Strait of Hormuz Ship Deployment Issue — Structural Transformation
As approximately 20% of the world's crude oil transport passes through the Strait of Hormuz, and President Trump pressures Japan, China, and South Korea to share the burden of its security, an attack on a UAE oil facility has materialized, simultaneously exposing the vulnerability of energy supply and cracks in alliance relationships.
── Understand in 3 points ─────────
- • President Trump criticized Japan, China, and South Korea by name as "not active" regarding naval vessel deployment to the Strait of Hormuz.
- • The United States is deploying naval forces, including a carrier strike group, around the Strait of Hormuz.
- • A world-leading crude oil export facility in the UAE (United Arab Emirates) was attacked, halting crude oil loading operations.
── NOW PATTERN ─────────
As U.S. energy self-sufficiency and its pivot to China expose the limits of its sole commitment to Middle East security, and cracks widen among allies over burden-sharing, attacking forces are exploiting this "failure of coordination" to escalate attacks on energy infrastructure.
── Probability and Response ──────
• Base case 50% — Reports of Japan's ministerial-level consideration of expanding forces dispatched to the Middle East, materialization of additional burden-sharing demands by the Trump administration, sustained rise in crude oil prices above $90.
• Bull case 20% — Formal decision by Japan's National Security Council to expand Middle East deployment, announcement of multilateral maritime security exercises in the Persian Gulf, signs of expanding Chinese naval presence in the Indian Ocean.
• Bear case 30% — Concrete reports of U.S. military troop reductions from the Middle East, successive attacks on multiple crude oil export facilities, crude oil prices exceeding $120, direct attacks on tankers in the Strait of Hormuz.
📡 The Signal — What Happened
Why it matters: As approximately 20% of the world's crude oil transport passes through the Strait of Hormuz, and President Trump pressures Japan, China, and South Korea to share the burden of its security, an attack on a UAE oil facility has materialized, simultaneously exposing the vulnerability of energy supply and cracks in alliance relationships.
- Diplomacy — President Trump criticized Japan, China, and South Korea by name as "not active" regarding naval vessel deployment to the Strait of Hormuz.
- Military — The United States is deploying naval forces, including a carrier strike group, around the Strait of Hormuz.
- Energy — A world-leading crude oil export facility in the UAE (United Arab Emirates) was attacked, halting crude oil loading operations.
- Geopolitics — The Strait of Hormuz is the most critical chokepoint, through which approximately 20-21% of the world's seaborne crude oil passes.
- Economy — Japan relies on the Middle East for about 90% of its crude oil imports, the majority of which pass through the Strait of Hormuz.
- Diplomacy — The Trump administration has consistently demanded a significant increase in defense spending from its allies.
- Security — Japan has a precedent of dispatching the Maritime Self-Defense Force to the Middle East in 2019 for independent information-gathering activities.
- Market — Concerns are rising about increased upward pressure on international crude oil prices following reports of the UAE oil facility attack.
- Diplomacy — South Korea maintains a cautious stance on military contributions to securing the Strait of Hormuz.
- Geopolitics — China is one of the world's largest importers of crude oil via the Strait of Hormuz but is reluctant to participate in U.S.-led maritime security frameworks.
- Security — The United States has effectively borne the burden of maritime security in the Persian Gulf almost single-handedly for many years through "freedom of navigation" operations.
- Economy — It is estimated that if passage through the Strait of Hormuz is obstructed, it could impact global GDP by trillions of dollars.
The current tensions surrounding the security of the Strait of Hormuz indicate a fundamental turning point in the international order built by the United States after World War II. To understand the essence of this issue, it is necessary to look back at approximately 80 years of U.S. involvement in the Middle East.
In 1945, the Quincy Agreement between President Franklin D. Roosevelt and King Abdulaziz ibn Saud of Saudi Arabia became the prototype of an implicit deal: the U.S. would provide security for the Middle East in exchange for stable oil supplies. This "oil for security" framework remained the foundation of U.S. Middle East policy throughout the Cold War. The Carter Doctrine, announced in response to the 1979 Iranian Revolution and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, explicitly defined the security of the Persian Gulf as a vital U.S. interest, formalizing military commitment to the region.
During the Iran-Iraq War in the 1980s, the so-called "Tanker War" saw both nations attack civilian tankers to disrupt each other's oil exports, re-emphasizing the strategic importance of the Strait of Hormuz to the world. The U.S. Navy undertook the unprecedented measure of escorting Kuwaiti-flagged tankers under the U.S. flag as part of "Operation Earnest Will." In the 1991 Gulf War, the U.S. deployed over 500,000 troops to the Middle East, demonstrating the depth of its security commitment to the region.
