The Strait of Hormuz Crisis and Trump's "Bur
The de facto blockade of the Strait of Hormuz, through which approximately 20% of the world's oil transport passes, will directly hit the global economy through soaring energy prices. President Trump's "burden-shifting" strategy, demanding China and NATO dispatch escort vessels, marks a turning point that fundamentally re-examines the post-war maritime security order itself.
── Understand in 3 points ─────────
- • Iran has de facto blockaded the Strait of Hormuz, causing serious disruptions to international maritime transport.
- • President Trump demands China dispatch warships to secure the Strait of Hormuz.
- • President Trump also demands NATO member states dispatch warships for vessel escort.
── NOW PATTERN ─────────
A dual structural pattern is unfolding: the US "burden-shifting" strategy is creating cracks in existing alliance structures, while the failure of international cooperation is prolonging the energy crisis.
── Probability and Response ──────
• Base case 50% — Announcement of British and French naval deployment to the Persian Gulf, Japanese cabinet decision to expand Middle East deployment, Chinese navy deployment in the Arabian Sea, partial transit permission by Iran as a "humanitarian exception," crude oil prices stabilizing in the $100 range.
• Bull case 20% — Increased mediation efforts by Oman and Qatar, softening of the Iranian Foreign Ministry's stance on dialogue, initiation of Chinese diplomatic mediation, sharp drop in crude oil prices, increased influence of moderates in Iran.
• Bear case 30% — Attacks on escort vessels resulting in casualties, US military attacks on Iranian military facilities, attacks on oil infrastructure in the Persian Gulf, crude oil prices exceeding $150, large-scale Chinese fleet deployment, intensified Houthi attacks in the Red Sea and Bab el-Mandeb Strait.
📡 THE SIGNAL — What Happened
Why it matters: The de facto blockade of the Strait of Hormuz, through which approximately 20% of the world's oil transport passes, will directly hit the global economy through soaring energy prices. President Trump's "burden-shifting" strategy, demanding China and NATO dispatch escort vessels, marks a turning point that fundamentally re-examines the post-war maritime security order itself.
- Military & Security — Iran has de facto blockaded the Strait of Hormuz, causing serious disruptions to international maritime transport.
- Diplomacy — President Trump demands China dispatch warships to secure the Strait of Hormuz.
- Diplomacy — President Trump also demands NATO member states dispatch warships for vessel escort.
- Energy — The Strait of Hormuz is the most critical choke point, through which approximately 20-21% of the world's seaborne oil transport passes.
- Economy — Crude oil prices are soaring due to the strait blockade, and its impact on the global economy is expanding.
- Geopolitics — Since the shale revolution, the US's dependence on Middle Eastern crude oil has significantly decreased, reducing its direct interest in defending the strait.
- Security — China sources approximately 40% of its crude oil imports via the Strait of Hormuz, making it one of the biggest victims of a blockade.
- Alliance Relations — Many NATO member states have not met the 2% GDP defense spending target, which the Trump administration uses as a point of criticism.
- International Law — The Strait of Hormuz is an international strait under the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, and transit passage rights are recognized.
- Military — The US Navy's Fifth Fleet has been responsible for security in the Persian Gulf from its base in Bahrain, but there are limits to defending the strait alone.
- Energy Market — Japan depends on the Middle East for approximately 90% of its crude oil imports, making it one of the countries most severely affected by a Strait of Hormuz blockade.
- Diplomacy — The Trump administration has already withdrawn from the nuclear agreement with Iran (JCPOA), limiting the framework for diplomatic resolution.
This current crisis concerning the security of the Strait of Hormuz should be understood not as a sudden incident, but as the culmination of decades of structural changes.
First, the strategic importance of the Strait of Hormuz dates back to the 1970s oil crisis. After Britain withdrew from east of Suez in 1971, security in the Persian Gulf was entrusted to the US "Twin Pillar Policy" — a strategy utilizing Iran and Saudi Arabia as regional stabilizers. This structure collapsed with the 1979 Iranian Revolution, and the Carter Doctrine (1980) officially declared US military involvement in the Persian Gulf. Since then, the US Navy has guaranteed freedom of navigation in the Strait of Hormuz for over 40 years.
However, the shale revolution of the 2010s fundamentally altered US energy security calculations. The US became a net oil exporter in 2019, and its direct dependence on Middle Eastern crude oil dramatically decreased. This structural change lent credibility to the Trumpian question, "Why should only American taxpayers defend the Strait of Hormuz?" In fact, the biggest beneficiaries of oil passing through the Strait of Hormuz are Asian countries like China, Japan, South Korea, and India, and Europe also indirectly depends on it for LNG imports.
