Six Hours in Geneva — The Structure Where the War in

Why it Matters: Nearly four years have passed since the full-scale invasion in February 2022. Russian and Ukrainian delegations met in Geneva for a third round of US-mediated talks, but the first day's six-hour discussions were summarized by a single word: "tense." Territory, security, Europe's role—all remained unresolved, and missiles continued to fly even as talks progressed. Understanding the structure of these negotiations is directly linked to grasping the overall geopolitical risks in the coming months.

📝 Summary: Nearly four years have passed since the full-scale invasion in February 2022. Russian and Ukrainian delegations met in Geneva for a third round of US-mediated talks, but the first day's six-hour discussions were summarized by a single word: "tense." Territory, security, Europe's role—all remained unresolved, and missiles continued to fly even as talks progressed.

What Happened

• February 17-18, 2026, Geneva — The third round of trilateral peace talks between Russia, Ukraine, and the United States was held. The Ukrainian side was led by Rustem Umerov, Secretary of the National Security and Defense Council, while the Russian delegation was headed by Vladimir Medinsky, a close aide to President Putin. Steve Witkoff, Special Envoy, and Jared Kushner, Senior Advisor to the President, attended from the US, occupying the head of the horseshoe-shaped table.
• First day: six hours of "tense" discussions — Multiple bilateral and trilateral sessions were held, but there was no breakthrough on core issues such as territorial disputes or security guarantees. Umerov stated that the discussions focused on "practical matters," suggesting some progress on technical points like responses to ceasefire violations and humanitarian exchanges.
• Second day: Witkoff declared "meaningful progress" — However, no specific agreements were disclosed, and each delegation concluded by taking the results back to report to their respective leaders. The date for the next round was not immediately announced.
• Missiles continued to fly during negotiations — As talks progressed in Geneva, Russian forces continued their attacks across Ukraine. This structure of "diplomacy at the negotiating table and artillery fire on the front lines proceeding in parallel" symbolically demonstrated the essence of this conflict.
• President Trump set a June deadline — President Zelenskyy announced that the United States is demanding both Russia and Ukraine reach a peace agreement by June 2026. The Trump administration aims for a diplomatic achievement before the midterm elections, intensifying pressure on both parties.
• European representatives on the sidelines — Security officials from Germany, France, the UK, and Italy traveled to Geneva but did not participate in the trilateral talks themselves. Their involvement was limited to separate meetings with the Ukrainian and US delegations. This arrangement, with Europe excluded from the table, made visible the fissures within NATO.
• Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant's status remains an unresolved focal point — The control of the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant, Europe's largest, is one of the most difficult issues among the remaining 10% not agreed upon in the 28-point peace plan. Russia insists on retaining control, while Ukraine proposes joint operation with the US. The US has put forward a trilateral joint management framework, but both proposals have been rejected by the opposing party.
• Russia demanded the cession of the entire Donbas region — The Russian delegation, led by Medinsky, demanded not only the confirmation of control over occupied territories but also the complete withdrawal of Ukrainian forces from Donbas. For Kherson and Zaporizhzhia regions, they proposed freezing the current front lines. The Ukrainian side stipulated "long-term and reliable Western security guarantees" as a prerequisite for any territorial concessions.

Overall Picture

Historical Context

When Russia launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022, the world was divided between those who predicted it would "end in weeks" and those who saw it "prolonging." Reality far exceeded the latter's assessment. Nearly four years later, this war has reached historical proportions as the largest armed conflict in 21st-century Europe, in terms of casualties, economic losses, and geopolitical impact.

It is essential to review the lineage of negotiations. In March 2022, just one month after the war began, both countries engaged in direct talks in Istanbul. The Russian delegation was led by Medinsky, the same as this time. At that point, Ukraine had barely avoided the fall of its capital, Kyiv, and the framework of the "Istanbul Communiqué" was discussed, which involved obtaining security guarantees in exchange for constitutional neutrality (non-NATO membership). However, with the discovery of the Bucha massacre, negotiations collapsed. Since then, direct dialogue between the two countries has been suspended for nearly three years.

The turning point was the return of the Trump administration. Since his inauguration in January 2025, President Trump, while campaigning on a promise to "end the war in 24 hours," in reality adopted a gradual approach centered on improving relations with Russia. In February 2025, US-Russia summit-level talks began in Riyadh, establishing a bilateral channel without Ukraine. In the second round in Saudi Arabia in March of the same year, a limited agreement to halt attacks on energy infrastructure was reached, but a 30-day ceasefire did not materialize.

