North Korea Resumes Missile Launches — Spiral of
With North Korea resuming ballistic missile launches in early 2026 and at least one confirmed to have fallen within Japan's EEZ, Japan's security system is facing its biggest turning point since the Cold War. This situation is not merely a military provocation but an manifestation of structural dynamics reshaping the security order of East Asia itself.
── Understand in 3 points ─────────
- • North Korea conducted multiple ballistic missile launches from January to March 2026. Launches included a new type of intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM).
- • At least one of the launched missiles fell within Japan's Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), reaching a level of direct threat not seen since 2017.
- • The new missile employs a solid-fuel propulsion system, confirming a significant reduction in launch preparation time and operational capability from a Transporter Erector Launcher (TEL).
── NOW PATTERN ─────────
The "spiral of conflict," where North Korea's missile launches and the defense strengthening of Japan, the U.S., and South Korea mutually provoke each other, is accelerating, reproducing a Cold War-type security dilemma in East Asia. This spiral is becoming entrenched in a structure difficult to control due to "alliance strain" and "path dependency."
── Probabilities and Responses ──────
• Base case 55% — North Korea's missile launch frequency remains at 1-3 times per month. The Japanese government announces concrete measures based on the three defense documents. A new UN Security Council resolution is not adopted. Regular Japan-U.S.-ROK consultations are held periodically.
• Bull case 15% — North Korea suddenly declares a missile launch moratorium. Signs of China strengthening economic pressure on North Korea. Reports of secret contacts between the U.S. and North Korea. Dialogue signals in Kim Jong Un's New Year's address or official statements.
• Bear case 30% — Signs of a nuclear test, such as preparations for tunnel closure at the Yongbyon nuclear facility. Launch of a Hwasong-17 or higher-class ICBM. Missile trajectory passing over Japanese territory. Threats of nuclear use in North Korea's official statements. Reports of accidental incidents.
📡 The Signal — What Happened
Why it matters: With North Korea resuming ballistic missile launches in early 2026 and at least one confirmed to have fallen within Japan's EEZ, Japan's security system is facing its biggest turning point since the Cold War. This situation is not merely a military provocation but an manifestation of structural dynamics reshaping the security order of East Asia itself.
- Military — North Korea conducted multiple ballistic missile launches from January to March 2026. Launches included a new type of intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM).
- Military — At least one of the launched missiles fell within Japan's Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), reaching a level of direct threat not seen since 2017.
- Technology — The new missile employs a solid-fuel propulsion system, confirming a significant reduction in launch preparation time and operational capability from a Transporter Erector Launcher (TEL).
- Diplomacy — The UN Security Council held an emergency meeting, but a new sanctions resolution was not adopted due to opposition from China and Russia.
- Defense — The Japanese government issued J-Alerts (National Instant Warning System) multiple times. Evacuation orders were issued to the public.
- Alliance — Japan, the U.S., and South Korea held an emergency foreign ministers' meeting and "condemned in the strongest terms" North Korea's missile launches in a joint statement.
- Defense — Japan's Ministry of Defense decided to additionally deploy Aegis-equipped destroyers to the Sea of Japan, strengthening its 24-hour vigilance and surveillance posture.
- Economy — Immediately after the missile launches, the Nikkei Stock Average temporarily fell by over 500 points. A "flight to safety yen buying" occurred, with the yen sharply appreciating against the dollar.
- Politics — Within Japan's ruling party, calls for the early operationalization of "counterattack capabilities (反撃能力)" grew stronger, and discussions are underway for the accelerated execution of the FY2027 budget.
- Technology — North Korea's missiles were launched on an irregular trajectory (lofted trajectory), confirming an increased difficulty in interception by existing missile defense systems.
- Intelligence — South Korea's National Intelligence Service reported signs of North Korea reactivating activities at the Yongbyon nuclear facility, pointing to the possibility of further progress in miniaturizing nuclear warheads.
- International — In response to North Korea's missile launches, the U.S. Indo-Pacific Command deployed B-1B strategic bombers to the vicinity of the Korean Peninsula.
To understand North Korea's resumption of missile launches, it is necessary to survey the historical trajectory of the Korean Peninsula's nuclear and missile issues over the past 30 years.