The second structural factor is the deadlock in Iran's "Axis of Resistance" strategy. Iran has pursued expanding its regional influence through Lebanon's Hezbollah, Yemen's Houthis, and pro-Iranian militias in Iraq, but conflicts between Israel and Hezbollah since 2024, US-UK military operations against the Houthis, and a domestic economic crisis have cornered Tehran. The blockade of the Strait of Hormuz is Iran's last "escalation card" and its biggest bargaining chip against the international community.
Third, President Trump's "burden-shifting" strategy signifies a fundamental redefinition of alliance relations. The Cold War alliance structure was based on an implicit deal where the US provided security, and allies offered political support and base access. The Trump administration has made this "deal" explicit, demanding an equal sharing of financial and military burdens. The demand for China to dispatch warships is an unprecedented approach, seeking security cost-sharing even from an adversary, and challenges the very concept of maritime security as an international public good.
Fourth, there is the rapid expansion of China's naval power. The Chinese navy has become the largest in the world by vessel count and maintains overseas bases in the Indian Ocean and Djibouti on Africa's east coast. However, China is significantly inferior to the US Navy in blue-water operational capabilities — particularly in anti-submarine warfare and integrated air defense. Dispatching warships to the Strait of Hormuz presents a dual aspect for China: the risk of exposing its "Malacca Dilemma" (vulnerability of energy transport routes) and an opportunity to showcase its naval power.
On the NATO side, Europe's security environment has fundamentally changed since Russia's invasion of Ukraine in 2022. NATO member states are increasing defense spending, but they are preoccupied with supporting Ukraine and rebuilding their own defenses, limiting their power projection capabilities to the Persian Gulf. Trump's demand means Europe faces a "two-front problem."
Historically, this situation recalls the 1987-88 "Tanker War" and "Operation Earnest Will." During the Iran-Iraq War, both countries attacked oil tankers in the Persian Gulf, and the US Navy escorted Kuwaiti-flagged tankers. However, there are crucial differences between then and now. At that time, the US was heavily dependent on Middle Eastern oil and had a direct interest in escorting. The current US is an exporter, and soaring crude oil prices actually benefit the US shale industry. This structural divergence of interests underlies the current "burden-shifting" strategy.
The delta: The biggest change is the Trump administration's rejection of maritime security as an "international public good" and its declaration of a shift to the beneficiary-pays principle. This signifies a fundamental re-evaluation of the US-led maritime order since 1945, forcing a strategic recalculation for all maritime trade-dependent nations, including China, NATO, and Japan.
🔍 BETWEEN THE LINES — What the News Isn't Saying
The true aim of Trump's demand for China and NATO to dispatch warships is not merely to secure the Strait of Hormuz. Since the shale revolution, high oil prices bring enormous profits to the US energy industry, so an immediate resolution to the blockade does not necessarily align with US economic interests. Rather, it is highly probable that this crisis is being used as leverage to push for increased NATO defense spending and to create new diplomatic obligations for China. Furthermore, by asking China to dispatch warships to the Persian Gulf, there's an information warfare aspect that aims to publicly expose the limits of the Chinese navy's blue-water capabilities, portraying it as a "paper tiger" to the international community.
NOW PATTERN
Alliance Strain × Overextension of Power × Failure of Coordination
A dual structural pattern is unfolding: the US "burden-shifting" strategy is creating cracks in existing alliance structures, while the failure of international cooperation is prolonging the energy crisis.
Intersection of Dynamics
Three dynamics — alliance strain, overextension of power, and failure of coordination — mutually reinforce each other, compounding and deepening the crisis.
First, "alliance strain" accelerates "failure of coordination." As the US demands excessive burdens from its allies, trust in the alliance declines, and nations lean towards the logic of "if the US won't protect us, we'll prioritize our own interests." This chain of self-interest makes multilateral cooperation even more difficult. If European NATO members are reluctant to deploy to the Persian Gulf, Trump will further weaken his commitment to NATO, leading to a spiral where Europe becomes more inward-looking due to security anxieties.
Next, "overextension of power" exacerbates "alliance strain." The dispersion of US military power across three theaters sends a signal to allies that "the US is no longer a reliable security provider." In response, nations rush to strengthen their own defenses, but in the short term, this investment yields no results, creating a security "vacuum" during the transition. Iran is believed to have exploited this vacuum to implement the blockade, leading to a chain reaction where overextension begets overextension.
