US-China Paris Trade Talks — Tariffs and Rare Earth
The direct talks between the world's first and second largest economies in Paris signify that the tariff war is not merely a trade dispute, but has escalated into structural negotiations over technological hegemony, resource dominance, and the reorganization of the geopolitical order. The commencement of these talks at this timing, ahead of Trump's visit to China, marks a turning point where both nations have shifted from "negotiations for the sake of negotiations" to "laying the groundwork for a deal."
── Understand in 3 points ─────────
- • Trade talks between U.S. and Chinese officials began on March 15, 2026, in Paris, France.
- • President Trump's visit to China is scheduled for the near future, and these talks serve as preliminary adjustments for it.
- • The United States activated new tariff measures against China in February 2026, which will be one of the main topics.
── NOW PATTERN ─────────
The tit-for-tat tariff retaliation and rare earth regulations between the U.S. and China are a classic example of a "spiral of conflict." While the industrial structures of both nations are caught in "path dependency," making decoupling difficult, the dynamic of "crisis opportunism" is simultaneously at play, with both sides converting crises into negotiation leverage.
── Probability and Response ──────
• Base case 55% — The joint statement will not include specific figures or deadlines, focusing instead on vague wording such as "establishment of working groups" and "continued discussions." Officials from both sides will describe the talks as "constructive dialogue" but will not mention concrete outcomes.
• Bull case 20% — Talks extend beyond the scheduled days, reports emerge of phone calls between the leaders of both countries, the number of processed export permit applications for rare earths increases, Trump mentions a "great deal" on social media.
• Bear case 25% — The talks are cut short, both sides issue statements blaming the other, China announces new restrictions on rare earth export permits, the announcement of Trump's visit to China is postponed, security-related ministers intensify criticism of China.
📡 THE SIGNAL — What Happened
Why it matters: The direct talks between the world's first and second largest economies in Paris signify that the tariff war is not merely a trade dispute, but has escalated into structural negotiations over technological hegemony, resource dominance, and the reorganization of the geopolitical order. The commencement of these talks at this timing, ahead of Trump's visit to China, marks a turning point where both nations have shifted from "negotiations for the sake of negotiations" to "laying the groundwork for a deal."
- Diplomacy — Trade talks between U.S. and Chinese officials began on March 15, 2026, in Paris, France.
- Diplomacy — President Trump's visit to China is scheduled for the near future, and these talks serve as preliminary adjustments for it.
- Trade — The United States activated new tariff measures against China in February 2026, which will be one of the main topics.
- Resources — The stable supply of China's rare earths (rare earth elements) is expected to be a key theme of the talks.
- Geopolitics — The choice of Paris, a third country, as the venue for the talks, rather than Washington or Beijing, indicates both sides' intention to project negotiations on equal footing.
- Economy — Trade between the U.S. and China amounts to approximately $700 billion annually, and tariff measures directly impact both countries' GDP.
- Industry — China accounts for approximately 60% of global rare earth production and 90% of refining, meaning a supply disruption would have a severe impact on Western high-tech industries.
- Politics — Since President Trump's re-inauguration in 2025, tariffs on China have been progressively raised, with overall tariff rates exceeding 60% for some items.
- Security — Rare earths are strategic materials indispensable for dual-use technologies such as electric vehicles, wind power generation, and precision-guided weapons.
- Markets — Following reports of the talks' commencement, semiconductor and EV-related stocks reacted in Asian markets, and changes were observed in the movements of the yuan and dollar in the foreign exchange market.
- Diplomacy — French President Macron is believed to have played a certain mediating role, positioning it as part of the EU's balanced diplomacy between the U.S. and China.
- Technology — Semiconductor export restrictions and limitations on AI technology to China also exist in the background as negotiation cards alongside tariffs.
The history of U.S.-China trade friction is not merely a story of rising and falling tariff rates. It is a mirror reflecting the structural changes in the international economic order from the post-war Bretton Woods system to the present day.
In 2001, when China joined the WTO (World Trade Organization), Western nations operated on the optimistic premise that "economic liberalization would lead to political liberalization." However, a quarter-century later, China has grown into the world's second-largest economy while simultaneously strengthening its state capitalist system. This "failure of convergence" is the root cause of the current structural conflict between the U.S. and China.
In 2018, when the first Trump administration fully activated tariffs against China, it was explained with the economic logic of "correcting the trade deficit." However, its essence was a strategic countermeasure by the U.S. against China's rise in high-tech sectors—namely semiconductors, AI, quantum computing, and aerospace—symbolized by China's "Made in China 2025" industrial policy. The Biden administration largely continued this approach, implementing regulations focused on specific choke-point technologies as part of a "small yard, high fence" strategy.
