The 3 Hours of Hormuz — The Day 20% of the World's Oil Stopped

Why it matters: On February 17, 2026, Iran partially closed the Strait of Hormuz for the first time in history, citing a live-fire military drill dubbed 'Smart Control of the Strait of Hormuz.' Roughly 20% of the world's oil supply — approximately 13 million barrels per day — transits this narrow chokepoint. Even a closure lasting only hours immediately moved crude futures, exposed the structural fragility of Asian energy security (Japan depends on Hormuz for 80% of its oil imports), and signaled that Iran now treats Hormuz as an 'economic hostage' card — deployed simultaneously with US-Iran nuclear talks in Geneva.

📝 Summary: On February 17, 2026, Iran partially closed the Strait of Hormuz for the first time in history, citing a live-fire military drill dubbed 'Smart Control of the Strait of Hormuz.' Roughly 20% of the world's oil supply — approximately 13 million barrels per day — transits this...

What happened

• IRGC Navy launched the 'Smart Control of the Strait of Hormuz' drill — The large-scale live-fire exercise, which began February 16, was conducted under the direct command of IRGC Commander Major General Mohammad Pakpour. Live missiles were fired from coastal and inland launch sites at targets inside the Strait of Hormuz. Drone units operated under electronic-jamming conditions.
• Parts of the Strait of Hormuz were closed for 'several hours' — a first in Iranian history — Iran's state-run Fars News Agency announced the closure 'for navigational safety.' Since the US began intensifying military pressure on Iran, this marks the first time Tehran has officially closed any portion of the strait.
• Oil prices spiked, then reversed — Brent crude fell 1.79% to $67.42 — Brent initially surged toward $68.50 on the closure headlines, but reversed sharply after reports of progress in Geneva nuclear talks. WTI settled down 1.3% at $62.06; Brent ended 2.3% lower at $67.03. Analysts estimate $4–7/barrel of geopolitical risk premium is currently priced in.
• US-Iran indirect nuclear talks proceeded simultaneously in Geneva — A US delegation led by envoys Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner, and an Iranian delegation led by Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi, held their second round of indirect talks in Switzerland. Iran said 'general agreement on guiding principles' was reached, with a detailed proposal to follow within two weeks.
• US Navy surged to a two-carrier posture — USS Gerald R. Ford deployed to the Middle East — President Trump announced the deployment of the world's largest carrier, USS Gerald R. Ford, from the Caribbean to the Middle East, joining USS Abraham Lincoln and its accompanying destroyer squadron already on station for over two weeks.
• IRGC officials issued provocative statements about US carriers — An IRGC-affiliated source told media that 'US carriers can't do a damn thing,' signaling confidence in Iran's asymmetric warfare capabilities. Iran's naval strategy centers on fast-attack boat swarm tactics and shore-based anti-ship missiles.
• President Trump maintained a diplomatic tone — 'I think they want to make a deal. I don't think they want the consequences of not making a deal,' Trump said, declining to rule out military options but signaling a preference for negotiation.

The Big Picture

Historical Context

The Strait of Hormuz is a waterway just 33 km wide — the only exit from the Persian Gulf to the open ocean. This geographic fact has threatened global energy security repeatedly since the Iran-Iraq War of the 1980s.

In 1984, the 'Tanker War' began as part of the Iran-Iraq conflict, with both sides attacking commercial vessels transiting the Persian Gulf. In 1987, the Reagan administration launched Operation Earnest Will — the largest maritime convoy operation since World War II — reflagging Kuwaiti tankers under the US flag to provide naval escort.

A new crisis erupted in 2019. In May and June, six tankers were attacked off the coast of Oman; the US attributed responsibility to Iran. In July, Iran seized the British-flagged tanker Stena Impero. In September, drones and cruise missiles struck Saudi Aramco's Abqaiq and Khurais oil facilities, temporarily knocking out roughly 5% of global oil supply and sending Brent crude up ~15% in a single day.

But the February 2026 action is qualitatively different from every previous incident. For the first time in history, Iran officially declared a 'closure' of part of the Strait of Hormuz. All prior incidents were indirect — attacks on tankers, mine-laying, vessel seizures — but none involved an explicit announcement that the strait itself was being shut. The rhetorical threshold has been breached.

