Gaza "Peace Council" First UN Report —
The Trump-led "Peace Council" delivered its first report at the UN and called for participation in an international stabilization force. However, a framework lacking Palestinian representation expands the legitimacy void and could become a turning point fundamentally reshaping the Middle East's security order.
── Understand in 3 points ─────────
- • On March 24, 2026, a representative of the "Peace Council," which oversees the interim governance of the Gaza Strip, delivered its first status report to the UN Security Council.
- • The Peace Council called on nations to participate in an "international stabilization force" responsible for disarming Islamic organizations such as Hamas.
- • The Peace Council is chaired by US President Trump, making it a US-led governance framework.
── NOW PATTERN ─────────
The "legitimacy void" created after the collapse of Hamas rule, coupled with the US's "overreach of power" in unilaterally attempting to fill it, and the "failure of coordination" by the international community, makes the establishment of sustainable governance difficult.
── Probability and Response ──────
• Base case 50% — The number of participating countries in the stabilization force remains around 10, reconstruction funding contributions stay below $10 billion, sporadic terrorist attacks occur a few times a month, and no new comprehensive resolution is adopted by the Security Council.
• Bull case 20% — Saudi Arabia formally declares support for the Peace Council, reports of secret negotiations with Hamas's political wing, a surge in stabilization force participating countries (15 or more), and an announcement of large-scale contributions to the reconstruction fund.
• Bear case 30% — A large-scale attack on the stabilization force (50+ casualties), participating countries announce withdrawal, evidence of weapons smuggling into Gaza by Iranian proxy forces, statements indicating a reduction in the Trump administration's commitment, and a deepening refugee crisis at the Egyptian border.
📡 Signal — What Happened
Why it matters: The Trump-led "Peace Council" delivered its first report at the UN and called for participation in an international stabilization force. However, a framework lacking Palestinian representation expands the legitimacy void and could become a turning point fundamentally reshaping the Middle East's security order.
- Diplomacy — On March 24, 2026, a representative of the "Peace Council," which oversees the interim governance of the Gaza Strip, delivered its first status report to the UN Security Council.
- Security — The Peace Council called on nations to participate in an "international stabilization force" responsible for disarming Islamic organizations such as Hamas.
- Political Structure — The Peace Council is chaired by US President Trump, making it a US-led governance framework.
- Humanitarian — The Gaza Strip has suffered massive destruction since the military conflict began in October 2023, with the majority of its approximately 2.3 million residents displaced.
- International Law — The report to the UN Security Council is positioned as a crucial step for the Peace Council to gain international legitimacy.
- Regional Affairs — The disarmament of Hamas has been the biggest obstacle in all past peace negotiations.
- Military — The specific troop strength, command structure, and rules of engagement for the international stabilization force have not yet been announced.
- Diplomacy — Many Arab nations have not clarified their stance on the Peace Council and maintain a cautious attitude.
- Domestic Politics — The Palestinian Authority (PA) has been effectively excluded from the Peace Council's framework and is intensifying its opposition.
- Economy — The reconstruction of the Gaza Strip is estimated to require over $50 billion, and securing funding nations is a challenge.
- International Relations — Russia and China have questioned the legitimacy of the Peace Council, and discussions in the Security Council are expected to be contentious.
- History — The first report to the UN was part of the interim governance process following the Israel-Hamas ceasefire agreement in 2025.
To understand this first UN report by the "Peace Council" regarding the Gaza Strip, it is necessary to delve deeply into the structural history of the Palestinian issue and the shifts in US Middle East policy.
The Gaza Strip was originally placed under Egyptian administration during the 1948 First Arab-Israeli War and occupied by Israel in the 1967 Six-Day War. Although limited autonomy by the Palestinian Authority (PA) was recognized in the 1993 Oslo Accords, Hamas won the Palestinian Legislative Council election in 2006, and in 2007, Hamas seized control of the Gaza Strip by force. Since then, a divided state has been entrenched, with Gaza under Hamas rule and the West Bank under PA rule.
