Strait of Hormuz Naval Deployment Issue — Alliance Cr
As the US pressures allies to share the burden of securing the Strait of Hormuz, through which approximately 20% of the world's crude oil passes, an attack on a UAE oil export facility has materialized, instantly exposing the vulnerability of energy supply. This is not merely a military issue but a structural turning point that questions the sustainability of the US security umbrella, a cornerstone of the post-war international order.
── Understand in 3 points ─────────
- • President Trump criticized Japan, China, and South Korea by name as "not active" regarding the dispatch of warships to the Strait of Hormuz.
- • The US continues its freedom of navigation operations, deploying warships, including an aircraft carrier strike group, around the Strait of Hormuz.
- • A world-leading crude oil export facility in the UAE (United Arab Emirates) was attacked, halting crude oil loading operations.
── NOW PATTERN ─────────
US hegemonic fatigue and the free-rider structure of its allies have reached their limits, and "failure of coordination" is materializing at the Strait of Hormuz, a critical choke point for the global economy. "Path dependency" on the post-war 80-year security system hinders change, and cracks in alliances are creating a dangerous vacuum.
── Probability and Response ──────
• Base case 50% — Announcement of accelerated pace of Japan's defense spending increase, expansion of Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force deployment to the Middle East, revitalization of bilateral security consultations between the US and various countries, stabilization of crude oil prices at $80-90 per barrel.
• Bull case 20% — Japan's proposal for a multilateral maritime security initiative, commencement of joint patrols by multiple nations, announcement of concrete policies for energy procurement diversification, positive reaction from the US.
• Bear case 30% — Intensification of Iranian military exercises in the Strait of Hormuz, attacks on multiple Gulf infrastructures, crude oil prices breaking $100, official announcement of reduced US military presence in the Middle East, explicit link between stationing costs and trade negotiations.
📡 THE SIGNAL — What Happened
Why it matters: As the US pressures allies to share the burden of securing the Strait of Hormuz, through which approximately 20% of the world's crude oil passes, an attack on a UAE oil export facility has materialized, instantly exposing the vulnerability of energy supply. This is not merely a military issue but a structural turning point that questions the sustainability of the US security umbrella, a cornerstone of the post-war international order.
- Diplomacy — President Trump criticized Japan, China, and South Korea by name as "not active" regarding the dispatch of warships to the Strait of Hormuz.
- Military — The US continues its freedom of navigation operations, deploying warships, including an aircraft carrier strike group, around the Strait of Hormuz.
- Energy — A world-leading crude oil export facility in the UAE (United Arab Emirates) was attacked, halting crude oil loading operations.
- Economy — The Strait of Hormuz is the most critical choke point, through which approximately 20-21% of the world's seaborne crude oil passes.
- Security — Japan has dispatched destroyers to the Middle East for intelligence-gathering activities by the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force, but this has not met the level requested by the US.
- Geopolitics — As Houthi attacks on merchant vessels in the Red Sea continue, the security environment in the Persian Gulf region is deteriorating.
- Diplomacy — China is strengthening economic ties with Gulf states through its Belt and Road Initiative but remains reluctant to engage militarily.
- Economy — South Korea depends on the Middle East for approximately 70% of its crude oil imports, making the security of the Strait of Hormuz a vital interest.
- Markets — Reports of the attack on the UAE oil facility created upward pressure on crude oil futures prices.
- Security — The US's "burden-sharing" demand is expanding to East Asian allies, following a similar pattern to that applied to NATO allies.
- Diplomacy — While the Japanese government shows a willingness to contribute to stability in the Middle East, it remains cautious about expanding military involvement due to constitutional constraints.
- Geopolitics — Even after the normalization of relations between Saudi Arabia and Iran (mediated by China in 2023), military tensions in the region have not subsided.
The security issue surrounding the Strait of Hormuz is fundamental to the US-led international order established after World War II. Since the "Quincy Agreement" between President Franklin Roosevelt and King Abdulaziz ibn Saud of Saudi Arabia in 1945, the US has been responsible for the security of Middle Eastern oil supplies, and in return, has maintained the status of the dollar as the key currency and its hegemony in the energy market. This "oil, dollar, and security" triangle was the economic foundation of Pax Americana.
The Iranian Revolution in 1979 and the outbreak of the Iran-Iraq War the following year brought the first major test to this structure. The "Carter Doctrine," announced by President Carter in 1980, declared that any attempt by an outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf region would be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the United States, to be repelled by any means necessary, including military force. In response, CENTCOM (Central Command) was established in 1983, and since then, the US military has maintained a constant presence in the Persian Gulf for over 40 years.
