Strait of Hormuz Crisis and Trump's
The de facto blockade of the Strait of Hormuz, through which approximately 20% of the world's oil transport passes, would shake the entire global economy through a surge in energy prices. President Trump's moves to demand escort ship dispatches from China and NATO are not merely requests for military cooperation, but rather signs of a structural shift compelling a reorganization of the international security order itself.
── Understand in 3 points ─────────
- • Iran has effectively blockaded the Strait of Hormuz, causing severe disruptions to international maritime transport.
- • President Trump has demanded that China dispatch naval vessels to secure the Strait of Hormuz.
- • President Trump has also demanded that NATO member states dispatch naval vessels for ship escort.
── NOW PATTERN ─────────
A structural pattern prevails where the U.S., using the "beneficiary pays" principle as leverage, pressures allies and competitors to share security costs, while conflicting national interests hinder coordinated responses, leading to a prolonged and exacerbated crisis.
── Probability and Response ──────
• Base case 50% — Concrete announcements of escort ship dispatches from NATO member states, diplomatic movements between China and Iran, stabilizing crude oil prices, reports of back-channel negotiations between the U.S. and Iran.
• Bull case 20% — Clear diplomatic pressure from China on Iran, movements in the UN Security Council, signs of political change within Iran, rapid reversal of crude oil price decline.
• Bear case 30% — Reports of direct attacks on tankers, military contact between U.S. and Iranian vessels, attacks on Saudi Arabian energy infrastructure, crude oil prices breaking $150, clear refusal statement from China.
📡 THE SIGNAL — What Happened
Why it matters: The de facto blockade of the Strait of Hormuz, through which approximately 20% of the world's oil transport passes, would shake the entire global economy through a surge in energy prices. President Trump's moves to demand escort ship dispatches from China and NATO are not merely requests for military cooperation, but rather signs of a structural shift compelling a reorganization of the international security order itself.
- Military-Security — Iran has effectively blockaded the Strait of Hormuz, causing severe disruptions to international maritime transport.
- Diplomacy — President Trump has demanded that China dispatch naval vessels to secure the Strait of Hormuz.
- Diplomacy — President Trump has also demanded that NATO member states dispatch naval vessels for ship escort.
- Energy — The Strait of Hormuz is the most critical choke point, through which approximately 20-21% of the world's oil transport passes.
- Economy — Crude oil prices have surged due to the strait blockade, expanding the impact on the global economy.
- Geopolitics — The U.S., having reduced its dependence on Middle Eastern crude oil since the shale revolution, is advocating a "beneficiary pays" argument for strait defense.
- Security — The U.S. Navy's Fifth Fleet continues operations in the Persian Gulf, based in Bahrain.
- Diplomacy — China imports large quantities of crude oil from Iran and is one of the biggest victims of a strait blockade.
- Economy — Japan relies on the Middle East for about 90% of its crude oil imports, most of which pass through the Strait of Hormuz.
- Military — Iran has strengthened its A2/AD (Anti-Access/Area Denial) capabilities with asymmetric forces such as anti-ship missiles, mines, fast attack craft, and drones.
- Diplomacy — China has traditionally avoided military involvement in the security of the Strait of Hormuz.
- Economy — Qatar, a major exporter of LNG (liquefied natural gas), also borders the Strait of Hormuz, impacting the gas market.
The Strait of Hormuz, a narrow waterway only about 33 kilometers wide connecting the Persian Gulf and the Gulf of Oman, has remained the greatest vulnerability for global energy security since the latter half of the 20th century. The strategic importance of this strait dates back to the oil crises of the 1970s. In the First Oil Crisis of 1973, Arab nations of OPEC (Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries) used oil as a weapon, inflicting severe damage on Western economies. Since then, ensuring free navigation through the Strait of Hormuz has been central to the security policies of Western nations, led by the United States.
During the Iran-Iraq War in the 1980s, the so-called "Tanker War" erupted, with both countries attacking tankers in the Persian Gulf. In response, the U.S. conducted "Operation Earnest Will," reflagging Kuwaiti tankers with the U.S. flag and providing direct naval escort. The framework established during this period—"the U.S. guarantees the security of the Persian Gulf"—has since served as the foundation of the international energy order for approximately 40 years.