This division is also a consequence of the "failure of coordination" by the international community, which could not maintain a consistent strategy for the Palestinian issue. Since the Oslo Accords, the US has positioned itself as an "honest broker" for Middle East peace, but in reality, it has consistently maintained a pro-Israel stance. The policies of successive administrations have swung like a pendulum: the Obama administration's two-state solution, Trump's first term "Deal of the Century," the Biden administration's reduced engagement, and now Trump's second term with this Peace Council.
The Hamas attack on Israel on October 7, 2023, and the subsequent large-scale Israeli military operation, brought devastating destruction to the Gaza Strip. The humanitarian crisis, with tens of thousands of deaths, the destruction of most infrastructure, and the displacement of over 90% of the population, completely collapsed the traditional governance structure. This "legitimacy void" is the direct background for the birth of the Peace Council.
The unusual structure of the Trump administration itself chairing the Peace Council is an extension of the role the US played in the 2025 ceasefire negotiations. President Trump aims to position the ceasefire as his diplomatic achievement and directly involve himself in the subsequent governance process, making it a political asset for the November 2026 midterm elections. Simultaneously, he seeks to integrate the "resolution" of the Gaza issue into the larger strategic goal of expanding the Abraham Accords (especially the normalization of diplomatic relations between Saudi Arabia and Israel).
However, this framework has fundamental problems. First, it lacks the representation of the Palestinians themselves. The PA is excluded, Hamas is targeted for disarmament, and there is no channel for Gaza residents to participate in their own governance. Second, its legitimacy under international law is unclear. Interim governance not based on a Security Council resolution is questioned not only by Russia and China but also by many countries in the Global South. Third, the effectiveness of disarmament is dubious. There is no successful precedent for achieving the disarmament of not only Hamas but also Islamic Jihad and other armed groups through external military force, as seen with Hezbollah in Lebanon.
This structure is also a typical example of "overreach of power," where the US still attempts to shape regional order through the logic of force amidst the weakening of its unipolar dominance in the post-Cold War international order. A series of precedents—the failure of governance after the Iraq War, the withdrawal from Afghanistan, and the chaos after the Libya intervention—demonstrate how difficult externally-led governance transitions are.
Furthermore, it is crucial that this move is not merely a Gaza-specific issue. The success or failure of the Peace Council will determine the future of the entire Middle East order, including Israel-Saudi normalization, Iran's regional influence, Turkey's position, Egypt's security, and the authority of the UN. The first report to the UN was the moment when this US-led framework faced international scrutiny for the first time on a stage where such complex interests intersect.
The delta: The US-led "Peace Council," overseeing interim governance in Gaza, delivered its first official report to the UN, bringing a governance framework lacking Palestinian representation to international scrutiny. This poses fundamental questions about the legitimacy of post-conflict governance and marks a watershed moment for whether the reshaping of the Middle East order will proceed according to the US blueprint.
🔍 Reading Between the Lines — What the Reports Aren't Saying
The timing of the Peace Council's first UN report is designed to align with the Trump administration's political calendar, looking ahead to the 2026 US midterm elections. The true aim is not the stabilization of Gaza, but rather to fill the outer moat of the "deal" of Saudi-Israel normalization, with Gaza merely a "hostage" in that transaction. The call for nations to participate in the stabilization force is a political performance aimed at gaining de facto international recognition by having them "sign on" to the US-led framework, rather than genuinely securing troops. The very fact that the report makes no mention of the structural exclusion of Palestinian voices speaks to the true nature of this framework.
NOW PATTERN
Legitimacy Void × Overreach of Power × Failure of Coordination
The "legitimacy void" created after the collapse of Hamas rule, coupled with the US's "overreach of power" in unilaterally attempting to fill it, and the "failure of coordination" by the international community, makes the establishment of sustainable governance difficult.