However, this structure underwent a fundamental transformation in the 2010s. The shale revolution made the US the world's largest oil producer, dramatically reducing its dependence on Middle Eastern oil. By 2019, the US became a net energy exporter, and its direct economic interest in the security of the Strait of Hormuz significantly receded. Meanwhile, major Asian economies such as Japan, South Korea, China, and India continued to increase their reliance on Middle Eastern oil. Japan depends on the Middle East for approximately 90% of its crude oil imports, with most passing through the Strait of Hormuz. South Korea also relies on the Middle East for about 70%, and China for about 50%.
This asymmetry is the structural background to President Trump's current dissatisfaction. The question, "Why don't the countries that benefit the most bear the cost of security?" holds a certain legitimacy from an economic rationality perspective. President Trump has consistently pointed out the "free-rider" problem among allies since his first term (2017-2021), but this is not merely his personal ideology; it reflects a structural shift in perception that is increasingly shared across the US strategic community.
Since the "pivot to Asia (rebalance)" policy during the Obama administration, US strategic interest has shifted from the Middle East to the Indo-Pacific. The Biden administration also carried out the withdrawal from Afghanistan and prioritized strategic competition with China. A second Trump administration would further accelerate this trend, intensifying demands for burden-sharing from allies under the "America First" principle.
Further complicating the issue are geopolitical shifts within the Middle East itself. The normalization of diplomatic relations between Saudi Arabia and Iran in 2023, mediated by China, symbolized the relative decline of US influence in the Middle East. Simultaneously, destabilizing factors in the region are steadily increasing, including Houthi attacks on merchant vessels in the Red Sea, the prolonged Israel-Gaza conflict, and Iran's nuclear development issue.
The attack on the UAE's crude oil export facility is a symbolic event where this structural vulnerability materialized as a real risk. Fujairah Port and Ruwais Industrial Complex in the UAE play crucial roles as loading hubs for global crude oil and petroleum products, and an attack here would directly impact the global energy supply chain. There have been precedents, such as sabotage against merchant vessels off Fujairah in 2019 and drone attacks on Saudi Arabia's Abqaiq oil facility.
For Japan, this issue presents an extremely serious dilemma. The triple challenge of maintaining its alliance with the US, preserving good relations with Middle Eastern countries, and expanding military contributions within constitutional constraints is a recurrence of a fundamental dilemma in post-war Japanese diplomacy. When the Abe administration decided to dispatch the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force to the Middle East in 2019-2020, it maintained a distinction from the exercise of collective self-defense by using the pretext of "research and study," but the divergence from the level requested by the US was clear.
The delta: As US demands for burden-sharing from allies shift from rhetoric to substantive pressure, the attack on the UAE oil facility dramatically heightened its urgency. This transformed the question of "who will protect the sea lanes" from a hypothetical discussion into a real policy challenge.
🔍 BETWEEN THE LINES — What the News Isn't Saying
The true intent behind President Trump's criticism of Japan, China, and South Korea "in the same breath" is not a security demand on allies, but rather to build leverage in trade negotiations. The Strait of Hormuz issue is subtly linked to semiconductor and automobile tariff negotiations, where the implicit threat of "removing the security umbrella" is used to raise trade terms. The timing of the UAE oil facility attack coinciding with increased US pressure on Japan is not accidental; there is a structure where regional instability itself enhances US negotiating power. Though not officially stated, for the US, "moderate instability" in the Strait of Hormuz can also be an effective tool to keep allies compliant.
NOW PATTERN
Alliance Strain × Failure of Coordination × Path Dependency
US hegemonic fatigue and the free-rider structure of its allies have reached their limits, and "failure of coordination" is materializing at the Strait of Hormuz, a critical choke point for the global economy. "Path dependency" on the post-war 80-year security system hinders change, and cracks in alliances are creating a dangerous vacuum.
Intersection of Dynamics
The three structural dynamics of "Alliance Strain," "Failure of Coordination," and "Path Dependency" mutually reinforce each other, making the current crisis even more severe. First, "Path Dependency" structurally entrenches "Failure of Coordination." Japan and South Korea's 80-year reliance on US security has left them without independent Middle East security capabilities to this day. This lack of capability makes it difficult to substantively respond to US demands for burden-sharing, thus entrenching the failure of coordination. In other words, the classic pattern of path dependency, where past rational choices narrow current options, is at play.