After the end of the Cold War, the U.S. further strengthened its military presence in the Middle East following the Gulf War (1991). The Fifth Fleet, headquartered in Bahrain, became a symbolic presence supporting stability in the Persian Gulf. However, since the 2000s, two structural changes began to fundamentally shake this order.
The first change was the U.S. shale revolution. In the 2010s, with dramatic advancements in horizontal drilling and fracking technology, the U.S. emerged as the world's largest producer of oil and natural gas. By 2019, the U.S. became a net oil exporter, and its dependence on Middle Eastern crude oil dramatically decreased. This structural change provided the economic basis to justify the Trumpian question: "Why should American taxpayers bear enormous military costs to protect oil shipping lanes for Asia and Europe?"
The second change was China's rise and deepening economic involvement in the Middle East. Since the 2000s, China's energy demand has exploded with rapid economic growth, deepening its reliance on Middle Eastern crude oil. Approximately 40-50% of China's crude oil imports come from the Middle East, with the majority passing through the Strait of Hormuz. Despite this, China has made almost no military contributions to the security of the Persian Gulf, leading to growing criticism in the U.S. that it has been a "free rider" on the "public good" provided by the U.S.
Iran's motivations are also multilayered. Iran is in economic distress under severe economic sanctions over its nuclear development program, and control of the Strait of Hormuz is one of its few external leverages. The 2015 JCPOA (Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, or Iran nuclear deal) temporarily eased this tension, but the Trump administration's withdrawal from the agreement in 2018 and the resumption of its "maximum pressure" policy again cornered Iran. Iran's Revolutionary Guard Corps has accelerated the development of asymmetric forces—anti-ship ballistic missiles, mines, fast attack craft, and drones—steadily enhancing its strait blockade capabilities.
The current situation is the result of these long-term structural changes converging at one point. The U.S.'s decreased motivation for Middle East involvement due to energy self-sufficiency, China's deepening dependence on Middle Eastern crude oil, dissatisfaction among NATO allies regarding defense spending, and Iran's cornered situation leading to a brinkmanship strategy—these factors are interacting to create one of the largest energy security crises since the post-war era. President Trump's moves to demand "beneficiary pays" from China and NATO could signify the end of the "U.S. alone defends the Gulf" paradigm that has persisted since the Tanker War of the 1980s.
The delta: By redefining the security of the Strait of Hormuz as a "burden sharing" issue with China and NATO, the Trump administration is fundamentally questioning the traditional U.S.-led maritime security system. This is not merely a temporary diplomatic negotiation, but suggests a structural transformation of the international maritime order that the U.S. built as a global public good after World War II.
🔍 Between the Lines — What the News Isn't Saying
The true purpose of the Trump administration's demand for China to dispatch naval vessels is not so much to secure the Strait of Hormuz itself, but to force China into a "loyalty test." If China complies, it will be integrated into the U.S.-led order; if it refuses, it will be labeled a "free rider failing to fulfill international responsibilities"—either outcome serves U.S. strategy toward China. Furthermore, the demand directed at NATO is a strategic move to extract concessions in upcoming trade negotiations, a typical Trumpian tactic of linking security and commerce. It is possible that a crisis in the strait that "doesn't get too resolved" is actually the most convenient state for the Trump administration.
NOW PATTERN
Alliance Cracks × Failure of Coordination × Spiral of Conflict
A structural pattern prevails where the U.S., using the "beneficiary pays" principle as leverage, pressures allies and competitors to share security costs, while conflicting national interests hinder coordinated responses, leading to a prolonged and exacerbated crisis.
Intersection of Dynamics
The three dynamics of "Alliance Cracks," "Failure of Coordination," and "Spiral of Conflict" mutually reinforce each other, structurally deepening the crisis. First, alliance cracks directly lead to a failure of coordination. As the U.S. abandons its traditional role as an "unconditional security provider" and demands conditional "burden sharing," a central actor to organize multilateral coordinated responses is absent. Previously, the U.S. would lead in forming a Coalition of the Willing and organizing joint patrols in the Persian Gulf, but with the Trump administration shifting from leading to demanding, a "leadership vacuum" has emerged regarding who will take the initiative.
