North Korea Resumes Missile Tests — Spiral of
North Korea's resumption of missile tests in early 2026 is not merely a repeat of provocative acts. It marks a turning point where three structural changes are simultaneously unfolding: the complete collapse of US-DPRK negotiations, Japan's transition to defense spending exceeding 2% of GDP, and a fundamental reorganization of the nuclear deterrence system in East Asia.
── Understand in 3 points ─────────
- • North Korea conducted multiple test launches of new ballistic missiles from January to March 2026, with at least one falling within Japan's EEZ.
- • The launched missiles are believed to include a new solid-fuel ICBM and a type equipped with a hypersonic glide vehicle (HGV).
- • The UN Security Council held an emergency meeting, but no new sanctions resolution was adopted due to opposition from China and Russia.
── NOW PATTERN ─────────
The primary dynamic is a "spiral of conflict" where North Korea's missile tests and the military responses of Japan, the US, and South Korea mutually escalate. This is rendered uncontrollable by the "failure of coordination" in the UN Security Council, and the "alliance fracture" between China-Russia and the US-Japan-South Korea coalition is solidifying the structure.
── Probabilities and Responses ──────
• Base case 55% — North Korea's missile launches continue at a pace of 1-2 times per month, UN Security Council resolutions continue to be rejected, regular US-Japan-South Korea joint exercises, smooth execution of Japan's defense budget
• Bull case 15% — Signs of increased Chinese pressure on North Korea (e.g., oil supply restrictions), reports of clandestine US-DPRK contacts, decrease in North Korea's provocative rhetoric, reactivation of North Korea's diplomatic channels
• Bear case 30% — Satellite images showing renewed activity at North Korea's nuclear test site (Punggye-ri), signs of an ICBM launch on a normal trajectory, North Korea's declaration of tactical nuclear deployment, commencement of policy-level discussions on nuclear armament within South Korea
📡 The Signal — What Happened
Why it matters: North Korea's resumption of missile tests in early 2026 is not merely a repeat of provocative acts. It marks a turning point where three structural changes are simultaneously unfolding: the complete collapse of US-DPRK negotiations, Japan's transition to defense spending exceeding 2% of GDP, and a fundamental reorganization of the nuclear deterrence system in East Asia.
- Military — North Korea conducted multiple test launches of new ballistic missiles from January to March 2026, with at least one falling within Japan's EEZ
- Military — The launched missiles are believed to include a new solid-fuel ICBM and a type equipped with a hypersonic glide vehicle (HGV)
- Diplomacy — The UN Security Council held an emergency meeting, but no new sanctions resolution was adopted due to opposition from China and Russia
- Defense — The Japanese government announced the additional deployment of Aegis system-equipped vessels to the Sea of Japan and a strengthening of interception capabilities
- Defense — Japan's Ministry of Defense solidified its policy to request a 40% year-on-year increase in counterattack capability (enemy base strike capability) related expenses for the FY2027 budget
- Economy — Immediately after the launch, the Nikkei Stock Average temporarily fell by over 800 points, and the yen surged against the dollar (risk-off yen buying)
- Diplomacy — South Korea's Yoon Suk-yeol administration expressed its commitment to deepening US-Japan-South Korea trilateral security cooperation, but domestic opposition parties increasingly called for a shift to a dialogue-oriented approach
- Technology — North Korea's new missiles were confirmed to fly on irregular trajectories, and an analysis shared within the Ministry of Defense indicated that interception with existing missile defense systems would be difficult
- Diplomacy — The United States increased the frequency of strategic asset deployments (B-1B bombers, nuclear submarines) to US bases in Japan
- Intelligence — South Korea's National Intelligence Service pointed to the possibility that North Korea received hypersonic technology from Russia in the latter half of 2025
- Domestic Politics — Debate over amending Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution reignited domestically, and calls for a review of the "defense-only policy" concept expanded even within the ruling party
- Economy — Share prices of Japanese defense-related companies (Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, IHI, Kawasaki Heavy Industries) rose by an average of 12% in the week following the launch
The history of North Korea's missile development and military tensions in the Sea of Japan is a mirror reflecting the structural instability of the East Asian security order since the end of the Cold War. To understand this issue, it is necessary to consider at least 30 years of historical context.
In 1993, North Korea conducted a Nodong missile test, confronting Japan with the reality that the Japanese archipelago was within range of North Korean ballistic missiles. At this point, Japan's security debate shifted significantly, and serious consideration of introducing a missile defense system began. However, Japanese society at the time was still immersed in the "peace dividend" of the post-Cold War era, and threat perception was limited.