However, since the 2000s, several structural changes have begun to shake the sustainability of the model where "the U.S. single-handedly assumes maritime security in the Middle East as the world's policeman." Firstly, due to the Shale Revolution, the U.S. itself is transitioning into a net energy exporter, significantly reducing its direct dependence on Middle Eastern crude oil. In 2019, the U.S. temporarily became a net energy exporter, weakening the traditional logic that securing the Strait of Hormuz directly serves U.S. economic interests. Secondly, China's rapid rise necessitated a reallocation of strategic resources to the Indo-Pacific region. For the U.S., the opportunity cost of continuously tying up vast military resources in the Middle East increased.
Thirdly, and perhaps most significantly, bipartisan dissatisfaction with "allies free-riding" grew in U.S. domestic politics. The demands for burden-sharing repeatedly asserted by President Trump during his first term (2017-2021) continued in modified forms under the Biden administration. Demands for NATO members to spend 2% of GDP on defense, negotiations with Japan and South Korea over host-nation support costs, and pressure on allies for military contributions in the Middle East are structural trends that transcend administrations.
For Japan, this issue presents an extremely serious security dilemma. Japan relies on the Middle East for approximately 88% of its crude oil imports, almost all of which pass through the Strait of Hormuz. However, considering constitutional constraints and domestic public opinion, a significant expansion of military presence in the Persian Gulf is not politically easy. Even when the Abe administration decided to dispatch the Maritime Self-Defense Force to the Middle East in 2019, it did so under the guise of "research and study," distinguishing it from the exercise of collective self-defense.
China is also in a complex position. As the world's largest crude oil importer, its dependence on Middle Eastern crude is high, but participating in a U.S.-led maritime security framework contradicts its independent foreign and security policy. China is building its own Indo-Pacific and Middle East presence through the "Belt and Road Initiative," including Pakistan's Gwadar Port and a military base in Djibouti, but its direct contribution to the security of the Strait of Hormuz is limited.
The attack on the UAE oil facility occurred amidst these structural changes. While it has not yet been definitively determined whether it was carried out by Houthi rebels or Iran-linked forces, this attack dramatically highlighted the vulnerability of maritime transport routes. The triple pressure of the U.S. being exhausted by providing security unilaterally, allies being cautious about contributing, and regional threats increasing, is creating a "responsibility vacuum" in the security of the Strait of Hormuz. This vacuum is the essence of the current problem.
The delta: As President Trump explicitly demanded burden-sharing for the security of the Strait of Hormuz from allies, the actual attack on the UAE oil facility transformed the "theoretical threat" into "real damage." This means allies are losing the "freedom not to contribute," making a reorganization of the U.S.-led maritime security system inevitable.
🔍 Between the Lines — What the News Isn't Saying
President Trump's true aim in criticizing Japan, China, and South Korea "equally" is not the security of the Strait of Hormuz itself, but rather to accumulate bargaining chips in bilateral trade and tariff negotiations. The rhetoric that "it is unfair for countries that do not contribute to Middle East security to freely access the U.S. market" should be seen as a prelude to negotiating defense spending and trade deficits as a single package. The timing of the UAE oil facility attack is a "godsend" for the Trump administration, serving as a perfect justification for pressuring allies. What Japanese diplomatic authorities are most wary of is the Strait of Hormuz issue being incorporated into a "package deal" linked to automobile tariffs and semiconductor regulations.
NOW PATTERN
Alliance Strain × Failure of Coordination × Overextension of Power
As U.S. energy self-sufficiency and its pivot to China expose the limits of its sole commitment to Middle East security, and cracks widen among allies over burden-sharing, attacking forces are exploiting this "failure of coordination" to escalate attacks on energy infrastructure.
Intersection of Dynamics
The three dynamics of "alliance strain," "failure of coordination," and "overextension of power" mutually reinforce each other, structurally deteriorating the security situation surrounding the Strait of Hormuz.
The overextension of U.S. power creates pressure for burden-sharing, and that pressure exacerbates alliance strain. The widening of cracks makes the establishment of a collective security system difficult, deepening the failure of coordination. The security vacuum created by this failure of coordination incentivizes attacking forces to escalate, manifesting as actual attacks (such as the attack on the UAE oil facility). The occurrence of attacks reaffirms the need for security, but simultaneously sharpens the question of "who should bear the burden," further deepening the cracks and the failure of coordination.