Next, "Failure of Coordination" accelerates "Alliance Strain." If countries continue free-rider behavior, US dissatisfaction will accumulate and escalate into public criticism and more substantive retaliatory measures (trade pressure, conditional security commitments). This further erodes the credibility of alliance relationships, leading allies to perceive the US security umbrella as "unreliable." However, due to path dependency, countries without alternative solutions are left in limbo amidst uncertainty.
Furthermore, a vicious cycle exists where "Alliance Strain" generates new "Failures of Coordination." If the US unilaterally reduces its burden, competition among regional countries will intensify over the resulting security vacuum. Iran will strengthen its control over the Strait of Hormuz, Saudi Arabia and the UAE will accelerate their own military buildup, and China will seek to position itself as an "alternative security provider." In this multipolar security environment, transactional bilateral relationships replace multilateral coordination mechanisms, making the maintenance of sea lane security as a public good even more challenging.
The most dangerous scenario is when these three dynamics simultaneously reach a critical point. If alliance cracks reach an irreparable level, coordination frameworks completely collapse, and the Strait of Hormuz is actually blockaded without alternative measures due to path dependency, the impact on the global economy would be immeasurable. The attack on the UAE oil facility should be understood as a "preview" of such a scenario.
📚 PATTERN HISTORY
1956: Suez Crisis
Withdrawal of external great powers (UK, France) and regional security vacuum
Structural similarity to the present: After the UK and France withdrew from the Suez Canal, regional security was reconfigured along the US-Soviet rivalry. The withdrawal of a hegemonic power creates a vacuum, and the search for a new power balance is accompanied by long-term instability.
1973: First Oil Crisis (OAPEC Oil Embargo)
Geopolitical weaponization of energy supply and vulnerability of dependent nations
Structural similarity to the present: Middle Eastern oil-producing countries used oil as a political weapon, and developed nations, including Japan, faced a severe energy crisis. From this lesson, Japan developed an oil stockpiling system, but the fundamental structural dependence on the Middle East did not change.
1987-88: Tanker War ("Operation Earnest Will" during the Iran-Iraq War)
US escort of merchant vessels and demands for burden-sharing from allies
Structural similarity to the present: In response to attacks on merchant vessels in the Persian Gulf, the US escorted Kuwaiti-flagged tankers under the US flag. Even then, the military contributions of allies were limited, and the US effectively bore the burden of maritime security alone.
2019: Strait of Hormuz Tanker Attacks and Coalition of the Willing Initiative
US call for multilateral cooperation and limited participation by allies
Structural similarity to the present: Despite attacks on Japan-related tankers, Japan responded with independent intelligence-gathering activities rather than joining a coalition of the willing. The pattern of coordination failure was repeated.
2024-25: Houthi Attacks on Red Sea Merchant Vessels and Operation Prosperity Guardian
Sea lane attacks by non-state actors and delayed international response
Structural similarity to the present: The international community's response to Houthi attacks was fragmented, forcing significant diversions for commercial shipping in the Red Sea. It was demonstrated that multilateral deterrence against non-state actor attacks is ineffective.
Patterns Revealed by History
Historical patterns reveal three structural lessons. First, the "exhaustion and withdrawal of hegemonic powers" in sea lane security is a recurring phenomenon, each time creating a security vacuum and regional instability. As the UK and France exited the Suez Crisis in 1956 and the US and Soviet Union stepped in, the succession of hegemony does not proceed peacefully. Second, the pattern of path dependency, where energy-dependent nations declare "de-dependence" during each crisis but fail to achieve structural transformation, has been repeated for over 50 years since the 1973 oil crisis. Japan promoted energy conservation and nuclear power after the oil crisis, but its dependence on the Middle East has ultimately not changed significantly since the 1970s. Third, the pattern of US demands for burden-sharing from allies and the limited response from those allies has fundamentally remained unchanged from the Tanker War in the 1980s to the present. What has changed is the US's own reduced interest in the Middle East and the corresponding increase in the urgency of its demands. History teaches that this type of structural imbalance is unsustainable in the long term and will, at some point, lead to abrupt adjustments (crises).