The 1998 Taepodong launch delivered a shock, landing in the Pacific Ocean after flying over the Japanese archipelago. This spurred the acceleration of US-Japan joint missile defense development, and in 2003, the establishment of a Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) system was approved by the Cabinet. However, during this period, North Korea continued to buy time within the diplomatic framework of the Six-Party Talks, steadily advancing its nuclear and missile development.
The first nuclear test in 2006, long-range missile launches in 2009 and 2012, and the "Hwasong-15" ICBM launch and hydrogen bomb test in 2017 demonstrated that North Korea's nuclear and missile capabilities had reached a qualitatively new stage. In 2017, in particular, missiles passed over Japan twice, triggering J-Alerts in an unprecedented situation.
The Trump-Kim Jong Un summits from 2018 to 2019 temporarily eased tensions, but after the collapse of the Hanoi summit, North Korea reverted to a path of military posturing. What is noteworthy during this period is that North Korea began to simultaneously pursue three technological leaps—solid-fuel ICBMs, submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), and hypersonic weapons—rather than merely improving existing technologies.
The Russia-Ukraine war since 2022 brought a decisive change to this dynamic. North Korea is believed to have received transfers of advanced military technology (satellite technology, hypersonic technology, nuclear submarine technology) from Russia in exchange for providing artillery shells and personnel to Russia. This implies the possibility that North Korea's technological progress could proceed at a pace far exceeding its traditional self-development.
Japan's response also changed structurally. The three key security documents—the "National Security Strategy," "National Defense Strategy," and "Defense Buildup Program"—approved by the Cabinet in December 2022, explicitly stated the possession of counterattack capabilities and outlined a policy to raise defense spending to 2% of GDP. This represents the biggest turning point in Japan's post-war security policy, with the North Korean threat serving as its primary justification.
The significance of the resumption of tests in 2026 should be understood within this long-term context. North Korea is demonstrating technologies, such as irregular trajectory missiles and hypersonic weapons, that are extremely difficult for existing missile defense systems to intercept. This fundamentally questions the effectiveness of the Aegis BMD system, in which Japan has invested enormous sums, and necessitates a review of Japan's entire defense strategy. Simultaneously, amidst the geopolitical environment of China's military pressure on Taiwan and the prolonged Russian invasion of Ukraine, the security environment in East Asia is in its most unstable state since the end of the Cold War. North Korea's missile tests are both a "symptom" of this structural instability and a "catalyst" that further exacerbates it.
The delta: North Korea's resumption of missile tests in 2026 is the result of a qualitative leap due to technology transfer from Russia (hypersonic weapons, irregular trajectory technology) and the simultaneous manifestation of UN Security Council dysfunction (China and Russia's refusal to sanction). It is a structural turning point that fundamentally questions the effectiveness of Japan's existing missile defense system and irreversibly accelerates the development of counterattack capabilities and the doubling of defense spending.
🔍 Between the Lines — What the News Isn't Saying
While official statements emphasize "cooperation with the international community," the Japanese government internally has fully factored in the dysfunction of the UN Security Council, with expectations for multilateral coordination being almost zero. The true policy focus is on utilizing the North Korean threat as a "political driving force" to irreversibly advance fundamental reforms of the post-war 80-year-old defense system—the development of counterattack capabilities, reorganization of the defense industry, and militarization of space and cyber domains. In other words, the practical goal is not the "resolution" of the missile crisis itself, but the "construction of a new security system" predicated on the crisis. Furthermore, though not reported, the Japanese government has a high degree of certainty that North Korea's hypersonic weapons are based on Russian technology, which is causing a hidden policy shift: further cooling of relations with Russia and acceleration of security cooperation with NATO.
NOW PATTERN
Spiral of Conflict × Alliance Fracture × Failure of Coordination
The primary dynamic is a "spiral of conflict" where North Korea's missile tests and the military responses of Japan, the US, and South Korea mutually escalate. This is rendered uncontrollable by the "failure of coordination" in the UN Security Council, and the "alliance fracture" between China-Russia and the US-Japan-South Korea coalition is solidifying the structure.
Intersection of Dynamics
The three dynamics—"spiral of conflict," "failure of coordination," and "alliance fracture"—form a self-reinforcing, self-propagating system. Understanding this interaction is key to analyzing the situation in 2026.
First, the "failure of coordination" acts to disengage the braking mechanism of the "spiral of conflict." In an era when the UN Security Council was functional, the international community's unified sanctions in response to North Korea's missile tests provided a certain brake on escalation. However, with this braking mechanism lost due to China and Russia's veto power, Japan, the US, and South Korea can only respond with military means (strengthening interception systems, developing counterattack capabilities, expanding joint exercises). This invites further provocation from North Korea, accelerating the spiral.