In November 2025, the Trump administration formally presented a "28-point peace plan." This plan contained extremely harsh terms for Ukraine—de facto recognition of Crimea, Donetsk, and Luhansk as Russian territory, a cap of 600,000 troops for the Ukrainian military, and constitutional neutrality (non-NATO membership). On the other hand, "compensations" such as the granting of EU membership eligibility and the establishment of a Ukraine Development Fund were included. Zelenskyy stated that "90% had been agreed upon," but the remaining 10%—the final demarcation of territory, the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant, and the presence of Western forces—were the essential points of contention.

Then, in February 2026, with the fourth anniversary of the invasion just a week away, the third round in Geneva materialized. However, nothing had changed behind the scenes. Russia showed no sign of lowering its demands, backed by military superiority on the front lines, while Ukraine continued to refuse territorial concessions without security guarantees. The US was pressuring both sides with a June deadline, but its motivation was more about the midterm election calendar than the substance of peace.

Stakeholder Map

Structure Through Data

• Approx. 1.25 million — Estimated cumulative Russian military casualties by Ukraine (February 2022 – February 2026). Western intelligence estimates around 1 million.
• 500,000-600,000 — Estimated Ukrainian military casualties (CSIS January 2026 estimate). Of these, 100,000-140,000 are fatalities.
• Approx. 20% — Proportion of Ukrainian territory occupied by Russia. Approximately 118,700 square kilometers (including Crimea).
• 182 square miles — Territory newly occupied by Russia in the four weeks from January 13 to February 10, 2026. A 2.3-fold acceleration compared to the previous period.
• 13.5 trillion rubles (approx. $169 billion) — Russia's defense budget for 2025. 7.2% of GDP, the largest since the collapse of the Soviet Union.
• Over $1.6 trillion — Russia's cumulative GDP loss due to the war (compared to a scenario without invasion, Bruegel estimate).
• 0.6-1.0% — Russia's GDP growth forecast for 2025-2026 (IMF). A significant slowdown from pre-war levels of over 3%.
• 28 points — Number of articles in the peace plan presented by the Trump administration in November 2025. Zelenskyy stated 90% had been agreed upon.
• 34 countries + Ukraine — Number of participating countries in the "coalition of the willing" launched in 2025. Led by the UK and France, it envisages the deployment of European forces after a ceasefire.
• June — Deadline for a peace agreement set by the Trump administration. A political timeline aiming for results before the midterm elections (November 2026).

The delta: The six hours in Geneva were reported as "peace negotiations," but their reality was entirely different. This was merely a ritual of position-taking, conducted at the intersection of the "path dependency" structure created by four years of war and the "fissures" within the Western alliance. The true negotiations are unfolding outside the table—on the military balance at the front, the sustainability of sanctions, and Washington's political calendar.

NOW PATTERN

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Path Dependency × Alliance Strain

Four years of war have created irreversible path dependency, locking both parties into non-negotiable positions. Simultaneously, fissures within the Western alliance—Trump's pressure, divisions within the EU, and the ambiguity of NATO's role—are structurally eroding Ukraine's negotiating power. The intersection of these two dynamics forms a stalemate where parties "come to the negotiating table but cannot reach an agreement."

Path Dependency: The Irreversible Structure Locked in by Four Years of War

Path dependency refers to a structure where initial choices irreversibly narrow subsequent options. Russia's invasion of Ukraine triggered a series of irreversible processes from its very beginning. The occupation of territory, destruction of infrastructure, displacement of populations, and the reorganization of both nations' identities—these are changes that are structurally impossible to "undo," fundamentally constraining the scope for negotiation.

"In addition to confirming control over occupied territories, we demand the complete withdrawal of Ukrainian forces from Donbas. Kherson and Zaporizhzhia regions will be frozen along the current front lines."
— Russian delegation's negotiating position (multiple media reports, February 17, 2026)

"Any agreement must include long-term, reliable Western commitments to protect Ukraine from future aggression."
— President Zelenskyy (statement preceding Geneva talks, February 2026)

"The economic cost of the war has reduced Russia's GDP by approximately 12% compared to a scenario without the invasion. Cumulative losses exceed $1.6 trillion."
— Bruegel (European think tank) research report, February 2026

These three quotes illustrate different dimensions of path dependency.

