South China Sea: Simultaneous US-China Military

South China Sea: Simultaneous US-China Military
⚡ FAST READ1 min read

In early 2026, the simultaneous deployment of large-scale military exercises by both the US and China in the South China Sea has created the most dangerous military tension since the Cold War. As the risk of accidental collision rapidly increases, the security order across the entire Indo-Pacific, including Japan, is being fundamentally questioned.

── Understand in 3 points ─────────

  • • The U.S. Navy deployed two carrier strike groups to the South China Sea from January to March 2026 and conducted the joint exercise "Balikatan 2026" with the Philippine military. It involved the largest number of participating forces ever.
  • • The Chinese People's Liberation Army conducted large-scale live-fire exercises in the South China Sea, primarily centered in the Southern Theater Command. Threatening exercises, including the launch training of Dongfeng-21D anti-ship ballistic missiles, were carried out.
  • • At the ASEAN Foreign Ministers' Meeting, negotiations on the wording of a joint statement regarding tensions in the South China Sea faced difficulties, with Cambodia and Laos maintaining their pro-China stance.

── NOW PATTERN ─────────

The US-China confrontation in the South China Sea is a textbook example of a "spiral of conflict," where both sides' defensive actions trigger aggressive responses from the other, leading to a self-reinforcing loop. This is compounded by "alliance strains" within ASEAN and China's "overextension of power," creating complex instability.

── Probabilities and Responses ──────

Base case 55% — Regular use of the US-China military hotline continues, conflicts between the Philippines and China remain at a non-fatal level, and a minimum joint statement is adopted at the ASEAN Foreign Ministers' Meeting.

Bull case 20% — US-China summit held and joint statement issued, decrease in frequency of military activities in the South China Sea, reports of substantial progress in COC negotiations, partial reduction of military facilities on China's artificial islands.

Bear case 25% — Casualties occur in a clash between the Philippine military and China Coast Guard, direct escort of Philippine resupply missions by US warships begins, China establishes an ADIZ in the South China Sea, US-China military hotline is cut off.

📡 THE SIGNAL — What Happened

Why it matters: In early 2026, the simultaneous deployment of large-scale military exercises by both the US and China in the South China Sea has created the most dangerous military tension since the Cold War. As the risk of accidental collision rapidly increases, the security order across the entire Indo-Pacific, including Japan, is being fundamentally questioned.
  • Military — The U.S. Navy deployed two carrier strike groups to the South China Sea from January to March 2026 and conducted the joint exercise "Balikatan 2026" with the Philippine military. It involved the largest number of participating forces ever.
  • Military — The Chinese People's Liberation Army conducted large-scale live-fire exercises in the South China Sea, primarily centered in the Southern Theater Command. Threatening exercises, including the launch training of Dongfeng-21D anti-ship ballistic missiles, were carried out.
  • Diplomacy — At the ASEAN Foreign Ministers' Meeting, negotiations on the wording of a joint statement regarding tensions in the South China Sea faced difficulties, with Cambodia and Laos maintaining their pro-China stance.
  • Security — Japan's Maritime Self-Defense Force dispatched the destroyer "Izumo" to the South China Sea and participated as an observer in the US-Philippines joint exercise, deepening its quasi-alliance involvement.
  • Economy — Trade volume passing through the South China Sea reaches approximately $5.3 trillion annually, with about one-third of global maritime trade transiting this area.
  • Legal — The 2016 South China Sea arbitration ruling rejected China's Nine-Dash Line, but China has consistently dismissed this ruling as "a piece of paper" and refused to comply.
  • Technology — China has deployed HQ-9 long-range surface-to-air missile systems and YJ-62 anti-ship missiles on artificial islands in the Spratly Islands, accelerating the militarization of its effective control.
  • Regional — The Philippines has repeatedly experienced physical clashes with the China Coast Guard during resupply missions to Second Thomas Shoal (Ayungin Shoal), with the situation escalating further since late 2025.
  • Alliance — Regarding the scope of the US-Philippines Mutual Defense Treaty, the US explicitly stated it applies to armed attacks in the South China Sea. China condemned this as "adding fuel to the fire."
  • Domestic — Within China, nationalist public opinion, centered on social media, asserting "the South China Sea is a core interest of China," is growing, putting pressure on the Xi Jinping administration.
  • Economy — The seabed of the South China Sea is estimated to hold 11 billion barrels of oil and 190 trillion cubic feet of natural gas.
  • Military — The US military is rapidly advancing the development of four new EDCA (Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement) sites within the Philippines.