This matters because, even if the actual closure lasted only hours and was partial, a fait accompli has been established: 'Iran closed Hormuz.' The next time Tehran takes such action, markets and policymakers will process it as 'a repeat of a precedent' rather than 'an unprecedented escalation.' A new rung has been added to the escalation ladder.

The drill was named 'Smart Control.' This naming is not accidental. Iran introduced the concept of 'smart control' — selective, graduated restrictions on navigation — rather than 'total blockade.' This framing avoids the binary of 'fully open' versus 'fully closed' and creates a gray zone for influence projection. It is a strategic reframing that enables calibrated coercion without triggering automatic military responses.

Stakeholder Map

By the Numbers

• 13 million barrels/day — Crude oil transiting the Strait of Hormuz — roughly 31% of all seaborne crude
• 20% — Share of global oil consumption that passes through Hormuz
• 80% — Share of Japan's crude imports that transit Hormuz — approximately 1.6 million barrels/day
• 95% — Japan's overall Middle East oil dependency — the highest among advanced economies
• 84% — Share of Hormuz-transiting crude destined for Asian markets (2024 data); China, India, Japan, and South Korea account for 69%
• $4–7/barrel — Analyst estimates of the geopolitical risk premium currently priced into Brent crude
• 33 km — Width of the Strait of Hormuz at its narrowest; navigable channels are just 3.2 km in each direction
• 2 carriers — US carrier strike groups currently deployed in the Middle East (Abraham Lincoln + Gerald R. Ford)
• 1,500+ fast-attack boats — Estimated IRGC Navy fleet — the core of Iran's asymmetric warfare capability
• 1,000 km range — Maximum reach of Iran's island-deployed anti-ship missiles, covering the entire Persian Gulf

The delta: On the surface, this looks like 'a few hours of military exercises.' The real story is the breaching of a rhetorical threshold: the word 'closure' has been converted from threat into action. Iran's 'Smart Control' concept carves out a gray zone between full blockade and normal operations, transforming Hormuz into a card that can be played for nuclear talks, military deterrence, and domestic politics simultaneously. The true risk is that this 'new normal' lowers the threshold for the next escalation.

Between the Lines

This is not a military drill; it's a negotiation tactic broadcast via missile fire. Iran's 'Smart Control' exercise is a carefully calibrated demonstration designed to create maximum leverage in Geneva without crossing a red line that would force a US military response. Tehran is showing Washington, and more importantly energy-dependent US allies like Japan, the precise economic pain it can inflict at will. For its part, the Trump administration's two-carrier deployment is less about imminent war and more about political stagecraft. It provides the White House with a backdrop of strength, allowing President Trump to negotiate from a perceived position of power and secure a foreign policy victory. Both sides are engaged in a high-stakes performance, using military hardware to signal their resolve while privately moving toward a deal they both need.

NOW PATTERN

Escalation Spiral × Path Dependency

Escalation Spiral × Path Dependency

The US-Iran adversarial relationship has been self-reinforcing for over 40 years (Escalation Spiral). Meanwhile, global energy infrastructure is structurally locked into dependence on the Strait of Hormuz as a single chokepoint, and escaping this lock-in would require decades and trillions of dollars (Path Dependency). At the intersection of these two dynamics, a 'three-hour closure' is converted into a structural threat to the global economy.

Escalation Spiral: How 40 Years of Mutual Hostility Produce 'Rational Irrationality'

Forty-six years have passed since the 1979 Iranian Revolution and the US Embassy hostage crisis. The US-Iran relationship is trapped in a self-reinforcing adversarial loop: one side's action triggers the other's reaction, and that reaction provokes further action. The February 2026 Hormuz closure is the latest — and most dangerous — step in this spiral.

'I think they want to make a deal. I don't think they want the consequences of not making a deal.'
— President Donald Trump, February 17, 2026

'US carriers can't do a damn thing.'
— IRGC-affiliated source, Breitbart reporting, February 17, 2026

'For navigational safety, portions of the Strait of Hormuz will be closed for several hours.'
— Iran's Fars News Agency, February 17, 2026

These three quotes illuminate the three layers of the escalation spiral.

The first layer is the exchange of threats. Trump's statement is diplomatically phrased, but its core is a threat: 'If you don't deal, there will be consequences.' The IRGC's 'carriers can't do a damn thing' is a counter-threat. Each side responds to the other's intimidation with intimidation of its own — the basic mechanism of the spiral.