Firstly, Russia's territorial demands have transformed from "ambition" to "necessity." Putin unilaterally declared the "annexation" of four regions—Donetsk, Luhansk, Kherson, and Zaporizhzhia—in September 2022. This decision is domestically irreversible—the Russian constitution prohibits the cession of territory. For Putin to return occupied territories in negotiations would be a "unconstitutional" act domestically. This is the first layer of path dependency. The occupied territories are no longer a bargaining chip but an entrenched position from which Russia cannot retreat.

Secondly, Ukraine is similarly locked into path dependency. Four years of war, resulting in an estimated 500,000-600,000 casualties, have fundamentally altered the identity of the Ukrainian people. The option of being a "neutral state," which might have been possible before 2022, is no longer acceptable to Ukrainian public opinion. Zelenskyy's insistence on security guarantees reflects not so much a personal conviction as the political impossibility of accepting "concessions without guarantees" after a war that has claimed over 100,000 lives.

Thirdly, there is economic path dependency. Russia has allocated 7.2% of its GDP to military spending, shifting its economy to a wartime footing. The 2025 defense budget of 13.5 trillion rubles is the largest since the collapse of the Soviet Union. This military Keynesianism temporarily boosted GDP but is also an inescapable trap. Reducing military spending would cause a sharp economic contraction, while not reducing it would make public finances unsustainable. IMF forecasts show Russia's growth rate slowing to 0.6-1.0%, indicating a contradiction between the "economic incentive to stop the war" and the "structural lock-in that prevents stopping it."

The military reality on the front lines also reinforces path dependency. In the four weeks from January 13 to February 10, 2026, Russia newly occupied 182 square miles of territory. This is a 2.3-fold acceleration compared to the previous period, suggesting that the Russian military is preparing for a large-scale offensive in spring 2026. A party making military advances has no incentive to make concessions in negotiations. For Russia, the six hours in Geneva had an aspect of buying time, "pretending to engage in diplomacy" while strengthening its positions on the front lines.

The Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant is a symbolic example of path dependency. Europe's largest nuclear power plant has been occupied by Russia since March 2022, with all six reactors shut down. Russia plans to connect it to its own power grid and restart it, Ukraine proposes joint operation with the US, and the US advocates for trilateral joint management. However, none of these proposals can be agreed upon because they touch upon the fundamental sovereignty issue of "who owns the plant." The nuclear plant, alongside Crimea, embodies the extreme form of path dependency as an "indivisible point of contention"—meaning an issue that cannot be divided or compromised upon.

Alliance Strain: Europe Excluded from the Table, Washington Exerting Pressure

Alliance strain refers to a structure where a coalition, ostensibly sharing common goals, loses cohesion due to misaligned internal incentives. In the Russia-Ukraine war, the Western alliance has progressively fractured over four years, moving from its "unity" in 2022. The Geneva negotiations made visible the moment this strain reached its structural limits.

"Security officials from Germany, France, the UK, and Italy traveled to Geneva but did not participate in the trilateral talks themselves."
— France24 / Kyiv Independent report, February 17, 2026

"Paris is ready to send thousands of troops" — President Macron. Meanwhile, "We do not agree to any foreign military presence after a ceasefire" — Kremlin spokesperson.
— CNN / NPR report, January 6, 2026

The seating arrangement at the Geneva negotiating table eloquently tells the story of the alliance strain. At the head of the horseshoe-shaped table sat Witkoff and Kushner, backed by the US flag, with Russia and Ukraine on the flanks. And Europe—was outside the table. Security officials from Germany, France, the UK, and Italy flew to Geneva but were not permitted to participate in the trilateral talks. They were confined to separate meetings on the sidelines.

This configuration is no accident. Since the Riyadh talks in February 2025, the Trump administration has consistently positioned the "US-Russia bilateral channel" as the main axis of negotiations. In the first round, even Ukraine was excluded. Europe was positioned as a "spectator" to this process from the outset, and Geneva further entrenched that structure.

The first layer of strain is the strategic divergence between the US and Europe. Trump's 28-point peace plan contained elements unacceptable to Europe. The constitutional stipulation of Ukraine's non-NATO membership would mean the de facto abandonment of NATO's "open-door policy" since the 2008 Bucharest Summit. This is not just a problem for Ukraine—it would set a precedent for countries like Georgia and Moldova, which aspire to NATO membership, that "status quo changes by force can prevent membership." The fact that European nations are concerned about this outcome yet lack the authority to sit at the negotiating table is the essence of the alliance strain.