Furthermore, "failure of coordination" worsens "overextension of power." Since multilateral cost-sharing does not materialize, the US is ultimately forced to respond unilaterally, further advancing military overextension. Alternatively, the crisis could be prolonged without adequate response from any nation, with soaring crude oil prices continuing to pressure the global economy. This economic blow further strains national defense budgets, eroding the very resource base for cooperation.
Breaking this triple vicious cycle requires a new maritime security governance structure that transcends traditional alliance frameworks, but there is a fundamental contradiction: the political will and trust needed to build it are precisely what the crisis has eroded.
📚 PATTERN HISTORY
1956: Suez Crisis
Britain and France militarily occupied the Suez Canal against US wishes but withdrew under US pressure. Britain was confronted with the reality of its "post-imperial" era.
Structural similarity to today: Control over maritime choke points visualizes power dynamics between great powers. Security of critical junctures cannot be maintained without the cooperation of the hegemonic power.
1987-88: Tanker War and "Operation Earnest Will"
During the Iran-Iraq War, oil tankers in the Persian Gulf were attacked, and the US Navy escorted Kuwaiti-flagged tankers. This eventually escalated into military clashes between the US and Iran.
Structural similarity to today: The risk of a Strait of Hormuz blockade has existed for decades, and escalation is difficult to control. Escort operations always carry the risk of unintentionally escalating into direct military conflict.
2019: Strait of Hormuz Tanker Attacks
Tankers linked to Japan and Norway were attacked, and the US blamed Iran. The "International Maritime Security Construct (IMSC)" coalition of the willing was formed, but participation was limited.
Structural similarity to today: Multilateral frameworks for strait defense are difficult to build, and conflicting national interests hinder cooperation. Coalitions of the willing carry a high risk of remaining "symbolic."
1930s: Collapse of the Free Trade System and Rise of Protectionism
After the Great Depression, nations engaged in tariff hikes and currency devaluation races, leading to the collapse of international economic cooperation. This ultimately contributed to World War II.
Structural similarity to today: The cessation of international public goods (free trade, freedom of navigation) leads to a cascading collapse of order. If the question of "who bears the cost" is left unaddressed, everyone will suffer losses.
2008: Somalia Piracy Issue and Multilateral Maritime Patrols
In response to the threat of piracy, NATO, the EU, China, Japan, India, and others conducted separate escort operations. While coordination was limited, they achieved some success.
Structural similarity to today: Multilateral cooperation in maritime security is possible, but when the threat level escalates to inter-state conflict, qualitatively different difficulties arise compared to responding to non-state actors.
Patterns Revealed by History
The patterns emerging from historical precedents are clear. First, the security of maritime choke points, including the Strait of Hormuz, has always functioned as a "mirror" reflecting the power dynamics between great powers. During periods of hegemonic transition or intensified great power rivalry, choke points become focal points of crisis. Second, while multilateral maritime security cooperation is theoretically rational, in practice, it consistently results in a "lowest common denominator" response due to conflicting national interests, asymmetric capabilities, and a lack of political will. The IMSC in 2019 and the Somalia patrol in 2008 are prime examples. Third, the will and capability of a hegemonic power are indispensable for maintaining maritime order, but if the hegemonic power retreats from that will (as the US is now), the vacuum of order will either be rapidly filled or lead to long-term instability. The history of international order collapsing during the hegemonic transition from Britain to the US in the 1930s serves as the most serious warning for the current situation. What distinguishes this crisis from past patterns is that the hegemonic power (the US) is voluntarily reducing its provision of security, a historically extremely rare occurrence.
🔮 NEXT SCENARIOS
Under pressure from the Trump administration, key NATO countries (UK, France) and Japan agree to limited warship deployments, and ad hoc multilateral escort operations begin. China refuses direct military participation but deploys a small number of vessels to the Indian Ocean and Arabian Sea as "its own escort activities," indirectly contributing to securing the strait. Iran, facing increased international military pressure, partially eases the blockade but does not fully restore freedom of navigation. Crude oil prices remain high at $100-120 per barrel, and the global economy slows down, but a full-blown recession is avoided. Negotiations between the US and Iran begin through back-channel diplomacy, but they do not lead to sanctions relief or a reconstruction of the nuclear agreement, and a state of "managed tension" continues for several months. From an energy security perspective, Japan intensifies its Middle East diplomacy and accelerates the development of a legal framework to expand the deployment of the Self-Defense Forces to the Middle East. In this scenario, the security of the Strait of Hormuz is not fully restored, but the worst is avoided, and the seeds of a new multilateral maritime security framework emerge. However, this framework still heavily relies on US military power, and structural vulnerabilities remain.