This leadership vacuum promotes fragmented responses based on individual national interests, consequently weakening deterrence against Iran. The weakening of deterrence further emboldens Iran's brinkmanship strategy, accelerating the spiral of conflict. If Iran intensifies its hardline stance, nations will be pushed into a more urgent situation, yet coordination will not easily materialize. This is because the deepening of the crisis rigidifies domestic politics in each country, making compromise and concessions difficult.
Particularly dangerous is that these dynamics form a "negative feedback loop": decreased alliance reliability → failure of coordination → weakening of deterrence → escalation of conflict → increased mutual distrust among allies → further failure of coordination. This structure is difficult to break through with the goodwill or diplomatic efforts of individual actors alone. Without some external shock (e.g., shared sense of crisis due to actual military conflict, or economic pressure from devastatingly high crude oil prices), a structural transformation is unlikely. In the Tanker War of the 1980s, the international community only truly mobilized after actual attacks on vessels became frequent. The same pattern is highly likely to repeat this time, which would be a re-enactment of the historical lesson that coordination always materializes "too late."
📚 Pattern History
1980-1988: Iran-Iraq War "Tanker War"
International response to tanker attacks in the Persian Gulf was delayed, and a U.S.-led escort operation (Operation Earnest Will) was only implemented several years after the war began.
Structural similarities with the current situation: The public good nature of maritime security leads to a failure of coordination, and multilateral responses do not form until the crisis has significantly deepened.
1956: Suez Crisis
Egyptian President Nasser nationalized the Suez Canal, and Britain, France, and Israel intervened militarily but were forced to withdraw due to U.S. opposition.
Structural similarities with the current situation: Conflicts over control of maritime choke points expose cracks in alliances and serve as catalysts for redefining power dynamics among major powers.
2019: Hormuz Strait Tanker Attacks
Tankers with Japanese connections were attacked near the Strait of Hormuz, and the first Trump administration stated that "the U.S. does not need to protect other countries' tankers." A Coalition of the Willing (International Maritime Security Construct: IMSC) was formed, but participation was limited.
Structural similarities with the current situation: The U.S.'s declining willingness to provide security had already begun in its first term, and in the second term, it has escalated to the stage of "demands."
1973: First Oil Crisis (Oil Shock)
An oil embargo by OPEC countries severely impacted the global economy, leading Western nations to establish the IEA (International Energy Agency) and a strategic petroleum reserve system.
Structural similarities with the current situation: Energy supply crises serve as catalysts for international institution building, but such institutions tend to become hollowed out before the next crisis.
2008: Anti-Piracy Measures off the Coast of Somalia and Multinational Maritime Patrols
Multilateral maritime patrols by NATO, the EU, China, Japan, and others were relatively quickly realized for anti-piracy measures off the coast of Somalia.
Structural similarities with the current situation: Multilateral coordination succeeds when there is a clear common threat perception and limited geopolitical conflicts among major powers, but the hurdle for coordination becomes significantly higher when geopolitical interests are involved.
Patterns Revealed by History
Historical patterns offer clear lessons. First, multilateral coordinated responses to maritime choke point crises always materialize "too late and too little." In the Tanker War, it took several years, and in the Suez Crisis, it took the collapse of alliances before a response was formed. Second, maritime security is a classic public good problem, with the country possessing the greatest military power (usually the U.S.) repeatedly bearing a disproportionate share of the costs. However, this structure depends on the will of the burden-bearer, and when that burden-bearer seeks to relinquish the role, the entire order is destabilized. Third, energy crises prompt the restructuring of international institutions, but these institutions tend to suffer from "institutional degradation" before the next crisis. The IEA and strategic petroleum reserves were born from the lessons of 1973, but it is questionable whether they can adequately respond to the current crisis. What distinguishes the current crisis from the past is that the U.S. itself is actively seeking to step down from its role as a "provider of public goods," which signifies a fundamental transformation of the very premise of the post-war international order.
🔮 Next Scenarios
In the base scenario, tensions in the Strait of Hormuz remain elevated for several months but do not escalate into full-scale military conflict. Under pressure from the Trump administration, some NATO member states (such as the UK, France, and the Netherlands, which have prior experience in the Persian Gulf) agree to dispatch a limited number of escort ships. China officially refuses military involvement but covertly urges Iran to lift the complete blockade of the strait. Iran maintains an ambiguous state of "partial transit restrictions" while continuing to use the strait card as leverage for sanctions relief negotiations. Crude oil prices fluctuate in the $90-110 Brent range, continuing to exert some inflationary pressure on the global economy but not reaching catastrophic levels like in 2008. Japan responds by expanding intelligence gathering activities and gradually releasing strategic petroleum reserves. Ultimately, some back-channel negotiations progress between the U.S. and Iran, leading to a partial easing of tensions in late 2026, but without a fundamental resolution. During this period, countries accelerate reviews of their energy security policies, initiating a long-term structural shift away from Middle Eastern dependence.