The intensification of US-China confrontation in the South China Sea is not a sudden event but the result of decades of structural dynamics. To understand the root causes of this tension, it is necessary to trace historically the transformation of the post-Cold War international order and the geopolitical shifts brought about by China's rise.

The South China Sea territorial dispute dates back to the 1940s. The starting point was the Republic of China (later Taiwan) publishing the "Eleven-Dash Line" (later revised to the "Nine-Dash Line" by the People's Republic of China) in 1947, asserting sovereignty over almost the entire South China Sea. However, this issue only became a focal point for international security after China's rapid economic growth and military modernization began in earnest in the 2000s.

The 2012 Scarborough Shoal incident was a turning point. After a standoff with the Philippines, China established effective control over Scarborough Shoal, and the international community began to recognize the danger of the "salami-slicing" strategy—a method of altering the status quo by accumulating small faits accomplis. Subsequently, from 2013 to 2015, China undertook unprecedented large-scale artificial island construction in the Spratly Islands. Over 3,200 acres of artificial land were created on features such as Fiery Cross Reef, Subi Reef, and Mischief Reef, where runways, radar facilities, and anti-air/anti-ship missile systems were deployed. President Xi Jinping explicitly stated to President Obama in 2015 that China had "no intention to militarize the South China Sea," but this promise was completely broken.

The US response has also escalated incrementally. "Freedom of Navigation Operations (FONOPs)," initiated in 2015 under the Obama administration, increased in frequency during the first Trump administration and were further strengthened under the Biden administration. In a potential second Trump administration from 2024 onwards, a hardline stance against China has become a bipartisan consensus, and military presence in the South China Sea has reached its highest level ever, both in quality and quantity.

Behind this structural escalation are three major dynamics. First, the maturation of China's "Anti-Access/Area Denial (A2/AD)" strategy. With Dongfeng-21D and Dongfeng-26 anti-ship ballistic missiles, YJ-18 supersonic anti-ship cruise missiles, and the modernization of its submarine forces, China has significantly constrained the freedom of action for US forces within the first island chain. Second, the US shift to an "integrated deterrence" strategy. It is attempting to build a multi-layered deterrence network by leveraging its network of allies and partners, including AUKUS, the Japan-US-Australia-India (Quad), and the expansion of the US-Philippines EDCA. Third, the domestic politics of both countries demand a hardline stance externally. In China, the narrative of "the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation" does not permit concessions in the South China Sea, while in the US, bipartisan hardline views on China narrow the president's room for dialogue.

The simultaneous military exercises in early 2026 are a consequence of these structural pressures. The US seeks to deter China's expansion in the "gray zone" through strengthening its alliance with the Philippines, while China aims to prevent neighboring countries from "bandwagoning" and to raise the cost of US intervention through military displays. The problem is that both strategies mutually reinforce the "security dilemma," confirming each other's worst assumptions. Both sides characterize their own actions as defensive, but they appear aggressive to the other. This cognitive gap is the greatest risk for escalating accidental clashes into intentional conflicts.

The delta: The simultaneous US-China military exercises in early 2026 signify a qualitative shift from the traditional asymmetric tension structure of "Freedom of Navigation Operations" versus "harassment by maritime militia" to a "symmetric escalation" where large-scale exercises by regular forces run concurrently in the same waters. This dramatically increases the probability of accidental collision and fundamentally tests the effectiveness of existing escalation management mechanisms (such as the US-China military hotline).

🔍 BETWEEN THE LINES — What the News Isn't Saying

Officially framed as a conflict between "freedom of navigation" and "sovereignty defense," this is essentially a rehearsal for a Taiwan contingency. The US is rapidly developing EDCA sites in the Philippines with the true objective of securing southern logistics routes for a Taiwan contingency, and China's overreaction stems from its understanding of this. Both sides view the South China Sea as a "prelude" to the Taiwan Strait, and the calculation that any retreat here directly impacts the credibility of deterrence regarding Taiwan makes compromise structurally impossible. ASEAN being sidelined is no accident; for both the US and China, multilateral frameworks are merely obstacles that constrain their own actions.


NOW PATTERN

Spiral of Conflict × Alliance Strain × Overextension of Power

The US-China confrontation in the South China Sea is a textbook example of a "spiral of conflict," where both sides' defensive actions trigger aggressive responses from the other, leading to a self-reinforcing loop. This is compounded by "alliance strains" within ASEAN and China's "overextension of power," creating complex instability.