Implications for Investment/Action: Announcement of British and French naval deployment to the Persian Gulf, Japanese cabinet decision to expand Middle East deployment, Chinese navy deployment in the Arabian Sea, partial transit permission by Iran as a "humanitarian exception," crude oil prices stabilizing in the $100 range.
An optimistic scenario where international pressure combined with Iran's domestic economic hardship leads to a relatively early diplomatic resolution. Through mediation by Oman and Qatar, secret negotiations between the US and Iran rapidly advance, and Iran lifts the blockade in exchange for partial sanctions relief and the unfreezing of assets. There is also a possibility that China exerts influence on Iran, leading to high-level US-Iran talks in Beijing. In this scenario, the crisis significantly eases within three months, and crude oil prices fall to the $90 range. Furthermore, this crisis serves as an impetus for discussions on a new multilateral framework for Strait of Hormuz security—including the US, China, EU, Japan, India, and Gulf states—exploring new models for sharing maritime security costs. While not perfect, this framework could function as a preventive mechanism for future crises. Additionally, from an energy security perspective, accelerated investment in renewable energy by various countries could strengthen the long-term decarbonization momentum as a secondary effect. However, the realization of this scenario faces two high hurdles: suppressing opposition from hardliners within Iran and the Trump administration accepting diplomatic compromise.
Implications for Investment/Action: Increased mediation efforts by Oman and Qatar, softening of the Iranian Foreign Ministry's stance on dialogue, initiation of Chinese diplomatic mediation, sharp drop in crude oil prices, increased influence of moderates in Iran.
A pessimistic scenario where the crisis escalates into full-scale military conflict due to a failure of coordination and a chain of escalation. Multilateral escort operations begin, but escort vessels are attacked by Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) fast boats or mines, resulting in casualties. In response, the US conducts limited attacks on Iranian military facilities, and Iran retaliates further by attacking oil infrastructure in the Persian Gulf (such as Saudi Arabian oil refineries and UAE export terminals). Crude oil prices exceed $150, and the global economy enters full-blown stagflation. China deploys a large fleet to the Persian Gulf under the pretext of "protecting its own vessels," and military tensions between the US and China spill over into East Asia (Taiwan Strait, South China Sea). NATO faces intensified internal conflict over the activation of collective self-defense, effectively ceasing to function. Japan faces an energy crisis and is forced to release strategic petroleum reserves, but with only about 200 days' worth of reserves, it would suffer severe economic damage if prolonged. Furthermore, there is a risk that the Strait of Hormuz crisis could spread to other choke points, such as Yemen (Houthi attacks in the Red Sea's Bab el-Mandeb Strait) and the Strait of Malacca (increased piracy), developing into a global supply chain crisis. In this scenario, the post-war maritime order is severely disrupted, and recovery would take several years.
Implications for Investment/Action: Attacks on escort vessels resulting in casualties, US military attacks on Iranian military facilities, attacks on oil infrastructure in the Persian Gulf, crude oil prices exceeding $150, large-scale Chinese fleet deployment, intensified Houthi attacks in the Red Sea and Bab el-Mandeb Strait.
Key Triggers to Watch
- Iran's response: Maintenance or expansion of blockade, or partial easing? Specific actions by the IRGC Navy: March-April 2026
- China's decision: Official response to Trump's demand for warship deployment and specific actions: March-May 2026
- NATO Emergency Summit: Feasibility of reaching an agreement on joint deployment to the Persian Gulf: April 2026
- Crude oil price trends: Exceeding $130 per barrel is a threshold that could trigger a global recession: Continuous monitoring
- Japanese government's Middle East policy: Legal preparations for expanded SDF deployment and specific actions: April-June 2026
🔄 TRACKING LOOP
Next Trigger: NATO Emergency Foreign and Defense Ministers' Meeting Early April 2026 — The feasibility of agreeing on a framework for joint escort operations in the Persian Gulf will be a watershed moment determining the success or failure of multilateral cooperation.
Continuation of this pattern: Tracking Theme: Hormuz Strait Crisis and the Reshaping of Maritime Security Order — Next milestones are the NATO emergency meeting (April 2026) and China's official response.
>How do you read this? Participate in Prediction →