Implications for Investment/Action: Concrete announcements of escort ship dispatches from NATO member states, diplomatic movements between China and Iran, stabilizing crude oil prices, reports of back-channel negotiations between the U.S. and Iran.
In the optimistic scenario, the Hormuz Strait crisis resolves more quickly than the international community expects. The most likely path for this scenario is that a surge in crude oil prices severely impacts the Chinese economy, prompting Beijing to exert strong diplomatic pressure on Iran. China is Iran's largest oil purchaser and holds economic leverage. Simultaneously, public dissatisfaction with the economic crisis within Iran could rise, forcing the Supreme Leader to change course. Within an international framework, an emergency resolution by the UN Security Council (including abstentions from China and Russia) leads to the organization of a multinational maritime security mission. This framework includes the U.S., major NATO countries, as well as India, Japan, South Korea, and Australia, with China also participating in a limited capacity. Negotiations with Iran result in an agreement for the complete opening of the strait in exchange for partial sanctions relief, serving as a catalyst for building a new multilateral framework for energy security. Crude oil prices revert to the $80 range, and the impact on the global economy remains limited. In this case, the crisis functions as "constructive destruction," becoming a turning point toward building a more equitable international security order.
Implications for Investment/Action: Clear diplomatic pressure from China on Iran, movements in the UN Security Council, signs of political change within Iran, rapid reversal of crude oil price decline.
In the pessimistic scenario, the failure of coordination and the spiral of conflict become uncontrollable, leading to a significant escalation. In response to the Trump administration's "burden sharing" demands, China openly refuses, and NATO fails to present a united front. As cracks deepen among allies, Iran intensifies its strait blockade, leading to actual attacks on tankers and mine laying. An accidental armed clash occurs between the U.S. Navy and the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps, resulting in casualties on both sides. The U.S. conducts limited military retaliation, which provokes a full-scale Iranian counterattack, turning the entire Persian Gulf into a battlefield. Iranian attacks (missiles, drones) on energy infrastructure in Saudi Arabia and the UAE occur, causing catastrophic damage to oil and gas supplies from the Middle East. Crude oil prices surge to $150-200, and a global recession becomes a reality. This crisis further deteriorates U.S.-China relations, spilling over into tensions in the Taiwan Strait and the South China Sea. Japan's energy supply faces severe constraints, forcing a massive release of strategic petroleum reserves, which only buys a few months' time. In the worst case, simultaneous crises in multiple regions lead to the collapse of the entire international order.
Implications for Investment/Action: Reports of direct attacks on tankers, military contact between U.S. and Iranian vessels, attacks on Saudi Arabian energy infrastructure, crude oil prices breaking $150, clear refusal statement from China.
Key Triggers to Watch
- Decision on Hormuz Strait response at an extraordinary NATO Foreign Ministers' or Heads of State meeting: Late March to mid-April 2026
- China's official response to the Hormuz Strait issue (acceptance/rejection of naval vessel dispatch, or its own diplomatic initiative): March-April 2026
- Occurrence of military contact or clash incidents between U.S. vessels and Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps: Within the next few weeks to months (constant monitoring required)
- Whether crude oil prices (Brent) break $120/barrel and sustain that level: April-June 2026
- Submission and voting on a UN Security Council resolution regarding the Hormuz Strait issue: April-May 2026
🔄 Tracking Loop
Next Trigger: Extraordinary NATO Foreign Ministers' Meeting (expected late March to early April 2026) — The presence or absence of concrete commitments from member states to dispatch to the Strait of Hormuz will be the first turning point in judging the success of coordination.
Continuation of this Pattern: Tracking Theme: Hormuz Strait Crisis and the Reorganization of the International Maritime Security Order in the "Post-U.S. Sole Guarantee" Era — The next milestones are NATO's response decision and China's official answer (April 2026).
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