Strait of Hormuz Crisis and Trump's "
The de facto blockade of the Strait of Hormuz, through which approximately 20% of the world's oil transport passes, threatens to shake the entire global economy through a surge in energy prices. President Trump's unusual move to demand that China and NATO dispatch escort vessels signifies the arrival of a "compound crisis" where security burden-sharing issues and an energy crisis erupt simultaneously.
── Understand in 3 points ─────────
- • Iran has de facto blockaded the Strait of Hormuz, causing significant disruption to international maritime transport.
- • President Trump has demanded that China dispatch warships to ensure the security of the Strait of Hormuz.
- • President Trump has also demanded military contributions from NATO member states for vessel escort.
── NOW PATTERN ─────────
The vicious cycle in which the U.S. demand for "burden sharing" accelerates cracks in alliances, and these cracks make coordinated responses to the energy crisis difficult, is structurally prolonging the Hormuz Strait crisis.
── Probability and Response ──────
• Base case 50% — Announcement of small-scale vessel dispatch by NATO member states, increased frequency of "dialogue promotion" statements by the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, continuation of Iran's pattern of selective transit obstruction (not a complete blockade), reports of secret contacts between the U.S. and Iran.
• Bull case 20% — Announcement of a summit meeting between China and Iran, Iran's expression of intent to return to nuclear negotiations, statements by the Trump administration regarding "conditional easing" of sanctions, a sharp drop in crude oil prices (below $80 per barrel).
• Bear case 30% — Accidental military clashes in the Strait of Hormuz (e.g., incidents involving Iranian fast boats and U.S. warships), signs of Iranian mine-laying, attacks on Saudi Arabian oil facilities, a surge in crude oil prices above $130 per barrel, announcement of coordinated release of strategic petroleum reserves.
📡 THE SIGNAL — What Happened
Why it matters: The de facto blockade of the Strait of Hormuz, through which approximately 20% of the world's oil transport passes, threatens to shake the entire global economy through a surge in energy prices. President Trump's unusual move to demand that China and NATO dispatch escort vessels signifies the arrival of a "compound crisis" where security burden-sharing issues and an energy crisis erupt simultaneously.
- Military & Security — Iran has de facto blockaded the Strait of Hormuz, causing significant disruption to international maritime transport.
- Diplomacy — President Trump has demanded that China dispatch warships to ensure the security of the Strait of Hormuz.
- Diplomacy — President Trump has also demanded military contributions from NATO member states for vessel escort.
- Energy — The Strait of Hormuz is the most critical choke point, through which approximately 20-21% of the world's oil transport passes.
- Economy — The blockade of the strait has caused crude oil prices to surge, expanding its impact on the global economy.
- Geopolitics — China is the largest importer of oil passing through the Strait of Hormuz, importing approximately 9 million barrels of crude oil per day from the Middle East.
- Security — The U.S. maintains its Fifth Fleet in the Persian Gulf, but there are limits to defending the strait alone.
- Diplomacy — Many NATO member states have not met the 2% GDP defense spending target, and the Trump administration has consistently demanded increased contributions.
- Energy — Japan relies on the Middle East for approximately 80% of its energy imports, almost all of which pass through the Strait of Hormuz.
- Economy — A prolonged blockade of the strait would also affect LNG (liquefied natural gas) supply, impacting gas prices in Europe and Asia.
- Military — Iran has concentrated asymmetric forces such as anti-ship missiles, mines, fast attack craft, and drones around the strait.
- Diplomacy — China has traditionally avoided military involvement in the Middle East and has been criticized as a "free rider."
The strategic importance of the Strait of Hormuz has grown with the rise of oil civilization in the 20th century. This waterway, only about 33 kilometers wide, is the "artery of the global economy," sending oil and gas from the Persian Gulf's oil-producing nations—Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Kuwait, UAE, and Qatar—to the world market. Approximately 17 to 21 million barrels of crude oil pass through here daily, accounting for about one-third of global seaborne oil transport and about 20% of global oil consumption.
Tensions surrounding this strait are not new. During the "Tanker War" of the Iran-Iraq War in the 1980s, both countries attacked tankers passing through the Persian Gulf, and the U.S. launched "Operation Earnest Will" in 1987-88, escorting Kuwaiti tankers under the U.S. flag. The lesson from that time was that securing the strait's safety is difficult for a single nation, and international cooperation is indispensable.
In 2019, a series of tanker attacks, allegedly by Iran or its proxies, led to the launch of the U.S.-led "International Maritime Security Construct (IMSC)." However, major NATO member states like France and Germany did not participate in this coalition, quickly exposing the limitations of a "coalition of the willing."