The origins of North Korea's nuclear and missile development date back to the early 1990s. In 1993, North Korea declared its withdrawal from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), shocking the international community. While a temporary crisis was averted by the 1994 Agreed Framework between the U.S. and North Korea, this agreement effectively collapsed in 2002 with the discovery of North Korea's uranium enrichment program. Subsequently, a multilateral diplomatic framework known as the Six-Party Talks (2003-2009) was attempted, but North Korea conducted its first nuclear test in 2006, significantly narrowing the path to a diplomatic solution.
Entering the 2010s, nuclear and missile development accelerated under the Kim Jong Un regime. 2017 was a particularly critical year, with North Korea launching Hwasong-14 and Hwasong-15 ICBM-class missiles and conducting what it claimed was its sixth nuclear test (a hydrogen bomb test). In the same year, missiles passed over Hokkaido twice, making Japanese society acutely aware of the North Korean threat. The phrase "fire and fury" was exchanged between former President Trump and Chairman Kim Jong Un, bringing the Korean Peninsula to the brink of conflict.
From 2018 to 2019, a dramatic diplomatic shift occurred. Inter-Korean dialogue, triggered by the PyeongChang Winter Olympics, and three U.S.-North Korea summit meetings took place, with North Korea declaring a moratorium on ICBM launches and nuclear tests. However, when the Hanoi summit in February 2019 collapsed, the window for diplomacy began to close. North Korea declared it would take a "new path" and resumed short-range ballistic missile launches. As international attention shifted to the COVID-19 pandemic, North Korea continued its weapons development covertly.
2022 was a year when North Korea's missile launches reached a record frequency. Over 70 ballistic missiles were launched annually, including the Hwasong-17, an ICBM-class missile. In November, a short-range ballistic missile fell within Japan's EEZ, prompting the Japanese government to express strong alarm. During this period, Russia's invasion of Ukraine fundamentally shook the international order, and North Korea exploited this geopolitical turmoil to demonstrate its military capabilities.
The rapid deepening of military cooperation between North Korea and Russia since 2023 is a crucial backdrop to the current resumption of missile launches. Chairman Kim Jong Un visited the Russian Far East in September 2023 and met with President Putin. North Korea is believed to have received transfers of advanced military technology from Russia in exchange for supplying large quantities of artillery shells and ammunition for use in the war in Ukraine. The possibility of satellite technology, submarine technology, and know-how related to missile accuracy improvement having been transferred has been pointed out.
Why is the resumption of missile launches in early 2026 happening "now"? The answer lies in the convergence of multiple structural factors. First, North Korea has entered a phase of demonstrating the technologies acquired through cooperation with Russia. The successful launch of a solid-fuel IRBM is evidence of this technology transfer. Second, the international sanctions regime has effectively become dysfunctional. China continues economic support, and Russia blocks stronger sanctions in the UN Security Council with its veto power. Third, U.S. attention is dispersed across multiple crises, including Ukraine, the Middle East, and the Taiwan Strait, leading to a decrease in diplomatic focus on the Korean Peninsula. Fourth, 2026 is scheduled for a House of Councillors election in Japan and midterm elections in the U.S., and North Korea tends to time its provocations to coincide with the electoral cycles of democratic nations.
In this historical context, the resumption of missile launches in 2026 is not a "sudden provocation" but a strategic step towards establishing North Korea's status as a nuclear-armed state, and simultaneously, evidence that the security order of East Asia is structurally destabilizing. For Japan, this situation represents the most serious direct military threat since 1945, and the very concept of "exclusive defense-oriented policy (専守防衛)," which has been the cornerstone of Japan's post-war security, is being re-examined.
The delta: North Korea's successful launch of a solid-fuel IRBM and its impact within the EEZ have fundamentally altered the preconditions of Japan's missile defense system. The reduction in launch preparation time and the adoption of irregular trajectories are pushing responses into a realm difficult for existing detection and interception timelines. This is a turning point that makes the transition from "defense-only" to "integrated deterrence including counterattack capabilities (反撃能力)" inevitable.
📡 The Signal — What Happened
Why it matters: With North Korea resuming ballistic missile launches in early 2026 and at least one confirmed to have fallen within Japan's EEZ, Japan's security system is facing its biggest turning point since the Cold War. This situation is not merely a military provocation but an manifestation of structural dynamics reshaping the security order of East Asia itself.
- Military — North Korea conducted multiple ballistic missile launches from January to March 2026. Launches included a new type of intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM).
- Military — At least one of the launched missiles fell within Japan's Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), reaching a level of direct threat not seen since 2017.