When President Trump was re-inaugurated in 2025, U.S. policy towards China reverted from "precise technological restrictions" to "comprehensive economic pressure." New tariff measures extended to a wide range of items beyond semiconductors and EVs, including steel, aluminum, solar panels, and pharmaceutical raw materials. China retaliated by strengthening export controls on rare earths. At this point, the trade war qualitatively shifted from a "tariff tit-for-tat" to a "game of chicken over strategic materials."
The emergence of rare earths as a key topic in these talks is due to China's gradual tightening of its export permit system since late 2025. Heavy rare earths such as neodymium, dysprosium, and terbium are indispensable materials for modern high-tech products, from the precision guidance systems of F-35 fighter jets to Tesla's EV motors and iPhone's vibration motors. As China began to "weaponize" this supply, the U.S. was forced for the first time to confront the vulnerability of its own supply chains as a strategic risk.
The fact that these talks were held in Paris must also be understood in a historical context. It is unusual for the U.S. and China to conduct trade talks in a third country, reflecting both sides' desire to avoid the domestic political impression of having "gone to the other country." Simultaneously, the involvement of France's Macron administration in this mediation, from the perspective of the EU advocating "strategic autonomy," suggests that the international order is transitioning towards a multipolar structure that cannot be described solely by a U.S.-China bipolarity.
The commencement of these talks at this timing, ahead of Trump's visit to China, is reminiscent of Kissinger's secret diplomacy before Nixon's visit to China in 1972. At that time, too, preliminary adjustments were made behind the scenes before the official visit, leading to a fundamental shift in U.S.-China relations. Of course, the situation in 2026 is fundamentally different from the Cold War era, but the pattern of "seeking common ground at the working level before a direct meeting between leaders" is an unchanging grammar of great power diplomacy. The question is whether this "common ground" will be merely a minor adjustment of tariff rates, or a "grand bargain" encompassing technology, resources, and security.
The delta: These U.S.-China Paris talks are a watershed moment, indicating a qualitative shift in the trade war from "tariff tit-for-tat" to "comprehensive hegemonic negotiations leveraging strategic resources." With rare earths officially emerging as a negotiation topic, the form of "new great power negotiations" integrating the three domains of economy, security, and technology has become visible.
🔍 BETWEEN THE LINES — What the Reports Aren't Saying
The true focus of these talks is not the superficial "tariffs and rare earths," but rather the preliminary arrangements for a "gift" for Trump's visit to China. The Trump administration needs "concrete concessions from China" as a political achievement for the midterm elections, and stable rare earth supply is the most visible card for this. Meanwhile, China's agreement to talks in a third country like Paris is driven by urgent domestic circumstances, specifically the slowdown in economic growth after the real estate crisis, and the calculation that achieving its 2026 growth targets will be difficult without a recovery in exports to the U.S. The biggest unspoken agenda item in the talks is the "management" of military tensions between the U.S. and China in the Taiwan Strait, with economic talks serving as an entry point for that security dialogue.
NOW PATTERN
Spiral of Conflict × Path Dependency × Crisis Opportunism
The tit-for-tat tariff retaliation and rare earth regulations between the U.S. and China are a classic example of a "spiral of conflict." While the industrial structures of both nations are caught in "path dependency," making decoupling difficult, the dynamic of "crisis opportunism" is simultaneously at play, with both sides converting crises into negotiation leverage.
Intersection of Dynamics
The three dynamics of "spiral of conflict," "path dependency," and "crisis opportunism" mutually reinforce each other, forming the structural framework of these Paris talks.
First, there is an aspect where "path dependency" functions as a safety valve controlling the "spiral of conflict." Because the U.S. and China are deeply interdependent, both sides' fear of the spiral leading to complete decoupling serves as a motivation to come to the negotiating table. If this path dependency did not exist—that is, if the U.S. could secure rare earths without China, and China could grow without the U.S. market—then neither country would have a reason to stop the spiral, and they would likely be heading towards a complete Cold War-style division.
At the same time, "crisis opportunism" also carries the risk of accelerating the "spiral of conflict." As both sides attempt to use crises as leverage, there is always an incentive to go one step further in escalation. If tariffs are raised, the other side responds with export restrictions; if export restrictions are strengthened, the other side retaliates with technological sanctions. This "crisis escalation competition" accelerates the spiral, testing the limits of the safety valve provided by path dependency.
Furthermore, "path dependency" amplifies the effect of "crisis opportunism." It is precisely because China's rare earth monopoly creates deep path dependency that China's "crisis opportunism" through rare earth regulations functions effectively. If alternative supply sources were easily secured, China's card would lose its potency. However, the physical constraint that building refining infrastructure takes 5 to 10 years gives this "crisis opportunism" temporal effectiveness.