The direct background to the current crisis is the Trump administration's Iran policy. During his first term in 2018, President Trump withdrew from the Iran nuclear deal (JCPOA) and launched a "maximum pressure" campaign. In his second term, he continued and intensified this approach, imposing sanctions that effectively brought Iran's oil exports to zero. In response, Iran chose to blockade the Strait of Hormuz as a "trump card" for its survival. Ali Fadavi, commander of the IRGC Navy, had long warned, "If we cannot export oil, no one can," and his words have now become a reality.
There are several structural factors behind President Trump's pressure on China and NATO. First, the improvement in U.S. energy self-sufficiency. Thanks to the shale revolution, the U.S. has become the world's largest oil producer, and its dependence on the Strait of Hormuz has dramatically decreased. Only about 10% of the crude oil imported by the U.S. comes from the Middle East. In contrast, China relies on Persian Gulf countries for about 40% of its crude oil imports, with approximately 9 million barrels per day passing through the Strait of Hormuz. The Trump administration's logic is that "the biggest beneficiaries should bear the biggest burden."
Second, there is President Trump's consistent philosophy of "alliance burden sharing." Since his first term, he has argued that "NATO is freeloading" and that "Japan and South Korea should bear more of the costs of stationing U.S. troops." The Hormuz Strait crisis presents an excellent opportunity to apply this philosophy to Middle East security. Many NATO member states, despite their reliance on energy imports from the Middle East, have a limited military presence in the Persian Gulf.
Third, there is the structural rivalry in U.S.-China relations. The Trump administration has positioned China as a "strategic competitor" and has intensified pressure through trade wars, technology regulations, and the Taiwan issue. The demand on China regarding the Strait of Hormuz is not merely a matter of maritime security but also a geopolitical maneuver to compel China to assume the role of a "responsible great power" while simultaneously testing the capabilities and intentions of the Chinese navy.
However, this strategy contains an inherent paradox. If the Chinese navy advances into the Persian Gulf, it could challenge the U.S. maritime hegemony in the Middle East, which has been maintained for over 70 years. Furthermore, attempts to test NATO's cohesion risk widening cracks in the alliance amidst Russia's ongoing invasion of Ukraine. While President Trump's "transactional diplomacy" may extract concessions from allies in the short term, it carries the long-term danger of undermining the U.S.-led security order itself.
The delta: The decisive shift from traditional U.S. Middle East policy is President Trump's attempt to transform the responsibility for securing the Strait of Hormuz from "sole U.S. responsibility" to "responsibility of all beneficiaries." This is a fundamental redefinition of U.S. maritime hegemony in the Middle East since 1945, and the unprecedented demand for military contributions even from non-allied nations, including China, questions the nature of the post-hegemonic security order.
🔍 Between the Lines — What the News Isn't Saying
The true aim of the Trump administration's demand for NATO and China to dispatch warships is not the security of the Strait of Hormuz itself. The U.S. dependence on the Strait of Hormuz has dramatically decreased due to the shale revolution; in fact, a surge in crude oil prices due to a strait blockade would benefit the U.S. energy industry. The Trump administration's real intention is to leverage this crisis to achieve concrete results on NATO's burden-sharing issue and to confront China with its "energy security vulnerability," thereby extracting concessions in trade negotiations and technology regulations. In other words, it is highly probable that the Hormuz Strait crisis is perceived by the Trump administration not as a "problem to be solved" but as an "opportunity to be exploited."
NOW PATTERN
Alliance Strain × Escalation Spiral × Coordination Failure
The vicious cycle in which the U.S. demand for "burden sharing" accelerates cracks in alliances, and these cracks make coordinated responses to the energy crisis difficult, is structurally prolonging the Hormuz Strait crisis.
Intersection of Dynamics
The three dynamics of "alliance strain," "escalation spiral," and "coordination failure" form a vicious cycle that amplifies each other. First, the escalation spiral between the U.S. and Iran creates the Hormuz Strait crisis, which then brings to the forefront the burden-sharing issue among allies. President Trump's assertive demands for burden sharing widen cracks in alliances, and these cracks make international coordinated responses difficult. The failure of coordination leads to a prolonged crisis, and a prolonged crisis puts escalation pressure on both the U.S. and Iran, further accelerating the escalation spiral.