- Technology — The new missile employs a solid-fuel propulsion system, confirming a significant reduction in launch preparation time and operational capability from a Transporter Erector Launcher (TEL).
- Diplomacy — The UN Security Council held an emergency meeting, but a new sanctions resolution was not adopted due to opposition from China and Russia.
- Defense — The Japanese government issued J-Alerts (National Instant Warning System) multiple times. Evacuation orders were issued to the public.
- Alliance — Japan, the U.S., and South Korea held an emergency foreign ministers' meeting and "condemned in the strongest terms" North Korea's missile launches in a joint statement.
- Defense — Japan's Ministry of Defense decided to additionally deploy Aegis-equipped destroyers to the Sea of Japan, strengthening its 24-hour vigilance and surveillance posture.
- Economy — Immediately after the missile launches, the Nikkei Stock Average temporarily fell by over 500 points. A "flight to safety yen buying" occurred, with the yen sharply appreciating against the dollar.
- Politics — Within Japan's ruling party, calls for the early operationalization of "counterattack capabilities (反撃能力)" grew stronger, and discussions are underway for the accelerated execution of the FY2027 budget.
- Technology — North Korea's missiles were launched on an irregular trajectory (lofted trajectory), confirming an increased difficulty in interception by existing missile defense systems.
- Intelligence — South Korea's National Intelligence Service reported signs of North Korea reactivating activities at the Yongbyon nuclear facility, pointing to the possibility of further progress in miniaturizing nuclear warheads.
- International — In response to North Korea's missile launches, the U.S. Indo-Pacific Command deployed B-1B strategic bombers to the vicinity of the Korean Peninsula.
To understand North Korea's resumption of missile launches, it is necessary to survey the historical trajectory of the Korean Peninsula's nuclear and missile issues over the past 30 years.
The origins of North Korea's nuclear and missile development date back to the early 1990s. In 1993, North Korea declared its withdrawal from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), shocking the international community. While a temporary crisis was averted by the 1994 Agreed Framework between the U.S. and North Korea, this agreement effectively collapsed in 2002 with the discovery of North Korea's uranium enrichment program. Subsequently, a multilateral diplomatic framework known as the Six-Party Talks (2003-2009) was attempted, but North Korea conducted its first nuclear test in 2006, significantly narrowing the path to a diplomatic solution.
Entering the 2010s, nuclear and missile development accelerated under the Kim Jong Un regime. 2017 was a particularly critical year, with North Korea launching Hwasong-14 and Hwasong-15 ICBM-class missiles and conducting what it claimed was its sixth nuclear test (a hydrogen bomb test). In the same year, missiles passed over Hokkaido twice, making Japanese society acutely aware of the North Korean threat. The phrase "fire and fury" was exchanged between former President Trump and Chairman Kim Jong Un, bringing the Korean Peninsula to the brink of conflict.
From 2018 to 2019, a dramatic diplomatic shift occurred. Inter-Korean dialogue, triggered by the PyeongChang Winter Olympics, and three U.S.-North Korea summit meetings took place, with North Korea declaring a moratorium on ICBM launches and nuclear tests. However, when the Hanoi summit in February 2019 collapsed, the window for diplomacy began to close. North Korea declared it would take a "new path" and resumed short-range ballistic missile launches. As international attention shifted to the COVID-19 pandemic, North Korea continued its weapons development covertly.
2022 was a year when North Korea's missile launches reached a record frequency. Over 70 ballistic missiles were launched annually, including the Hwasong-17, an ICBM-class missile. In November, a short-range ballistic missile fell within Japan's EEZ, prompting the Japanese government to express strong alarm. During this period, Russia's invasion of Ukraine fundamentally shook the international order, and North Korea exploited this geopolitical turmoil to demonstrate its military capabilities.
The rapid deepening of military cooperation between North Korea and Russia since 2023 is a crucial backdrop to the current resumption of missile launches. Chairman Kim Jong Un visited the Russian Far East in September 2023 and met with President Putin. North Korea is believed to have received transfers of advanced military technology from Russia in exchange for supplying large quantities of artillery shells and ammunition for use in the war in Ukraine. The possibility of satellite technology, submarine technology, and know-how related to missile accuracy improvement having been transferred has been pointed out.