At the intersection of these three lies the current Paris talks. The desire to stop the spiral (safety valve of path dependency), yet the temptation to use the crisis to extract favorable terms (allure of crisis opportunism), yet the catastrophic damage to both sides if the spiral runs out of control (uncontrollability of the spiral)—this triple dilemma makes the negotiations extremely complex and unpredictable.
📚 PATTERN HISTORY
1930: Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act and the Global Chain of Retaliatory Tariffs
Unilateral high tariffs by the U.S. triggered retaliation from trading partners, shrinking global trade by approximately 65%. The spiral of protectionism exacerbated the Great Depression.
Structural Similarity to Today: The tariff tit-for-tat inflicted greater damage than expected on both sides, ultimately leading to economic bloc formation and intensified geopolitical conflict. Protectionism without coordination leads to destructive outcomes.
1973: OPEC Oil Embargo (First Oil Shock)
Oil-producing countries used oil supply as a diplomatic and security weapon. The "weaponization" of resources shocked the international order and fundamentally transformed energy security policies in Western countries.
Structural Similarity to Today: Disruption of strategic resource supply is a powerful negotiating card in the short term, but in the long term, it accelerates the development of alternative technologies and diversification of supply sources by demanding countries, eroding the market dominance of the weaponizing party.
1985: Plaza Accord (U.S., Japan, Germany, UK, France Coordinated Currency Intervention)
Against the backdrop of a massive U.S. trade deficit, major countries agreed to cooperatively guide the dollar lower. U.S.-Japan trade friction was temporarily eased by "managed adjustment."
Structural Similarity to Today: Economic conflicts between great powers can be managed through a "grand bargain" within a multilateral framework including third countries, but the adjustment costs (Japan's bubble economy and its collapse) tend to be disproportionately borne by some participants.
2010: China's Rare Earth Embargo Against Japan (Senkaku Islands Dispute)
China effectively halted rare earth exports to Japan following a territorial dispute. This caused temporary disruption to Japan's automotive and electronics industries, but Japan responded by developing alternative technologies and diversifying its supply chain.
Structural Similarity to Today: The weaponization of rare earths is effective in the short term, but in the long term, it diminishes the value of one's own negotiating card by strengthening the incentive for the opposing country to innovate technology and diversify supply sources. Since 2010, Japan has become a world leader in rare earth reduction and recycling technologies.
2018-2020: U.S.-China Trade War "Phase One Agreement"
A partial agreement was reached between the first Trump administration and China, centered on gradual tariff reductions and increased Chinese purchases of U.S. products. However, structural issues (industrial subsidies, forced technology transfer, etc.) remained unresolved.
Structural Similarity to Today: Trade agreements between great powers tend to be "postponements of problems" rather than "comprehensive solutions." The Phase One agreement reduced some tariffs but did not resolve fundamental structural conflicts, leaving the groundwork for re-escalation after the pandemic.
Patterns Revealed by History
The consistent pattern revealed by these historical precedents is a cycle of "spiral → crisis → managed adjustment → unresolved structural issues → re-escalation" in economic conflicts between great powers. The Smoot-Hawley Act of 1930 demonstrated the destructive power of uncoordinated protectionism, the 1973 oil shock showed the short-term effectiveness and long-term counterproductivity of resource weaponization, the Plaza Accord of 1985 illustrated the potential and side effects of multilateral adjustment, the 2010 rare earth embargo highlighted the limits of China's resource leverage, and the 2018 Phase One agreement revealed the fragility of partial agreements.
It is noteworthy that in all cases, the "weaponized" economic means succeed in inflicting pain on the negotiating opponent in the short term, but paradoxically, they repeatedly accelerate the development of alternatives in the long term, eroding the advantage of the weaponizing party. Just as OPEC's oil embargo spurred the development of North Sea and Alaskan oil fields, China's rare earth regulations are likely to accelerate new mine development and refining technology transfer in Australia, Canada, and Brazil. The lesson of history is clear—the weaponization of resources is a "depleting bullet," and its power diminishes with each use. The question is how much damage will accumulate on both sides before that depletion is complete.