The second layer is behavioral escalation. The US sent two carrier strike groups to the Middle East. Iran responded by conducting live-fire exercises in the Strait of Hormuz and partially closing it. Each action is framed as 'defensive,' but objectively constitutes escalation. Without the carrier deployments, the drill's timing might have been different; without the drill, the Ford's redeployment might have been unnecessary. The causal chain is circular — the starting point cannot be identified.

The third layer is cognitive lock-in. As the spiral persists, policymakers and publics on both sides develop fixed perceptions of the adversary as 'untrustworthy' and 'malicious.' This cognitive bias causes cooperative signals to be interpreted as 'traps' and adversarial signals as 'revelations of true nature.' Iran negotiating in Geneva while drilling in Hormuz is not a contradiction — within an escalation spiral, the negotiating table and military demonstrations are different expressions of the same strategy.

What makes the Hormuz closure particularly significant in spiral theory is the phenomenon of rhetorical threshold-breaking. In international relations theory, behavioral escalation proceeds in stages: verbal threats → military demonstrations → limited use of force → full-scale conflict. Iran had previously issued verbal threats about closing Hormuz but had never crossed the line into action. Now it has.

The danger of threshold-breaking is that the psychological barrier to the next step is lowered. Once the word 'closure' has been converted into action, the next closure can be executed for longer, over a wider area, and with less hesitation. This is the classic pattern of 'salami slicing' — incremental fait accompli that cumulatively changes the status quo. It is structurally isomorphic to China's artificial island construction in the South China Sea and Russia's graduated pressure campaign preceding the annexation of Crimea.

Furthermore, escalation spirals exhibit 'exit disappearance.' As the spiral deepens, compromise carries rising risk of being interpreted as 'weakness.' In Iran's domestic politics, Supreme Leader Khamenei has made 'never yielding to the US' a core identity of the revolutionary regime. In US domestic politics, Trump has built a brand as the president who is 'tough on Iran.' Both leaders face structures in which compromise with the adversary incurs domestic political costs.

The report of 'general agreement on guiding principles' from the Geneva nuclear talks appears, at first glance, to offer an exit from the spiral. But history repeatedly demonstrates that such 'progress' does not stop the spiral. The 2015 JCPOA was hailed as a 'historic agreement' — only to be abandoned by the first Trump administration in 2018, after which Iran progressively resumed uranium enrichment. The agreement was a pause button, not a power-off button.

What the escalation spiral teaches is that 'resolving' individual incidents does not mean resolving the spiral itself. The 3 hours of Hormuz are over. But the structure that produces the next 3 hours — or 3 days — persists in a reinforced form.

Path Dependency: Why the World Cannot Bypass Hormuz

The world's energy infrastructure depends on the Strait of Hormuz not by accident, but by structure. Decades of investment, infrastructure construction, and contractual relationships have locked in this chokepoint dependency. Path dependency theory teaches that initial choices create lock-in, lock-in raises the cost of alternatives, and rising costs deepen dependence — a vicious cycle.

'Japan's crude oil imports are 80% dependent on the Strait of Hormuz, and its overall Middle East dependency stands at 95%.'
— IEA (International Energy Agency), Strait of Hormuz Factsheet

'84% of crude oil and condensate transiting the Strait of Hormuz is destined for Asian markets, with China, India, Japan, and South Korea accounting for 69%.'
— US Energy Information Administration (EIA), 2024 data

These two data points reveal the depth of path dependency.

Japan's case is a textbook example. Post-war Japanese energy policy was designed on the premise of cheap Middle Eastern crude. Refineries were optimized for the chemical properties of Arabian Light. Long-term supply contracts were built on relationships with Persian Gulf states. LNG import infrastructure was similarly premised on supply from Qatar, the UAE, and Oman.

The core of path dependency is switching cost. For Japan to exit Hormuz dependency, all of the following would be required: (1) securing alternative supply sources (US shale, Russian Far East, Africa); (2) refinery modifications (to process different crude grades); (3) transport-route changes (tanker contracts, insurance, port infrastructure); (4) a massive increase in strategic petroleum reserves. These costs run into the trillions of yen, and implementation would take over a decade.

More importantly, path dependency generates a collective-action problem. Japan is not alone — South Korea (68% Hormuz dependency), India (53%), and China (15%, but massive in absolute volume) all depend on Hormuz. Each country building alternative routes individually is inefficient, and coordination adds political complexity. The result is an equilibrium in which everyone waits for someone else to move first, and no one moves.