The second layer of strain is the division within Europe. Conflict among member states is intensifying over the EU's 20th package of sanctions against Russia, scheduled for late February 2026. Greece and Malta opposed a proposal to replace the price cap on Russian crude oil with an import ban. For these countries, which are highly dependent on shipping services (insurance and transport), strengthening sanctions means a direct blow to their own economies. Agreeing on the general principle of "maintaining pressure on Russia" while diverging on specifics—this is the reality of the alliance strain.

The third layer of strain is the paradox of the "coalition of the willing." The 34-nation coalition, launched in March 2025 under Anglo-French leadership, was a groundbreaking framework envisioning a military presence in Ukraine after a ceasefire. In January 2026, UK Prime Minister Starmer and French President Macron signed a "Declaration of Intent," stating that the UK and France were prepared to establish military hubs and deploy "thousands" of troops. However, Russia dismissed this, stating it "does not agree to the presence of foreign troops in Ukraine." And crucially, the Trump administration also explicitly stated, "The United States will not send ground troops." The coalition of the willing, unable to secure the support of the US, which it most needs, functions only as a symbol of "European resolve."

Here lies the paradox of alliance strain. Europe seeks to become a guarantor of security, but without US backing, it is insufficient as a deterrent against Russia. The US seeks to transfer the burden to Europe but excludes it from the table. Ukraine welcomes European guarantees but knows they are insufficient without US guarantees. With each of the three parties making different calculations, none holds a complete solution—this is the stalemate created by alliance strain.

Trump's pressure on Kyiv strategically exploits this strain. The message, "reconsider aid if no agreement by June," simultaneously narrows Zelenskyy's negotiating room and challenges Europe with the question, "Are you prepared to support Ukraine after the US withdraws?" It is crucial that this pressure is directed at Ukraine, not Russia. The US, ostensibly a mediator, is forcing concessions only from one party—this is the structure that critics call "a peace plan aligned with Putin's war aims."

Intersection of Dynamics

Path dependency and alliance strain are not independent dynamics. They form a feedback loop that reinforces each other.

The mechanism by which path dependency deepens alliance strain is clear. The longer the war drags on, the more "fatigue costs" accumulate for each nation. Over four years, Europe's total burden for Ukraine support—military, economic, humanitarian—has reached hundreds of billions of euros. Soaring energy prices, refugee reception, increased defense spending. These cumulative burdens have sharpened the question within the alliance: "How long can this continue?" Greece and Malta's resistance to the sanctions package is because four years of path dependency are beginning to exceed their respective limits of tolerance.

A reverse feedback loop is also at play: alliance strain entrenches path dependency. Ukraine's negotiating power is proportional to Western unity. In 2022, the G7's united imposition of sanctions and expanded military aid prevented a Russian military victory. However, in 2026, with the US shifting to pressure Ukraine, Europe excluded from the table, and divisions over sanctions packages, Russia is receiving a signal that "if we wait, the West will fracture." This signal reinforces Russia's path dependency—its stance of not relinquishing occupied territories—because the more divided the West, the less Russia needs to compromise.

The six hours in Geneva were the nexus of this dual feedback loop. "Practical matters" were discussed at the table, but beneath it, path dependency made concessions impossible, and alliance strain entrenched the stalemate. Witkoff's talk of "meaningful progress" was diplomatic rhetoric; structurally, nothing had moved.

The most unsettling conclusion this analysis suggests is the paradox that the act of "negotiation" itself reinforces both dynamics. The longer negotiations drag on, the more Russian-occupied territory expands on the front lines (deepening path dependency), and within the West, pressures to "just agree already" clash with pressures to "don't make easy concessions" (exacerbating alliance strain). In other words, the negotiation process itself is reproducing the conditions that make negotiation difficult.

The June deadline is unlikely to be a solution to this paradox; rather, it is likely to act as an amplifier. As the deadline approaches, Trump's pressure on Ukraine will intensify (alliance strain), and Russia will accelerate its creation of facts on the ground at the front (path dependency). Once the deadline passes, US mediation efforts will wane (transitioning to midterm election mode), leaving behind a frozen front line and a fractured alliance—in other words, an "unnamed frozen conflict."

History of the Pattern

1951: Korean War Armistice Negotiations (1951-1953) — Two Years of Fighting While Negotiating

In July 1951, one year after the Korean War began, armistice negotiations commenced when the front lines stalemated near the 38th parallel. However, talks dragged on for over two years