🔮 NEXT SCENARIOS
The Paris talks will yield "constructive but limited" results. Both sides will agree on the framework of a joint statement for Trump's visit to China and concur to "consider" easing rare earth export controls and reviewing some tariff items, but will not reach an agreement with specific numerical targets or deadlines. In this scenario, Trump's visit to China will proceed as scheduled, and a "working group for the comprehensive resolution of trade issues" will be announced at the summit. However, substantive progress by this working group will be slow, and concrete tariff reductions will not materialize until late 2026. Regarding rare earths, China will make concessions only to the extent of expediting export permits for some rare earth items for medical devices, citing "humanitarian considerations," while restrictions on strategic items for semiconductors and EVs will continue. The market will interpret "no breakdown" as a somewhat positive signal, rebounding slightly, but fundamental uncertainties will remain unresolved. Corporate supply chain restructuring plans will neither accelerate nor decelerate, continuing along the current trajectory. In the foreign exchange market, the yuan will stabilize near its current level against the dollar, and rare earth prices will remain flat at high levels. Essentially, this scenario depicts a repetition of "negotiations for the sake of negotiations," similar to the Phase One agreement talks of 2018-2020.
Implications for Investment/Action: The joint statement will not include specific figures or deadlines, focusing instead on vague wording such as "establishment of working groups" and "continued discussions." Officials from both sides will describe the talks as "constructive dialogue" but will not mention concrete outcomes.
The Paris talks show greater-than-expected progress, and the outline of a "comprehensive framework agreement" emerges before Trump's visit to China. China agrees to gradually ease rare earth export controls in exchange for the U.S. agreeing to a "confidence-building measure" to suspend some of the new tariffs activated in February for 90 days. This scenario is contingent on the domestic political calculations of both sides aligning. For the Trump administration, demonstrating a "deal" before the China visit would be a political asset for the midterm elections. For China, recovering export markets is urgent to halt declining economic growth, and partial concessions on rare earths would be an acceptable cost. In this scenario, markets react strongly. Semiconductor-related stocks surge by 10-15%, and rare earth-related stocks initially decline on expectations of supply stabilization before rebounding on expectations of increased demand. The yuan appreciates by 2-3% against the dollar, and a risk-on environment temporarily spreads. However, this agreement is not a resolution of structural issues but a "postponement of problems," carrying the risk of the same conflict re-emerging after 90 days. The possibility that a short-term agreement could create long-term distortions, similar to Japan's bubble and collapse after the Plaza Accord, cannot be ruled out.
Implications for Investment/Action: Talks extend beyond the scheduled days, reports emerge of phone calls between the leaders of both countries, the number of processed export permit applications for rare earths increases, Trump mentions a "great deal" on social media.
The Paris talks break down early, and U.S.-China tensions enter a new phase of escalation. Negotiators from both sides fail to bridge fundamental differences in understanding regarding the linkage between rare earths and tariffs, and the talks are downgraded to "preliminary exchanges of views." Trump's visit to China is effectively shelved as "postponed" or "conditions not met." In this scenario, China further strengthens rare earth export controls, announcing measures to extend the export permit review period for heavy rare earths such as neodymium and dysprosium from the current 45 days to 90 days. The U.S. retaliates with further export restrictions on Chinese semiconductor equipment and expanded investment restrictions on Chinese AI companies. The market impact is significant. Rare earth prices surge by 30-50%, semiconductor-related stocks plummet, gold prices rise due to a flight to safety, and the yen strengthens against the dollar. In the EV industry, some manufacturers are forced to revise production plans downwards, affecting stock prices of Tesla and BYD. In the worst case, a disruption in rare earth supply could spill over into the defense industry, potentially causing delays in the procurement of components for F-35 fighter jets and Aegis systems. This situation carries the risk of crossing a "red line" where economic conflict transforms into a security crisis, and U.S.-China relations could transition to a "new Cold War" phase.
Implications for Investment/Action: The talks are cut short, both sides issue statements blaming the other, China announces new restrictions on rare earth export permits, the announcement of Trump's visit to China is postponed, security-related ministers intensify criticism of China.
Key Triggers to Watch
- Formal announcement of President Trump's visit to China (or announcement of postponement): Late March to early April 2026
- Announcement of revisions or new measures to China's rare earth export permit system by the Ministry of Commerce: April to May 2026
- Publication of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) report on the review of tariffs on China: Mid-April 2026
- Announcement of China's Q1 2026 GDP growth rate: Mid-April 2026
- Announcement of the start-up date for Australia's Lynas Rare Earths' Texas refining plant in the U.S.: Second half of 2026
🔄 TRACKING LOOP
Next Trigger: Formal announcement of President Trump's visit to China — The expected announcement in late March to early April 2026 will be the most crucial signal directly reflecting the success or failure of the Paris talks.
Continuation of this Pattern: Tracking Theme: The Future of U.S.-China Hegemonic Negotiations — The next milestones are whether Trump's visit to China materializes and the publication of the USTR's report on the review of tariffs on China in April.
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