Particularly dangerous in this vicious cycle is the "self-reinforcing mechanism" inherent in each dynamic. Once visible, alliance strain amplifies mutual distrust, leading to further cracks. The failure of coordination becomes entrenched as nations fall into a passive equilibrium of "if others don't act, neither will we." The overextension of power contains the contradiction of creating new problems (security vacuums) during the process of retreat, which then demand further resources to address.
Furthermore, these dynamics spill over into the economic dimension through international energy markets. If a security vacuum leads to unstable energy supply, soaring crude oil prices will pressure the global economy and reduce the political leeway of each country. Reduced political leeway further weakens domestic support for military contributions, deepening the failure of coordination. Thus, a feedback loop spanning security, diplomacy, and economic dimensions is formed, creating a situation where solving the problem in only one dimension cannot address the overall structure. Most concerning is that this complex vicious cycle lacks an "equilibrium point" and a new equilibrium may only be formed by external shocks (large-scale military conflict or prolonged disruption of energy supply).
📚 Pattern History
1956: Suez Crisis
Alliance strain over the security of maritime chokepoints
Structural similarities to the present: When Britain and France militarily intervened in Egypt over control of the Suez Canal, the U.S. opposed it and forced their withdrawal. This demonstrated that if perceptions regarding the security of maritime routes diverge between a hegemonic power and its allies, the alliance itself can be shaken.
1987-88: Tanker War and U.S. Navy Escort Operations in the Persian Gulf
Limits of U.S. unilateral burden in the security of the Strait of Hormuz
Structural similarities to the present: During the Tanker War in the Iran-Iraq War, the U.S. Navy conducted escort operations almost unilaterally in response to tanker attacks. Military contributions from allies were limited, forming the prototype of the complaint that "U.S. blood and treasure protect other countries' oil." The mining of the USS Samuel B. Roberts became a symbolic incident of the risks of this unilateral burden.
2019: Oil Tanker Attacks in the Strait of Hormuz and the Coalition of the Willing Concept
Attempts at multilateralizing security and the free-rider problem
Structural similarities to the present: Following tanker attacks, the Trump administration proposed a coalition of the willing, but participation from major countries was limited. Japan chose independent activities, and Germany opted out. This reconfirmed the structural difficulty of building a multilateral security system.
1973: First Oil Shock (OAPEC Oil Embargo)
Vulnerability of energy security testing alliance relationships
Structural similarities to the present: The oil embargo by OAPEC member states led Japan and Europe to face a severe energy crisis. It became clear that energy security could not be ensured solely through alliance with the U.S., prompting each country to seek its own energy diplomacy. This also marks the origin of Japan's "independent path" in Middle East diplomacy.
2011: "Arab Spring" and Libya Intervention
U.S. aiming to reduce military involvement in the Middle East and allied burden-sharing
Structural similarities to the present: The Obama administration sought a leading role for NATO European countries in the Libya intervention as "leading from behind," but a lack of operational capability was exposed. This is a precedent demonstrating the limits of non-U.S. allies in both capability and willingness to lead military operations in the Middle East.
Patterns Revealed by History
The structural patterns revealed by these historical precedents are clear. Firstly, the security of maritime chokepoints has repeatedly served as a test case for alliance relationships. The defense of these points, which control the flow of strategic resources like oil, functions as a "litmus test" to visualize the alignment of interests and willingness to cooperate among allies. Secondly, dissatisfaction with the U.S.'s unilateral burden has consistently existed since the 1980s and is not a phenomenon unique to the Trump administration. The U.S.'s energy self-sufficiency due to the Shale Revolution has provided economic rationale for this long-standing dissatisfaction, enabling more acute political expression. Thirdly, the establishment of security systems through multilateral cooperation has been attempted for over 40 years but has never been fully realized due to structural collective action problems. Coalitions of the willing have always had a limited scope of "willing" participants and did not evolve into institutionalized security systems. Fourthly, security vacuums have historically always invited aggressive actions. Phases where coordination failures and power retreats coincide are also phases where the risk of regional destabilization is highest. The current situation presents itself as a "perfect storm" where all these patterns are operating simultaneously.
🔮 Next Scenarios
Under pressure from the Trump administration, Japan and South Korea will gradually expand their maritime presence around the Strait of Hormuz, but the scale will remain a "symbolic contribution" significantly below U.S. expectations. Japan will consider expanding the framework of its 2019 Middle East deployment, including additional destroyer dispatches and an expanded scope of activities, but will forgo a shift to full-scale escort operations involving the use of force. South Korea will also respond with a small naval deployment. China will continue to refuse participation in the U.S.-led framework and will seek dialogue with Iran through its own diplomatic channels. The attack on the UAE oil facility will draw international condemnation, but military retaliation against the attacking forces will remain limited, and the threat of sporadic attacks will persist. Crude oil prices will temporarily rise to the $90-100 per barrel range, but a sustained level significantly above $100 will be avoided due to increased production by Saudi Arabia and releases from the SPR (Strategic Petroleum Reserve). The U.S. will continue to express dissatisfaction but will not undertake an immediate large-scale withdrawal from the Middle East, instead making gradual adjustments to its presence. As a result, the structural security issues will be postponed without resolution, and an unstable equilibrium will persist.