Saudi Arabia's East-West Pipeline (Petroline, capacity ~5 million barrels/day) is one of the few Hormuz-bypass infrastructure assets, but its actual utilization rate is low and wholly insufficient to substitute full volumes. The UAE's Habshan-Fujairah Pipeline (~1.5 million barrels/day) is similarly inadequate. The very existence of these 'bypasses' proves the depth of path dependency — decades and billions of dollars have not significantly reduced dependency.

Another characteristic of path dependency is the incremental-improvement trap. After every crisis, countries announce energy-security enhancements, but what gets implemented is always incremental (a marginal increase in reserves, partial supply diversification) rather than structural (a fundamental exit from Hormuz dependence). This is rational behavior — the cost of structural transformation always exceeds the cost of the current 'stability,' so status-quo bias prevails. Yet this rational incrementalism locks in dependency over the long term.

In Japan's case, the Fukushima nuclear disaster of 2011 triggered a national energy-policy debate, but the resulting nuclear shutdown increased fossil-fuel dependence and actually deepened Middle East reliance. After the 2019 Hormuz crisis, the government again announced 'energy supply diversification,' but Middle East dependency remains unchanged at 95%. Crisis after crisis, 'learning' is declared, and once the crisis passes, 'forgetting' begins. This is yet another mechanism of path dependency — the cycle of 'shock → declaration → incremental improvement → forgetting → next shock' perpetually defers fundamental change.

The most frightening consequence of path dependency is that irreplaceability translates directly into geopolitical leverage. Iran can exercise 'smart control' over Hormuz precisely because the world cannot bypass it. The depth of dependence determines the effectiveness of the threat. For Iran, Hormuz is a weapon that functions without being used — merely demonstrating the possibility of closure moves crude futures, raises insurance rates, and alters every government's policy calculus. This is structurally isomorphic to nuclear deterrence-by-existence.

Dynamics Intersection

The true nature of this event lies at the intersection of these two dynamics.

The escalation spiral governs the dynamics of the US-Iran relationship. But the spiral alone cannot explain why Hormuz specifically becomes a weapon. Iran fires missiles and conducts exercises in many locations, but doing so in the Strait of Hormuz carries orders-of-magnitude greater significance. That differential is produced by path dependency.

Conversely, path dependency alone cannot explain why now. The world's Hormuz dependency has existed for decades. It was 'weaponized' on February 17, 2026, because the escalation spiral reached a specific stage — nuclear-talk deadlines, a US carrier surge, and heightened Israel-Iran tensions.

The most dangerous structure created by this intersection is commitment asymmetry. For Iran, a partial Hormuz closure is a relatively low-cost action: a few hours of exercises using a handful of fast-attack boats and a few missiles. But the impact on the world is enormous — oil-market volatility, insurance-rate spikes, energy-security anxiety across importing nations. This asymmetry between input cost and output impact makes Hormuz 'the supreme form of asymmetric warfare.'

Moreover, the escalation spiral and path dependency reinforce each other. The more the adversarial relationship intensifies, the higher the Hormuz risk premium climbs, and the more the cost of dependency (i.e., vulnerability) becomes visible. But that visibility does not, in the short run, accelerate exit from dependency — instead, it triggers military responses ('we must deter Iran'), which further accelerate the spiral and further elevate Hormuz risk. Path dependency provides the 'stage' for the spiral; the spiral reveals the 'cost' of path dependency. This mutually reinforcing mechanism makes structural solutions extraordinarily difficult.

Ultimately, this intersection suggests that the 'Hormuz problem' cannot be solved through energy policy, diplomacy, or military policy in isolation. Breaking path dependency requires decades of energy transition; stopping the escalation spiral requires a fundamental restructuring of US-Iran relations. Neither is achievable in the short term. In the interim, the world must coexist with the risk that 3 hours of closure becomes 3 days, and 3 days becomes 3 weeks.

Pattern History

1987: The Tanker War and Operation Earnest Will — The Prototype of the Hormuz Card

In 1984, the Iran-Iraq War entered a new phase. Iraq began attacking Iran's oil export hub at Kharg Island, and Iran retaliated by targeting all commercial shipping in the Persian Gulf. This was the 'Tanker War.'