Why is the resumption of missile launches in early 2026 happening "now"? The answer lies in the convergence of multiple structural factors. First, North Korea has entered a phase of demonstrating the technologies acquired through cooperation with Russia. The successful launch of a solid-fuel IRBM is evidence of this technology transfer. Second, the international sanctions regime has effectively become dysfunctional. China continues economic support, and Russia blocks stronger sanctions in the UN Security Council with its veto power. Third, U.S. attention is dispersed across multiple crises, including Ukraine, the Middle East, and the Taiwan Strait, leading to a decrease in diplomatic focus on the Korean Peninsula. Fourth, 2026 is scheduled for a House of Councillors election in Japan and midterm elections in the U.S., and North Korea tends to time its provocations to coincide with the electoral cycles of democratic nations.
In this historical context, the resumption of missile launches in 2026 is not a "sudden provocation" but a strategic step towards establishing North Korea's status as a nuclear-armed state, and simultaneously, evidence that the security order of East Asia is structurally destabilizing. For Japan, this situation represents the most serious direct military threat since 1945, and the very concept of "exclusive defense-oriented policy (専守防衛)," which has been the cornerstone of Japan's post-war security, is being re-examined.
The delta: North Korea's successful launch of a solid-fuel IRBM and its impact within the EEZ have fundamentally altered the preconditions of Japan's missile defense system. The reduction in launch preparation time and the adoption of irregular trajectories are pushing responses into a realm difficult for existing detection and interception timelines. This is a turning point that makes the transition from "defense-only" to "integrated deterrence including counterattack capabilities (反撃能力)" inevitable.
NOW PATTERN
Spiral of Conflict × Alliance Strain × Path Dependency
The "spiral of conflict," where North Korea's missile launches and the defense strengthening of Japan, the U.S., and South Korea mutually provoke each other, is accelerating, reproducing a Cold War-type security dilemma in East Asia. This spiral is becoming entrenched in a structure difficult to control due to "alliance strain" and "path dependency."
Intersection of Dynamics
The three dynamics of "spiral of conflict," "alliance strain," and "path dependency" do not operate independently but form complex dynamics that interact and amplify each other.
As the spiral of conflict accelerates, alliance cohesion is temporarily strengthened, but at the same time, internal cracks within the alliance also widen. While Japan, the U.S., and South Korea unite when the North Korean missile threat increases, differences in approach among allies emerge regarding specific countermeasures—the intensity of sanctions, the scale of military exercises, and the possibility of dialogue. Particularly, as the spiral escalates, domestic political pressure in each country increases, and a tendency to prioritize hardline stances for domestic audiences over inter-alliance coordination strengthens.
Alliance strain reduces the ability to control the spiral of conflict. If Japan, the U.S., and South Korea were completely unified, they could send a consistent deterrence message to North Korea, but if cracks are visible, North Korea can exploit these gaps to individually sway each country. As seen during the inter-Korean dialogue in 2018, if South Korea shifts to a conciliatory stance, it disrupts coordination with Japan and the U.S., breaking the trilateral cooperation. This disunity provides North Korea with further incentives for provocation, accelerating the spiral.
Path dependency is the most fundamental dynamic that entrenches both the spiral and the strain. As long as North Korea cannot choose denuclearization, the spiral will not stop. As long as Japan has shifted its course from exclusive defense-oriented policy (専守防衛) to counterattack capabilities (反撃能力), the trend of defense buildup cannot be reversed. And as long as the Japan-U.S. alliance remains the cornerstone of East Asian security, alliance strain will be managed but not resolved. As these three dynamics mutually entrench each other, the East Asian security environment converges into a state of "stable instability"—where large-scale war does not occur, but crises become normalized. To break this structure, a powerful external shock (such as a dramatic diplomatic shift between the U.S. and North Korea, a fundamental change in China's policy toward North Korea, or an accidental military clash on the Korean Peninsula) would need to be introduced to one of the dynamics. However, such a shift is difficult to predict and carries the risk of further deepening the crisis.
📚 Pattern History
1962: Cuban Missile Crisis
Attempt by a nuclear-armed state to create a fait accompli and the spiral escalation of a security dilemma.
Structural similarities with the present: Nuclear brinkmanship carries extremely high risks, but a direct dialogue channel (hotline establishment) served as a restraint after the crisis. The absence of such a channel with North Korea makes the current crisis even more serious.
1994: First North Korean Nuclear Crisis and U.S.-DPRK Agreed Framework
Diplomatic solutions are attempted at the peak of military tension, but the agreement collapses due to insufficient implementation mechanisms.