Implications for Investment/Action: Reports of Japan's ministerial-level consideration of expanding forces dispatched to the Middle East, materialization of additional burden-sharing demands by the Trump administration, sustained rise in crude oil prices above $90.
A scenario where the attack on the UAE oil facility acts as a "wake-up call," and shared sense of crisis among concerned nations accelerates the formation of a cooperative framework. Japan will take maximum measures within the framework of its security-related legislation, deciding on a large-scale dispatch of the Maritime Self-Defense Force and active participation in multilateral joint patrols. South Korea will also dispatch commensurate naval forces, and trilateral cooperation among Japan, the U.S., and South Korea will be substantially applied to maritime security in the Persian Gulf for the first time. Furthermore, Indo-Pacific partner countries such as India and Australia will also participate, taking the first step towards institutionalizing the security of the Strait of Hormuz as a truly multilateral framework. While China will forgo formal participation, it will make a de facto "parallel contribution" through the expansion of its own naval presence, forming an implicit division of labor between the U.S. and China. This will strengthen deterrence against attacking forces, reducing the frequency of attacks. Crude oil prices will stabilize, and confidence in the international energy market will recover. In this scenario, the Trump administration's pressure is evaluated as having ultimately prompted a constructive reorganization of the security system. However, the realization of this scenario requires strong political will transcending each country's domestic political constraints and rapid policy decisions, making its feasibility limited.
Implications for Investment/Action: Formal decision by Japan's National Security Council to expand Middle East deployment, announcement of multilateral maritime security exercises in the Persian Gulf, signs of expanding Chinese naval presence in the Indian Ocean.
A scenario where the failure of coordination becomes entrenched and the security vacuum expands, significantly deteriorating the security environment around the Strait of Hormuz. The Trump administration, exasperated by allies' "insufficient" responses, proceeds with a significant reduction of U.S. military presence in the Middle East. In response, Iran and its proxy forces (such as Houthi rebels, Iraqi militia groups) escalate attacks in the Persian Gulf, with more serious threats like direct attacks on tankers and mine-laying becoming a reality. Following the UAE oil facility, multiple crude oil export facilities such as Saudi Arabia's Ras Tanura port and Iraq's Basra port are attacked, leading to a significant reduction in crude oil exports from the Persian Gulf. Crude oil prices surge to over $120-150 per barrel, pushing the global economy into a stagflationary situation. The Japanese economy would suffer particularly severe damage, with a rapid expansion of the trade deficit and accelerated yen depreciation potentially triggering a complex economic crisis. In this scenario, Japan would be forced to secure emergency energy security and dispatch a large-scale MSDF contingent to the Middle East, but post-crisis responses would be far more costly and less effective than peacetime preventive measures. In the worst case, a de facto blockade of the Strait of Hormuz could last for weeks to months, leading to irreversible changes in the global energy supply system.
Implications for Investment/Action: Concrete reports of U.S. military troop reductions from the Middle East, successive attacks on multiple crude oil export facilities, crude oil prices exceeding $120, direct attacks on tankers in the Strait of Hormuz.
Key Triggers to Watch
- Specific demands from President Trump to Japan and South Korea for increased defense spending or a formal request for Strait of Hormuz deployment: March-May 2026
- Identification of perpetrators of the UAE oil facility attack and whether the U.S. takes retaliatory action: Late March-April 2026
- Consideration and decision by the Japanese government on additional dispatch of the Maritime Self-Defense Force to the vicinity of the Strait of Hormuz: April-June 2026
- Whether crude oil prices (Brent crude) break through $100 per barrel: March-June 2026
- Progress or breakdown of negotiations between the U.S. and Iran regarding the Iran nuclear deal: April-September 2026
🔄 Tracking Loop
Next Trigger: Identification of perpetrators of the UAE oil facility attack and announcement of U.S. response policy — late March to early April 2026 is the focus. The presence or absence of retaliatory action will be the turning point for escalation.
Continuation of this Pattern: Tracking Theme: Multilateralization of Strait of Hormuz Security and Renegotiation of U.S.-Japan Alliance Burden-Sharing — The next milestone is security and trade package discussions at the U.S.-Japan summit in April-May 2026.
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