Next, the "spiral of conflict" acts as a catalyst to reveal "alliance fractures." Each time the North Korean threat escalates, fundamental questions arise—"Will the US nuclear umbrella truly function?", "Should Japan possess counterattack capabilities?", "Should South Korea pursue independent nuclear armament?"—exposing differences in strategic direction among allies. If Japan develops counterattack capabilities, South Korea will be wary of Japan's militarization, and China will criticize Japan's "offensive armaments."
Furthermore, "alliance fracture" solidifies the "failure of coordination." The more fixed the axis of confrontation between Japan-US-South Korea and Russia-China-North Korea becomes, the more difficult compromise in the Security Council becomes, making the reconstruction of a sanctions regime almost impossible. This vicious cycle formed by these three dynamics has a structure that autonomously heightens tensions unless there is a major external shock (such as the realization of a US-DPRK summit, a regime change in North Korea, or an accidental military clash on the Korean Peninsula).
📚 Pattern History
1993-1994: First North Korean Nuclear Crisis and Nodong Missile Test
North Korea created a crisis through nuclear development and missile tests, leading to direct negotiations with the United States (US-DPRK Agreed Framework). Japan began to seriously discuss the necessity of missile defense for the first time.
Structural similarities with the current situation: North Korea established a pattern of using military provocation as a diplomatic card to ultimately gain benefits through negotiation. However, the implementation of agreements was always incomplete, and problems were postponed.
2006: North Korea's First Nuclear Test and Taepodong-2 Launch
With the success of its nuclear test, North Korea effectively established its status as a "nuclear-weapon state." UN Security Council Resolution 1718 was unanimously adopted, establishing a sanctions regime against North Korea.
Structural similarities with the current situation: The last era when the Security Council could unite. The background to the possibility of international pressure, including from China and Russia, was a convergence of interests where China did not want North Korea to be nuclear-armed.
2017: Hwasong-15 ICBM Launch and 6th Nuclear Test (Hydrogen Bomb Class)
North Korea demonstrated ICBM capability capable of reaching the US mainland. US-DPRK relations reached their highest tension ever with President Trump's "fire and fury" remarks, but this shifted to a surprise summit the following year.
Structural similarities with the current situation: Extreme military tension can sometimes lead to diplomatic shifts. However, as the collapse of the 2019 Hanoi summit shows, structural issues (sequence of denuclearization vs. sanctions relief) cannot be resolved through summit diplomacy.
2022: North Korea's Record Number of Missile Launches (approx. 70) and Revision of Japan's Three Security Documents
Coinciding with the outbreak of the Russia-Ukraine war, North Korea took advantage of diverted international attention to dramatically increase missile launches. Japan decided on its biggest post-war security policy shift (possession of counterattack capabilities, doubling of defense spending).
Structural similarities with the current situation: Disturbances in the international order give North Korea freedom of action and simultaneously accelerate Japan's security policy shift. Geopolitical shocks have cascading effects across multiple regions.
2023-2024: Rapid Expansion of North Korea-Russia Military Cooperation
Kim Jong Un's visit to Russia and Putin's visit to Pyongyang established a framework where North Korea provides weapons and personnel to Russia in exchange for transfers of advanced military technology.
Structural similarities with the current situation: Cooperation between internationally isolated states nullifies existing sanctions regimes and enables technological leaps. The limits of the post-Cold War "behavior change through sanctions" model have been exposed.
The Pattern Revealed by History
The pattern revealed by the past 30 years of history is clear. North Korea has steadily improved its nuclear and missile capabilities by repeating a cycle of military provocation → diplomatic negotiation → agreement → agreement violation → further military provocation. In each rotation of this cycle, North Korea's technological level has irreversibly risen, and the international community's response capabilities have relatively declined. Especially since 2022, due to the turmoil in the international order caused by the Russia-Ukraine war and the exercise of veto power by China and Russia in the Security Council, the traditional framework of "sanctions and dialogue as two pillars" has completely collapsed. The situation in 2026 is an extension of this pattern, but it differs qualitatively in two respects. First, North Korea's technological advancements (hypersonic weapons, irregular trajectory missiles) fundamentally question the effectiveness of existing defense systems. Second, Japan itself is undergoing an irreversible policy shift from "defense-only policy" to "possession of counterattack capabilities," entering a phase where the East Asian security structure itself is being reorganized. History teaches that the risk of accidental conflict is highest during such periods of structural transformation.