Structural similarities with the present: The Agreed Framework temporarily froze North Korea's nuclear development but collapsed 10 years later due to inadequate verification and mutual distrust. Diplomatic agreements are merely an "entry point" and cannot function without sustained verification and confidence-building.
2017: North Korean ICBM and Hydrogen Bomb Crisis and "Fire and Fury"
Technological breakthroughs (ICBM-class missiles, hydrogen bomb) elevated the spiral of conflict to a new level, with subsequent diplomacy yielding limited results.
Structural similarities with the present: The 2017 crisis led to a dramatic diplomatic shift in 2018, but the fundamental structure remained unchanged. Technological progress is irreversible, and diplomacy cannot "turn back the clock." The current success of the solid-fuel IRBM is a similar irreversible advancement.
2022: Russia's Invasion of Ukraine and Surge in North Korean Missile Launches
During periods of international disorder, states aspiring to nuclear armament expand their freedom of action.
Structural similarities with the present: Russia's invasion of Ukraine exposed the dysfunction of the UN Security Council, and North Korea exploited this vacuum to conduct missile launches at a record frequency. The relaxation of international order creates cascading security risks.
1983: Korean Air Flight 007 Incident and Strengthening of Japan-U.S.-ROK Cooperation
North Korea-related crises temporarily strengthen Japan-U.S.-ROK security cooperation, but the cohesion of cooperation diminishes once the crisis subsides.
Structural similarities with the present: Crisis-driven alliance strengthening lacks sustainability. Whether Japan-U.S.-ROK cooperation in 2026 becomes "institutionalized" or ends as "temporary cohesion" will determine the long-term security environment.
Patterns Revealed by History
The most important pattern revealed by historical precedents is a spiral ascent of "crisis → diplomacy → agreement → collapse → higher threat → more serious crisis." The 1994 Agreed Framework, the 2005 Six-Party Talks Joint Statement, and the 2018 Singapore U.S.-DPRK Joint Statement—all brought temporary tension reduction, but North Korea's nuclear and missile capabilities actually improved with each agreement. Diplomacy can temporarily pause the spiral, but it has not succeeded in reversing it.
Another important pattern is that North Korea's actions become more active during periods of international order relaxation. The vacuum of order after the collapse of the Soviet Union in the 1990s, the dysfunction of the Security Council due to the war in Ukraine in 2022—in both periods, North Korea expanded its freedom of action. The international environment in 2026, with the prolonged war in Ukraine, instability in the Middle East, and political division in the U.S., is more relaxed than at any previous time, making it historically the most conducive environment for North Korea to act.
The greatest lesson history teaches is that technological progress is irreversible. Even if a moratorium on nuclear tests is declared, the data obtained from nuclear weapon designs does not disappear. Even if missile launches are suspended, solid-fuel technology does not degrade. Time is always on the side of capability enhancement, and diplomatic delays increase the costs for the defense side. A strategy based on this structural asymmetry is required.
🔮 Next Scenarios
North Korea will continue intermittent missile launches throughout 2026 but will not proceed with ICBM-class launches or a seventh nuclear test. While the frequency of launches will not reach the record levels of 2022, approximately 20-30 ballistic and cruise missile launches will occur annually. An additional 1-2 impacts within Japan's EEZ are possible.
Ahead of the House of Councillors election in summer 2026, the Japanese government will put forward defense strengthening as a key policy agenda. Specifically, accelerated deployment of standoff defense capabilities (long-range missiles), faster construction of Aegis-equipped destroyers, and enhanced SDF deployment to the Nansei Islands will be announced. The defense budget will maintain its schedule to reach 2% of GDP in FY2027, and concrete operational concepts for "counterattack capabilities (反撃能力)" will be disclosed.
The UN Security Council will be unable to adopt new sanctions resolutions, and the existing sanctions regime will continue to be hollowed out with the tacit approval of China and Russia. Japan, the U.S., and South Korea will hold annual summit meetings based on the Camp David agreement and deepen missile warning data sharing, but a diplomatic breakthrough that fundamentally alters North Korea's behavior will not materialize. The security environment in East Asia will remain in a state of "managed tension," with military conflict avoided but structural instability unresolved.
Implications for Investment/Action: North Korea's missile launch frequency remains at 1-3 times per month. The Japanese government announces concrete measures based on the three defense documents. A new UN Security Council resolution is not adopted. Regular Japan-U.S.-ROK consultations are held periodically.
