be forced to make a real-world interception decision, potentially becoming a turning point that irreversibly alters the security structure of East Asia itself.

• Military — North Korea conducted multiple ballistic missile launches from January to March 2026, with impacts confirmed both inside and outside Japan's Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) in the Sea of Japan (East Sea).
• Military — The launched missiles included intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBMs) and new solid-fuel missiles, confirming a reduction in launch preparation time and improved detection evasion capabilities.
• Defense — Japan's Ministry of Defense announced a policy to strengthen the constant deployment posture of Aegis-equipped destroyers in the Sea of Japan and expand forward deployment bases for PAC-3.
• Diplomacy — The US-Japan-ROK trilateral alliance held emergency security consultations in February 2026 and agreed to expand the real-time sharing system for missile warning data.
• Diplomacy — China's Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued a statement calling on "all relevant parties to exercise restraint," but maintained a passive stance on additional sanctions resolutions at the UN Security Council.
• Diplomacy — Russia has effectively continued military-technical cooperation with North Korea, with transfers of solid-fuel technology and Transporter Erector Launcher (TEL) technology being noted.
• Economy — The Japanese government is considering an additional appropriation of approximately 500 billion yen for missile defense-related expenses in the fiscal 2026 supplementary budget.
• Domestic Politics — In Japan, debate has reignited over the criteria for exercising "enemy base attack capability" (counterstrike capability), with fierce controversy unfolding between ruling and opposition parties regarding the scope of cabinet decisions.
• Technology — North Korea's new missiles have been confirmed to fly on irregular trajectories (depressed trajectories), leading to analyses that interception based on conventional ballistic calculations will be difficult.
• Sanctions — UN Security Council resolutions imposing sanctions on North Korea have become increasingly hollow, with their effectiveness significantly diminished by China and Russia's exercise of veto power in the sanctions committee.
• Alliance — The US military is proceeding with the additional deployment of THAAD (Terminal High Altitude Area Defense) systems in Guam and at US military bases in Japan.
• Society — J-Alerts (National Instant Warning System) have been issued repeatedly in Japan, reigniting a sense of crisis among the public regarding the North Korean threat.

To understand the background behind the resumption of North Korea's ballistic missile launches in early 2026, it is necessary to take a bird's-eye view of the structural cycle of nuclear and missile crises on the Korean Peninsula over the past 30 years.

In 1993, North Korea's declaration of withdrawal from the NPT (Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons) triggered the First Nuclear Crisis. This crisis temporarily subsided with the 1994 Agreed Framework between the US and North Korea, but North Korea secretly pursued a uranium enrichment program, the discovery of which in 2002 led to the eruption of the Second Nuclear Crisis. The Six-Party Talks, which began in 2003, were held intermittently, but North Korea withdrew in 2009. Since then, North Korea has accelerated its nuclear tests and missile launches, conducting the launch of a "Hwasong-15" type ICBM and its sixth nuclear test in 2017, declaring "completion of nuclear force."

The US-North Korea summits in 2018-2019 (Singapore and Hanoi) brought about a temporary easing of tensions, but diplomatic channels have been effectively frozen since the breakdown in Hanoi. During this period, North Korea continued its domestic weapons development, advancing solid-fuel ICBM "Hwasong-18" and tactical nuclear weapons. In 2022, it launched a record high of approximately 70 missiles throughout the year, an unprecedented situation where multiple missiles fell within Japan's EEZ.

However, from late 2023 to 2025, the frequency of North Korean missile launches relatively decreased. Several factors lie behind this "quiet period." First, North Korea's deepening involvement in the Russia-Ukraine war prioritized the supply of conventional weapons (artillery shells, missile bodies) to Russia. Second, it took time to digest and integrate satellite and solid-fuel technologies acquired from Russia in return. Third, the Kim Jong Un regime was forced to allocate certain resources to stabilize the domestic economy.

The resumption of launches in early 2026 signifies the end of this "technology digestion period." It suggests that North Korea has integrated technologies acquired from Russia into its own missile program and entered a phase of demonstrating new capabilities. Particularly noteworthy is the significant reduction in response time from detecting launch signs to impact, due to irregular trajectory flight capabilities and the adoption of solid fuel. This represents a qualitatively different threat to Japan's missile defense system.

The geopolitical context is also crucial. The deepening US-China rivalry, Russia's international isolation and rapprochement with North Korea, the destabilization of South Korean domestic politics (the martial law turmoil at the end of 2024 and its aftermath), and Japan's structural change of increasing defense spending to 2% of GDP are all progressing simultaneously. North Korea's missile launches should be understood as actions by the Kim Jong Un regime to maximize its strategic value within this complex geopolitical environment.

Historically, North Korea has repeated a cycle of "provocation → crisis → negotiation → acquisition of concessions → agreement abrogation → renewed provocation." This time, however, diplomatic channels to transition to the "negotiation" phase of this cycle are virtually nonexistent. The United States faces multiple security challenges in Ukraine, the Middle East, and the Taiwan Strait, leaving it with no leeway to allocate diplomatic resources to North Korea. China has a strategic interest in preserving North Korea as a card against the US, and Japan faces an extremely high hurdle for interception decisions due to constitutional constraints and a lack of real-world experience. This "spiral of conflict with no exit" is what makes the current crisis qualitatively different from the past.

The delta: North Korea's missile capabilities have entered a phase of "qualitative transformation" from "quantitative expansion." The time allowed for Japan's interception decisions has been dramatically shortened due to irregular trajectories and solid-fuelization, approaching a threshold where decisions must be entrusted to technical automatic judgment rather than political judgment. Simultaneously, with diplomatic exits blocked, the risk of a self-reinforcing "spiral of conflict" has reached its highest level ever.