This triple vicious cycle is particularly dangerous because each dynamic has a "self-reinforcing" nature. Once alliance cracks emerge, it takes a long time to restore trust, making it easier for cracks to widen further in subsequent crises. The escalation spiral lowers the threshold for escalation at each stage, cumulatively increasing the risk of small incidents developing into major military conflicts. Coordination failure creates a negative feedback loop of "if others don't participate, neither will we," leading to a convergence towards zero participation.
Furthermore, this structure exposes the limits of traditional "hegemonic stability theory"—where order is maintained by a single hegemonic power providing international public goods. The U.S. is abandoning this role, but there is no new order provider to replace it. China lacks both the will and the capacity, and NATO has limitations in its out-of-area operational capabilities. This "legitimacy and capability vacuum" is accelerating the vicious cycle of the three dynamics. Solving the problem requires simultaneously approaching all three dynamics, but this is extremely difficult in the current international political environment.
📚 Pattern History
1956: Suez Crisis
The U.S. prevented British and French military intervention in the Suez Canal, leading to a shift in hegemony in Middle East security.
Structural similarities with the current situation: Conflicts between major powers over the control of international transport choke points have the power to fundamentally reshape existing alliance structures. Britain and France were forced to withdraw due to U.S. opposition, decisively losing their influence in the Middle East.
1987-88: Tanker War and "Operation Earnest Will"
Maritime security in the Persian Gulf became an international issue, and a U.S.-led escort operation was conducted.
Structural similarities with the current situation: While international cooperation is essential for securing the Strait of Hormuz, only a limited number of countries (primarily the U.S.) actually deploy military force, and the imbalance of burden continues to be a structural problem.
2003: Iraq War and "Coalition of the Willing"
The U.S. organized a coalition of the willing and conducted military action without UN Security Council approval, leading to serious cracks among allies.
Structural similarities with the current situation: U.S. demands for unilateral military action forced allies into a "participate or oppose" dilemma, weakening NATO's cohesion. Opposition from France and Germany exposed deep cracks within the alliance.
2019: Tanker Attacks and the Launch of IMSC (International Maritime Security Construct)
In response to Iranian attacks around the strait, a U.S.-led coalition of the willing was organized, but many major countries opted out of participation.
Structural similarities with the current situation: The "coalition of the willing" approach creates the appearance of international cooperation, but there are limits to securing substantial military commitment, and full participation is not achieved until the crisis deepens.
2022-26: Russia's Invasion of Ukraine and Increased NATO Burden
Europe's security crisis absorbed NATO's resources, reducing its capacity for military involvement in other regions.
Structural similarities with the current situation: When multiple security crises occur simultaneously, alliance resources are dispersed, risking "strategic overstretch" where no single crisis can be adequately addressed.
Patterns Revealed by History
Historical patterns indicate that issues surrounding the security of international choke points (Suez, Hormuz) are not merely military and security challenges but can be turning points for the international order itself. The 1956 Suez Crisis decisively marked the shift of Middle East hegemony from Britain and France to the U.S., and the current Hormuz crisis suggests the beginning of the end of the U.S.'s hegemonic role. Past examples show that the transition from a structure where a hegemonic power alone bears maritime security to multilateral burden-sharing always involves friction, and a security "vacuum" has emerged during transitional periods. Furthermore, as comparisons between 1987 and 2019 show, while coalitions of the willing are formed during each crisis, their effectiveness has declined over time. This reflects the international community's "crisis fatigue" and the U.S.'s own diminishing willingness to engage. The most important lesson is that choke point crises are not resolved quickly but tend to prolong for years, ultimately concluding in either political compromise or military resolution. The current crisis is highly likely to follow this pattern.
🔮 Next Scenarios
A partial blockade of the Strait of Hormuz continues until late 2026, with crude oil prices remaining high at $90-120 per barrel. In response to pressure from the Trump administration, NATO member states demonstrate "formal cooperation" with small-scale vessel deployments (around 1-2 frigates) but do not form a full-fledged multinational maritime force. China avoids direct military involvement, instead engaging Iran through diplomatic channels and negotiating individually for the security of its own tankers. Iran maintains its negotiating leverage with the international community by continuing selective transit obstruction (inspection and delay of tankers from specific countries) rather than a complete blockade. The U.S. Fifth Fleet intensifies escort activities, but direct military conflict with Iran is avoided due to mutual restraint. This state of "tense equilibrium" depresses global economic growth by approximately 0.5-1% through sustained high energy prices. Japan initiates an urgent review of its energy policy to reduce Middle East dependence, but securing short-term alternative sources is difficult, intensifying competition in the LNG spot market. Ultimately, indirect U.S.-Iran negotiations (mediated by Oman or Switzerland) begin covertly from late 2026 to early 2027, and a path toward gradual de-escalation starts to emerge.