Intersection of Dynamics

The three structural dynamics—spiral of conflict, alliance strain, and overextension of power—are not independently driving the South China Sea crisis but rather form a complex system that mutually reinforces itself. This intersection makes crisis control particularly difficult.

The mechanism by which the spiral of conflict deepens alliance strains within ASEAN is clear. As US-China escalation progresses, the pressure on ASEAN nations to "choose a side" increases, weakening regional cohesion. This weakening of cohesion reduces the effectiveness of conflict management mechanisms through ASEAN, further sharpening bilateral US-China confrontation. This is a typical positive feedback loop.

Concurrently, there is a pathway through which the overextension of power accelerates the spiral of conflict. As China expands its military commitments on multiple fronts, flexibility on each front decreases, making compromise or phased withdrawal politically difficult. A "withdrawal" in the South China Sea would be interpreted as a signal on other fronts (Taiwan, East China Sea), thus structurally impeding localized de-escalation. The US similarly finds itself in a "credibility trap," where commitments to multiple allies mutually constrain each other, and a retreat in one area undermines the credibility of the entire alliance.

Furthermore, alliance strains exacerbate the overextension of power. As multilateral conflict management fails due to ASEAN's fragmentation, both the US and China are compelled to maintain deterrence on their own, forcing them to further expand military spending and forward deployments. The interaction of these three dynamics creates systemic risks that cannot be understood by looking at individual elements alone, which is why the South China Sea in 2026 is being called "the most dangerous waters since the Cold War."


📚 PATTERN HISTORY

1914: Outbreak of World War I (Sarajevo Incident)

Spiral of Conflict

Structural similarities to the present: The automatic chain reaction of alliances and military mobilization schedules triggered a full-scale war that no one desired. This demonstrates the danger of a security dilemma between great powers leading to uncontrollable escalation.

1962: Cuban Missile Crisis

Spiral of Conflict + Overextension of Power

Structural similarities to the present: The US and Soviet Union reached the brink of nuclear war but averted it through secret diplomatic channels and the assurance of mutual room for retreat. This showed that crisis management requires back channels beyond official ones, and compromise solutions that allow both sides to claim "victory."

2001: Hainan Island Incident (EP-3 Reconnaissance Aircraft Incident)

Spiral of Conflict

Structural similarities to the present: A mid-air collision between US and Chinese military aircraft over the South China Sea resulted in the death of a Chinese pilot. It took 11 days for a diplomatic resolution, demonstrating the risk of an accidental incident escalating into a major diplomatic crisis.

2012: Scarborough Shoal Standoff

Overextension of Power + Alliance Strain

Structural similarities to the present: China exploited the stalemate with the Philippines to establish effective control. The US's lack of direct intervention raised questions about alliance credibility and contributed to the Philippines' Duterte administration's conciliatory approach toward China.

2016: South China Sea Arbitration Ruling

Spiral of Conflict + Alliance Strain

Structural similarities to the present: Although a landmark ruling that completely rejected China's claims under international law, it became unenforceable due to China's outright rejection. This demonstrated the danger of the spiral of conflict accelerating further when a legal victory does not lead to substantive change.

Patterns from History

The most important lesson from historical precedents is that the spiral of conflict between great powers can transition extremely rapidly from a seemingly "manageable" stage to an "uncontrollable" one. It took only five weeks from the Sarajevo incident in 1914 to the full-scale outbreak of World War I. The Cuban Missile Crisis reached the brink of nuclear war in 13 days. The 2001 Hainan Island incident was triggered by a misjudgment of a few seconds. The current situation in the South China Sea is structurally similar to these precedents but is even more dangerous in several respects. First, while the threshold for full-scale war is high due to nuclear deterrence, it conversely creates an environment where "limited conflicts under the nuclear umbrella" are more likely. Second, the system of arms control and confidence-building measures that existed between the US and Soviet Union during the Cold War is largely absent between the US and China. Third, social media and the real-time information environment drastically compress decision-making time during a crisis, depriving leaders of the leeway to calmly assess the situation. History offers both successful (Cuban Missile Crisis) and failed (1914) examples of escalation management, but it is extremely unclear how much of the conditions necessary for success—secret diplomatic channels, mutual room for retreat, and calm judgment by leaders—exist between the current US and China.