🔮 Next Scenarios
North Korea continues missile launches throughout 2026, with annual launches reaching 15-25 times. There is a possibility of ICBM-class missile launches and a 7th nuclear test, but actual military conflict is avoided. The UN Security Council continues to be dysfunctional, and no new sanctions resolutions are adopted. Japan proceeds with budget formulation to achieve 2% of GDP for defense spending and accelerates the deployment of counterattack capabilities (long-range missiles, drones, etc.). US-Japan-South Korea trilateral security cooperation deepens based on the Camp David agreement, but with limitations due to South Korea's domestic political situation. The United States reaffirms its commitment to extended deterrence and maintains the frequency of strategic asset deployments but does not engage in direct negotiations with North Korea. In this base case scenario, tensions persist as a "managed crisis," and while each country increases its military capabilities, direct military conflict is avoided. However, this "managed crisis" state harbors the risk of rapid escalation due to accidental events or miscalculations, and the situation remains far from stable. Public interest in security increases in Japanese society, and support for increased defense spending exceeds 60%, but constitutional revision is not achieved.
Implications for Investment/Action: North Korea's missile launch frequency continues at 1-2 times per month, UN Security Council resolutions continue to be rejected, regular US-Japan-South Korea joint exercises, smooth execution of Japan's defense budget
North Korea slows the pace of missile tests for some reason, entering a de facto moratorium (launch freeze) in the latter half of 2026. This could be underpinned by a scenario where China exerts stronger diplomatic pressure on North Korea than before. If the Xi Jinping administration prioritizes managing relations with the US over the Taiwan issue and judges that destabilization of the Korean Peninsula runs counter to China's interests, it may impose effective pressure such as restrictions on oil supply to North Korea. Alternatively, a new US administration might initiate clandestine contacts with North Korea, and a roadmap for phased relaxation conditional on "nuclear freeze" (freezing current nuclear capabilities rather than denuclearization) could emerge. In this optimistic scenario, the pace of Japan's defense spending increase would slightly ease, but the direction of counterattack capability development itself would be maintained. Military tensions in East Asia would temporarily decrease, and diplomatic space would expand, but North Korea's nuclear and missile capabilities themselves would be preserved, meaning a fundamental solution is far off. The Nikkei Stock Average would recover, buoyed by easing tensions, and defense-related stocks would temporarily adjust, but the long-term defense investment trend would remain unchanged.
Implications for Investment/Action: Signs of increased Chinese pressure on North Korea (e.g., oil supply restrictions), reports of clandestine US-DPRK contacts, decrease in North Korea's provocative rhetoric, reactivation of North Korea's diplomatic channels
North Korea conducts a 7th nuclear test and simultaneously launches an ICBM-class missile on a "normal trajectory" (a practical trajectory rather than a lofted trajectory). In the worst case, a missile passes over the Japanese archipelago or lands even closer to Japan's EEZ. In this event, recognition of a security crisis would rapidly escalate within Japan, and public opinion demanding immediate execution of "enemy base strike" could surge. The United States would conduct large-scale military demonstrations, including the deployment of an aircraft carrier strike group to the Sea of Japan, and military tensions on the Korean Peninsula would reach levels exceeding those of 2017. As a more pessimistic sub-scenario, North Korea might declare the operational deployment of tactical nuclear weapons, leading to serious policy-level discussions on independent nuclear armament within South Korea. In this case, the East Asian nuclear non-proliferation regime would effectively collapse, and the credibility of the entire NPT system would be undermined. The impact on financial markets would be immense, with the Nikkei Stock Average falling by thousands of points, the yen surging, and the Japanese economy suffering a severe short-term blow. The risk of accidental military conflict would rise to an undeniable level, and the international community would face its greatest security crisis since the end of the Cold War.
Implications for Investment/Action: Satellite images showing renewed activity at North Korea's nuclear test site (Punggye-ri), signs of an ICBM launch on a normal trajectory, North Korea's declaration of tactical nuclear deployment, commencement of policy-level discussions on nuclear armament within South Korea
Key Triggers to Watch
- North Korea's 7th nuclear test: April-December 2026 (Punggye-ri nuclear test site preparation status as an indicator)
- Vote on a new UN Security Council sanctions resolution against North Korea and the response of China and Russia: Within 72 hours after the next large-scale missile launch
- Announcement of concrete security cooperation measures at the US-Japan-South Korea summit: Around the 2026 G7 Summit (June, Canada)
- Changes in South Korean domestic politics (impeachment, elections, etc.) and their impact on North Korea policy: Throughout 2026 (next presidential election is March 2027)
- Commencement of operational deployment of Japan's counterattack capabilities (Type 12 Surface-to-Ship Missile improved version, etc.): By the end of FY2026 (March 2027)
🔄 Tracking Loop
Next Trigger: Satellite image analysis of tunnel restoration work at North Korea's Punggye-ri nuclear test site (April-May 2026) — The most important indicator for judging the feasibility of a 7th nuclear test
Continuation of this Pattern: Tracking Theme: North Korea Missile/Nuclear Escalation and Japan's Defense System Transformation — The next milestone is the content of the US-Japan-South Korea security cooperation agreement at the G7 Summit in June 2026
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