🔮 WHAT'S NEXT
The US maintains its military presence in the Strait of Hormuz while gradually increasing pressure on allies. Japan responds by accelerating defense spending increases and expanding Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force activities in the Middle East (upgrading from intelligence gathering to patrol activities), and South Korea also agrees to limited warship deployments. China continues to refuse military involvement but seeks "invisible contributions" (economic aid, diplomatic mediation) through bilateral negotiations. The attack on the UAE oil facility is identified as being carried out by Houthi forces or their supporters, leading to international condemnation, but no full-scale military retaliation occurs. Crude oil prices temporarily rise but stabilize due to Saudi Arabia's spare production capacity and releases from SPR (Strategic Petroleum Reserve). However, the fundamental issues of the security structure remain unresolved, merely buying time until the "next crisis." In Japan, discussions on reviewing security legislation reignite, but no major policy changes occur before the 2027 House of Councillors election. In this "incremental response" scenario, countries continue to postpone structural problems while making minimal concessions, and risks gradually accumulate.
Implications for Investment/Action: Announcement of accelerated pace of Japan's defense spending increase, expansion of Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force deployment to the Middle East, revitalization of bilateral security consultations between the US and various countries, stabilization of crude oil prices at $80-90 per barrel.
The attack on the UAE oil facility functions as "shock therapy," prompting concerned nations to seriously move towards establishing a multilateral maritime security framework. Japan takes the lead in proposing an "Asian version of the Maritime Security Initiative," realizing a multilateral escort system where Japan, South Korea, India, and Australia each dispatch warships. Even without formal participation, China develops de facto cooperation through its own merchant vessel escort activities. The US welcomes this development, evaluating it as a success in balancing its own burden reduction with alliance strengthening. Simultaneously, Japan seizes this crisis as an opportunity to accelerate the diversification of energy procurement sources, initiating a gradual reduction in its dependence on the Middle East. This includes expanding GX (Green Transformation) investments, securing long-term LNG procurement contracts from Australia and Canada, and accelerating the restart of nuclear power plants. Across the region, a culture of "self-help" begins to take root in both energy security and military security. For this scenario to materialize, political leaders in each country need the resolve to accept short-term political costs, and the US needs the flexibility to shift from zero-sum pressure to win-win cooperation.
Implications for Investment/Action: Japan's proposal for a multilateral maritime security initiative, commencement of joint patrols by multiple nations, announcement of concrete policies for energy procurement diversification, positive reaction from the US.
Alliance cracks and coordination failures accelerate, further deteriorating the security environment in the Strait of Hormuz. As the US hints at a gradual withdrawal from the Persian Gulf, Iran or its proxy forces intensify demonstrative actions in the Strait of Hormuz, with frequent harassment and inspections of merchant vessels. The attack on the UAE oil facility is revealed to be merely the first in a series, with other critical infrastructures such as Saudi Arabia's Ras Tanura oil terminal also becoming targets. Crude oil prices exceed $120 per barrel, and the global economy faces the risk of stagflation (inflation during a recession). The Japanese economy is hit by the double blow of soaring crude oil prices and a depreciating yen, leading to a rapid expansion of its trade deficit. President Trump criticizes allies' "inaction" even more strongly, applying comprehensive pressure by linking it to the issue of stationing costs for US forces in Japan and South Korea. In the worst-case scenario, the US explicitly links security provision with trade access, proposing a blatant deal: "countries that do not increase defense spending will face additional tariffs." In this scenario, the principle of "separation of economics and security," a foundation of the post-war liberal international order, collapses, forcing countries to adapt to an era of "power-based transactions." Japan faces a simultaneous crisis in economic and military security, potentially leading to political and social turmoil.
Implications for Investment/Action: Intensification of Iranian military exercises in the Strait of Hormuz, attacks on multiple Gulf infrastructures, crude oil prices breaking $100, official announcement of reduced US military presence in the Middle East, explicit link between stationing costs and trade negotiations.
Key Triggers to Watch
- Deliberation trends of bills in the US Congress to review military presence in the Persian Gulf: April-June 2026
- Agenda setting of the Strait of Hormuz issue and content of the joint statement at the Japan-US summit meeting: April-May 2026 (at the next summit meeting)
- Identification of perpetrators of the UAE oil facility attack and the international community's response: March-April 2026
- Whether crude oil prices (WTI, Brent) break $100 per barrel: March-June 2026
- Whether the Japanese government makes a cabinet decision to expand the dispatch of the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force to the Middle East: April-September 2026
🔄 TRACKING LOOP
Next Trigger: Japan-US Summit Meeting (scheduled for April-May 2026) — How the Strait of Hormuz issue and trade issues are packaged will be the most critical event determining the future direction of the alliance.
Continuation of this Pattern: Tracking Theme: The Future of Multilateral Framework Building for Strait of Hormuz Security — The next milestone is the agenda setting of maritime security at the G7 Summit in summer 2026.
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