🔮 NEXT SCENARIOS

55%Base case
20%Bull case
25%Bear case
55%Base case

Throughout 2026, US-China tensions in the South China Sea will remain high but will not escalate to direct military conflict. Both countries will further expand the scale and frequency of military exercises, continuing "brinkmanship," but will manage escalation through diplomatic channels even if accidental contacts occur. Between the Philippines and China, water cannon incidents and physical obstructions will continue around Second Thomas Shoal, but without fatal use of force. The US will expand security assistance to the Philippines and accelerate the development of EDCA sites. Japan, under the banner of a "Free and Open Indo-Pacific," will gradually increase the presence of its Maritime Self-Defense Force in the South China Sea. ASEAN's COC negotiations will formally continue but without substantive progress. This state of "dangerous stability" is maintained because both sides' nuclear deterrence and economic interdependence set the cost of full-scale conflict extremely high. However, this "stability" is inherently fragile and contains the potential for rapid collapse due to unforeseen events—military accidents, sudden domestic political changes, or actions by third parties.

Implications for Investment/Action: Regular use of the US-China military hotline continues, conflicts between the Philippines and China remain at a non-fatal level, and a minimum joint statement is adopted at the ASEAN Foreign Ministers' Meeting.

20%Bull case

In the latter half of 2026, concrete diplomatic initiatives for de-escalation in the South China Sea will be launched between the US and China. Triggers could include a near-miss military accident prompting both leaders to recognize the urgency of crisis management, or the necessity of cooperation in other areas like climate change or the North Korean issue creating an incentive for de-escalation in the South China Sea. Specifically, upgrades to the US-China military hotline, agreement on codes of conduct for air and sea encounters, or the initiation of joint marine environmental monitoring in the South China Sea could materialize. COC negotiations might also advance to a framework agreement level, with China strategically making certain concessions. However, even in this scenario, a fundamental resolution of the territorial dispute will not be reached, and a significant reduction in military presence cannot be expected. De-escalation will remain temporary, with the structural spiral of conflict continuing to lie dormant until the next crisis. The realization of this scenario requires the will and ability of both leaders to rein in domestic hardliners and invest political capital in dialogue, which is a high hurdle in the current political environment.

Implications for Investment/Action: US-China summit held and joint statement issued, decrease in frequency of military activities in the South China Sea, reports of substantial progress in COC negotiations, partial reduction of military facilities on China's artificial islands.

25%Bear case

Within 2026, a direct military conflict between the US and China will occur in the South China Sea. The most probable scenario is one where physical obstruction by the China Coast Guard against Philippine resupply missions escalates, resulting in damage or sinking of a Philippine naval vessel. In response, the US initiates direct military support (escort missions) under the US-Philippines Mutual Defense Treaty, leading to a direct confrontation with the Chinese Navy. Another pathway is an accidental contact (collision, misfire) between US and Chinese aircraft or vessels, which, due to real-time dissemination on social media, inflames domestic public opinion and eliminates the diplomatic window for resolution. Should a conflict occur, while nuclear deterrence would prevent full-scale war, it could escalate into a "hybrid conflict" involving localized naval and air battles, cyberattacks, and reciprocal economic sanctions. The impact on the global economy would be immense, with a cascading effect of soaring shipping insurance premiums in the South China Sea, supply chain disruptions, and surging energy prices. Japan, as an ally, would be called upon to support the US, leading to fierce domestic debate over the scope of exercising collective self-defense. Tensions in the Taiwan Strait would also simultaneously rise, plunging the entire Indo-Pacific into a state of military tension.

Implications for Investment/Action: Casualties occur in a clash between the Philippine military and China Coast Guard, direct escort of Philippine resupply missions by US warships begins, China establishes an ADIZ in the South China Sea, US-China military hotline is cut off.

Key Triggers to Watch

  • Occurrence of a fatal clash during Philippine resupply missions to Second Thomas Shoal (Ayungin Shoal): April-September 2026 (tension highest around monsoon season)
  • Unilateral establishment of a South China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) by China: Throughout 2026 (especially during politically sensitive periods before US midterm elections)
  • China's military countermeasures against the expansion of scale and extension of duration of the US-Philippines joint exercise "Balikatan 2026": April-May 2026
  • Simultaneous escalation of military tensions in the Taiwan Strait (risk linked to the South China Sea): Throughout 2026 (especially linked to political events in Taiwan)
  • Breakdown or significant setback in COC negotiations at the ASEAN Summit: October 2026 (scheduled ASEAN Summit period)

🔄 TRACKING LOOP

Next Trigger: Balikatan 2026 Joint Exercise (scheduled April-May 2026) — The scale, number of participating countries, and exercise area will determine the next turning point in US-China tensions.

Continuation of this Pattern: Tracking Theme: US-China Military Escalation Path in the South China Sea — The next milestones are the Balikatan 2026 exercise and China's countermeasures (April-June 2026).

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