A scenario where unexpected diplomatic shifts occur due to North Korea's internal circumstances (economic hardship, Kim Jong Un's health issues, elite discontent) or changes in the international environment (shifts in policy toward North Korea following the end of the war in Ukraine, increased Chinese pressure on North Korea).
Specifically, North Korea might declare a moratorium on missile launches and indicate a willingness for dialogue under certain conditions. For example, a scenario where it proposes a temporary halt to missile launches conditioned on a reduction in U.S.-ROK joint military exercises or a phased easing of sanctions is conceivable. While a dramatic diplomatic shift like in 2018 is unlikely to be replicated, there is room for "small agreements"—such as the reopening of communication channels or the acceptance of humanitarian aid—to materialize.
If this scenario materializes, the urgency of Japan's defense buildup might decrease, and the pace of defense spending increases could slow. However, as historical patterns show, diplomatic shifts carry a high risk of being temporary, placing a large question mark over the sustainability of an optimistic scenario. True optimism would entail North Korea's complete denuclearization, but that is not a realistic expectation; even in the best case, it would likely remain "managed coexistence"—tacitly accepting nuclear possession while limiting capability expansion.
Implications for Investment/Action: North Korea suddenly declares a missile launch moratorium. Signs of China strengthening economic pressure on North Korea. Reports of secret contacts between the U.S. and North Korea. Dialogue signals in Kim Jong Un's New Year's address or official statements.
A scenario where the crisis escalates by one level, with North Korea conducting a seventh nuclear test or resuming ICBM-class missile launches. In the worst case, a missile passing over Japanese territory (since 2017) recurs, causing panic within Japan.
If a nuclear test is conducted, it is highly likely to be aimed at demonstrating the miniaturization of tactical nuclear warheads. This would be a clear message that North Korea possesses "usable nuclear weapons," fundamentally altering the security calculations of Japan, the U.S., and South Korea. In Japan, discussions on "nuclear sharing" and "independent nuclear armament" would intensify, and a review of the Three Non-Nuclear Principles would be placed on the political table.
In this scenario, the risk of accidental military conflict also increases. If a North Korean missile deviates from its planned trajectory and falls into Japanese territorial waters, or if Japanese fishing boats or civilian vessels are damaged, Japan would have no choice but to consider exercising its right to self-defense. Such accidental escalation, though undesired by any party, is not zero probability amidst a rapidly accelerating spiral of conflict.
The impact on financial markets would also be severe. The Nikkei Stock Average would fall sharply, the yen would fluctuate wildly, and the credit risk of Japanese government bonds would rise. A surge in defense spending would strain public finances, intensifying political conflict over allocation with social security costs. In South Korea, arguments for independent nuclear armament would emerge as mainstream policy, placing all of East Asia at the threshold of a nuclear arms race.
Implications for Investment/Action: Signs of a nuclear test, such as preparations for tunnel closure at the Yongbyon nuclear facility. Launch of a Hwasong-17 or higher-class ICBM. Missile trajectory passing over Japanese territory. Threats of nuclear use in North Korea's official statements. Reports of accidental incidents.
Key Triggers to Watch
- Conduct of North Korea's 7th nuclear test: April-December 2026 (the period immediately after U.S.-ROK joint military exercises is particularly dangerous)
- Official announcement by the Japanese government of concrete operational concepts and deployment plans for "counterattack capabilities (反撃能力)": June-September 2026 (around the House of Councillors election)
- Voting on a North Korea sanctions resolution in the UN Security Council (presence or absence of Chinese/Russian veto): Multiple times within 2026
- Holding of Japan-U.S.-ROK summit meeting and content of joint statement (measures to strengthen extended deterrence): Summer-Autumn 2026
- Launch of North Korea's ICBM-class missile (Hwasong-17 or higher): Throughout 2026 (especially around anniversaries: April 15 Kim Il Sung's birthday, September 9 Foundation Day, October 10 Workers' Party Foundation Day)
🔄 Tracking Loop
Next Trigger: Around North Korea's Foundation Day, September 9, 2026 — The presence or absence of an ICBM-class missile launch or nuclear test coinciding with the anniversary will be the biggest turning point determining the East Asian security environment in the latter half of the year.
Continuation of this Pattern: Tracking Theme: North Korea's Missile and Nuclear Development and the Structural Transformation of Japan's Defense System — The next milestone is the Japanese government's announcement of defense measures expected around the House of Councillors election in summer 2026.
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