By 1987, hundreds of commercial vessels had been attacked. Kuwait requested US naval escort for its tankers. The Reagan administration 'reflagged' 11 Kuwaiti tankers under the US flag and began naval convoy operations — Operation Earnest Will, the largest maritime escort operation since World War II.

On May 17, 1987, an Iraqi air force strike mistakenly hit USS Stark, killing 37 American sailors. In October, Iran fired a missile at Kuwait's Sea Island oil terminal, and the US Navy destroyed Iranian armed oil platforms in retaliation. In April 1988's Operation Praying Mantis, the US Navy sank an Iranian frigate in direct naval combat.

The Tanker War proved that freedom of navigation in the Strait of Hormuz and Persian Gulf is an international public good. It was the first large-scale case demonstrating that a regional conflict in the Middle East could directly affect the global economy through energy supply disruption.

Structural Similarity: Three structural parallels connect 1987 and 2026. First, the basic pattern: a regional conflict threatens Hormuz navigation safety. Second, the reaction pattern: the US responds by surging military presence. Third, the tactical pattern: Iran uses asymmetric capabilities (mines in 1987; missiles and drones in 2026) to offset US conventional-force superiority. What differs is that 2026's Iran possesses far more advanced asymmetric capabilities than 1987's, and has actually crossed the behavioral threshold of 'Hormuz closure.'

2019: Tanker Attacks and the Aramco Drone Strike — The Limits of Escalation Control

In May 2018, the first Trump administration withdrew from the JCPOA (Iran nuclear deal) and launched its 'maximum pressure' campaign. The escalation spiral accelerated rapidly.

On May 12, 2019, four vessels — including two Saudi tankers — were attacked off Fujairah. On June 13, the Japanese-operated tanker Kokuka Courageous was attacked in the Gulf of Oman — while Prime Minister Abe was visiting Tehran, in a timing that seemed to mock Japan's diplomatic efforts.

In July, Iran seized the British-flagged tanker Stena Impero in the Strait of Hormuz — retaliation for Britain's seizure of an Iranian tanker off Gibraltar, a textbook instance of the escalation spiral's tit-for-tat pattern.

Then, on September 14, drones and cruise missiles struck Saudi Aramco's Abqaiq and Khurais facilities. Roughly 5% of global oil supply was temporarily knocked out, and Brent surged ~15% in a single day. Yemen's Houthis claimed responsibility, but the US asserted direct Iranian involvement. The fact that Saudi air defenses — including state-of-the-art Patriot missiles — failed to intercept the attack demonstrated the effectiveness of asymmetric warfare with shocking clarity.

The first Trump administration considered military retaliation but ultimately stood down. 'That would not be proportionate' was the official rationale, though the true reason is widely believed to be the difficulty of controlling escalation once initiated.

Structural Similarity: The continuity between 2019 and 2026 is unmistakable. In 2019, Iran used 'indirect force' (tanker attacks, vessel seizures) to demonstrate Hormuz's vulnerability. In 2026, it escalated to 'direct declaration' (a partial closure of the strait itself). Iran is ascending the escalation ladder one rung at a time. The asymmetry demonstrated by the 2019 Aramco attack — cheap asymmetric weapons threatening expensive infrastructure — is structurally isomorphic to the 2026 asymmetry: a few hours of exercises shaking global crude markets.

Pattern History

The history of the Tanker War (1987) and the 2019 crisis reveals three patterns.

First, the 'Hormuz Card' is deeply embedded in Iran's strategic culture. Across four decades, Iran has leveraged the geopolitical value of Hormuz in every crisis. Far from being 'worn out' by use, the card has been refined with each deployment, increasing in effectiveness.

Second, the US response is always 'surge military presence,' which has short-term deterrent effect but long-term accelerates the evolution of Iran's asymmetric capabilities. From 1987's mine warfare to 2019's drone attacks to 2026's 'Smart Control,' Iranian capabilities have continuously evolved to offset US conventional superiority.

Third, post-crisis 'learning' is always incomplete. After 1987 and after 2019, the international community debated reducing Hormuz dependency, but the forces of path dependency blocked structural change. The 2026 crisis will likely follow the same pattern: policy discussions intensify while crisis memories are fresh, only to return to 'business as usual' once the crisis fades. This 'failure to learn' is the most insidious expression of path dependency.