Implications for Investment/Action: Announcement of small-scale vessel dispatch by NATO member states, increased frequency of "dialogue promotion" statements by the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, continuation of Iran's pattern of selective transit obstruction (not a complete blockade), reports of secret contacts between the U.S. and Iran.
The crisis significantly de-escalates by summer 2026 due to an unexpected diplomatic breakthrough. The most likely scenario is China mediating a "comprehensive deal" where it leverages its economic influence over Iran to restore free passage through the Strait of Hormuz in exchange for some sanctions relief for Iran. China has a track record of mediating the Saudi-Iran rapprochement in 2023 and has an incentive to follow this pattern again—as China itself is the biggest victim of a Hormuz blockade. In this scenario, President Trump's pressure on China paradoxically triggers China's diplomatic initiative, and the "burden sharing" desired by the U.S. is realized in a diplomatic rather than military form. Iran obtains a phased easing of oil export sanctions in exchange for partially freezing its nuclear development. Crude oil prices return to the $70-80 per barrel range, and the global economy sees a rapid recovery. Energy security for Asian countries, including Japan, improves in the short term, but the fundamental structure of Middle East dependence remains unchanged. This scenario is only feasible if all major players fully recognize the "costs of the crisis" and can compromise while saving face, conditions that are historically rare.
Implications for Investment/Action: Announcement of a summit meeting between China and Iran, Iran's expression of intent to return to nuclear negotiations, statements by the Trump administration regarding "conditional easing" of sanctions, a sharp drop in crude oil prices (below $80 per barrel).
The crisis escalates, and actual military conflict occurs in the Strait of Hormuz. Potential triggers include damage to U.S. warships or allied tankers by Iranian mines or drone attacks. If a conflict occurs, the Trump administration is likely to carry out limited military retaliation against Iran (precision bombing of missile bases or naval facilities). However, the premise that "limited" military action is controllable is dangerous. In retaliation, Iran could attack oil facilities in Gulf states (especially Saudi Arabia's Ras Tanura oil terminal), attack Israel through proxies in Iraq and Lebanon, and even disrupt financial infrastructure through cyberattacks. In this case, crude oil prices would surge to over $150-200 per barrel, leading to global stagflation (inflation during an economic recession). Alliance cracks would deepen further. NATO would be internally divided over involvement in "conflicts outside the North Atlantic region," and China would choose hostile neutrality towards the U.S. Japan would face a severe dilemma between its constitutional constraints and its obligations under the Japan-U.S. alliance. In the worst-case scenario, the entire Persian Gulf would become a conflict zone, oil exports from Saudi Arabia and the UAE would be completely halted, and the global economy would plunge into its worst crisis since 2008. While the probability of this scenario is estimated at 30%, there is a risk of it rapidly materializing due to "black swan" events (accidental military clashes, political upheaval within Iran).
Implications for Investment/Action: Accidental military clashes in the Strait of Hormuz (e.g., incidents involving Iranian fast boats and U.S. warships), signs of Iranian mine-laying, attacks on Saudi Arabian oil facilities, a surge in crude oil prices above $130 per barrel, announcement of coordinated release of strategic petroleum reserves.
Key Triggers to Watch
- Occurrence of accidental contact incidents between U.S. and Iranian forces in the Strait of Hormuz: March-May 2026 (within the next 2 months)
- Official discussion of Persian Gulf deployment at an extraordinary NATO Foreign Ministers' meeting or Defense Ministers' meeting: April-May 2026
- Presence or absence of additional Chinese naval fleet deployment to the Gulf of Aden/Persian Gulf: April-June 2026
- Decision by IEA member states for coordinated release of strategic petroleum reserves: If crude oil prices exceed $120 per barrel (focus on Q2 2026)
- Reports of secret or indirect diplomatic contacts between the U.S. and Iran: Second half of 2026 (3-6 months after the crisis began)
🔄 Tracking Loop
Next Trigger: NATO Defense Ministers' Meeting (scheduled for April 2026) — Whether the dispatch of warships to the Persian Gulf becomes an official agenda item will be a litmus test for the alliance's substantive response.
Continuation of this pattern: Tracking Theme: Hormuz Strait Crisis and the Future of "Burden Sharing" — Next milestones are the NATO Defense Ministers' Meeting (April 2026) and whether an emergency IEA Ministerial Meeting is held.
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