What's Next

Base caseScenario (Probability: 55-65%)

Iran uses its demonstrated 'Smart Control' capability as ongoing leverage in nuclear talks without proceeding to full blockade. Geneva negotiations continue intermittently over several months, slowly progressing toward a partial deal (enrichment cap + phased sanctions relief). Oil markets maintain a $4–7/barrel geopolitical risk premium with neither sharp spikes nor collapses. Iran periodically repeats Hormuz drills to normalize the 'closure' precedent, progressively lowering the threshold for future use. For Japan's energy security, this 'permanent low-intensity risk' is the most probable challenge.

Investment/Action Implications: Energy stocks retain their risk premium. Consider medium-term investment in Hormuz-bypass infrastructure (pipelines, alternative LNG supply). Options strategies to hedge expanded crude-futures volatility may be effective.

Bull caseScenario (Probability: 15-25%)

Geneva talks progress faster than expected, producing a framework for a comprehensive 'Trump Deal.' Iran significantly limits enrichment in exchange for phased sanctions relief and security guarantees. Hormuz tensions ease materially; risk premium narrows to $2–3/barrel. Iranian crude exports normalize, stabilizing global supply. However, as the 2015 JCPOA precedent shows, structural uncertainty over the deal's durability persists.

Investment/Action Implications: Watch sanctions-relief beneficiaries (refiners with access to Iranian crude, companies with Iran-market exposure). Adjust energy-sector positioning for potential oil-price decline.

Bear caseScenario (Probability: 15-25%)

Nuclear talks collapse. The Trump administration strikes Iranian nuclear facilities. Iran retaliates with full Hormuz closure — IRGC Navy deploys mines, fast-attack boat swarms, and anti-ship missiles. Hormuz becomes effectively unnavigable for weeks to months; crude prices break $100/barrel. Oil exports from Saudi Arabia, UAE, and Iraq are severely curtailed, triggering a global energy crisis. Japan begins releasing strategic petroleum reserves (~200 days of supply), insufficient for a prolonged blockade. Asian economies face severe disruption.

Investment/Action Implications: Increase commodity-allocation as a hedge against energy-price shock. Producers with low Hormuz exposure (US shale, Brazil deepwater, West Africa) benefit. Defense stocks rally short-term but carry significant long-term risk.

Key Triggers to Watch

• Geneva Round 3 schedule and substance: Iran committed to return with a detailed proposal 'within two weeks.' The specificity of Round 3 in early March is the branching point between base case and bull case.
• USS Gerald R. Ford deployment pattern: Whether the two-carrier posture in the Middle East is sustained or augmented with additional assets is an early signal of movement toward the bear case.
• Iran's uranium enrichment activity (IAEA reporting): Whether Iran continues accumulating 60%+ enriched uranium or freezes is an objective indicator of negotiating seriousness.
• Frequency and scale of future IRGC maritime drills: Whether 'Smart Control' exercises become routine or expand in scale is a leading indicator of escalation trajectory.
• Saudi/UAE bypass-pipeline utilization rates: If Gulf states begin increasing bypass-infrastructure throughput, it signals preparation for worst-case scenarios.
• Japanese government energy-security review: Whether concrete policy discussions on Hormuz risk intensify in the Diet and METI measures the depth of the 'learning cycle' within path dependency.

What to Watch Next

Next trigger: The tabling of Iran's detailed nuclear proposal in Geneva and the initial US response, expected within two weeks.

Next in this series: The Hormuz Precedent: Asia's Energy Security Rethink

Related patterns:

Sources:

• CNBC: Iran partially closes Strait of Hormuz
• UPI: Iran partially closes oil route for military drills
• OilPrice.com: Oil Prices Rise as Iran Closes Parts of Hormuz
• PressTV: IRGC Navy holds Smart Control drills
• Army Recognition: Iran Conducts Live-Fire Naval Drills in Strait of Hormuz
• Axios: U.S. and Iran say progress made in Geneva nuclear talks
• Al Jazeera: Iran says good progress made in nuclear talks
• NBC News: U.S. and Iran tout progress in nuclear talks
• EIA: Strait of Hormuz — world's most important oil transit chokepoint
• Energy Tracker Asia: Japan Most at Risk from Disruption in Strait of Hormuz
• The National: Strait of Hormuz closes for few hours due to Iranian drills
• Fox News: Iran fires live missiles into Strait of Hormuz