Intersection of Dynamics
These three dynamics form a mutually reinforcing vicious cycle. The "legitimacy void" arose from the collapse of governance in Gaza, but the absence of international consensus to fill this void ("failure of coordination") creates a situation where the US is compelled to intervene unilaterally ("overreach of power"). The US's unilateral intervention, in turn, provokes international backlash, further hindering coordination and weakening the framework's legitimacy.
At the core of this cycle is a structure that could be called the "dilemma of legitimacy." To confer legitimacy upon Gaza's governance, the participation of Palestinians themselves and the approval of the international community are necessary. However, Palestinian representatives (PA) are weakened, Hamas is targeted for disarmament, and the international community (Security Council) is divided. This "shortage" of legitimacy renders any framework vulnerable.
Historically, cases where these three dynamics have acted simultaneously have almost invariably led to long-term destabilization. The post-Iraq War occupation governance (2003~) is precisely an example where the legitimacy void, US overreach, and failure of international coordination overlapped, resulting in over two decades of instability.
In Gaza's case, it is further complicated by the fact that these three dynamics are intertwined with the broader reshaping of the Middle East order—the expansion of the Abraham Accords, Iran's sphere of influence, and Turkey's regional ambitions. The success or failure of the Peace Council will determine not only Gaza's fate but also the balance of power in the Middle East itself. If the failure of coordination persists, the void risks being filled by other actors (Iranian proxy forces, jihadist organizations), and US overreach will deepen further, completing a structural trap with no exit.
📚 History of Patterns
2003-2011: CPA (Coalition Provisional Authority) Governance After the Iraq War
Legitimacy Void × Overreach of Power
Structural Similarity to Present Case: External forces conducted occupation governance without legitimate backing, leading to intensified sectarian conflict and the rise of ISIS. Formal legitimization through elections did not bring substantive stability.
1999-2008: UNMIK (UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo) Governance in Kosovo
Legitimacy Void × Failure of Coordination
Structural Similarity to Present Case: Even governance based on a UN Security Council resolution was delayed in its final status determination due to Russian opposition, creating a 9-year "frozen conflict" state. A typical example where the source of legitimacy is nullified by great power rivalry.
2011-Present: State Collapse After Libya Intervention
Overreach of Power × Failure of Coordination
Structural Similarity to Present Case: After the NATO-led military intervention, the lack of a governance transition plan and sporadic international engagement led to long-term chaos with dual governments and warring militias. The lesson: "Easy to break, hard to build."
1993-2000: Collapse of the Oslo Peace Process
Legitimacy Void × Failure of Coordination
Structural Similarity to Present Case: The divergence between Palestinian expectations and actual outcomes led to the Second Intifada. A foundational example demonstrating that formal agreements do not guarantee substantive legitimacy.
2001-2021: US Nation-Building in Afghanistan
Overreach of Power × Legitimacy Void × Failure of Coordination
Structural Similarity to Present Case: Nation-building efforts spanning 20 years and over $2 trillion were overturned by the Taliban's return to power just days after US troop withdrawal. The most dramatic example of how fragile externally-led governance can be.
Patterns Revealed by History
The pattern consistently shown by historical precedents is clear. When external forces lead governance without securing true representation of local residents, short-term stabilization may be possible, but in the long term, the lack of legitimacy becomes a seed for new violence and destabilization. Iraq's CPA held elections but could not prevent sectarian conflict, Kosovo's UNMIK, despite being backed by a Security Council resolution, was stalemated by great power rivalry, and in Afghanistan, even after 20 years and over $2 trillion, sustainable governance could not be established.
Common to these cases is the fact that "procuring legitimacy" is the most difficult challenge. While maintaining security with military force and rebuilding infrastructure with funds are technically possible, injecting legitimacy from the outside, making residents feel that governance is "theirs," is inherently almost impossible. For the Gaza Peace Council to overcome this historical pattern, a mechanism to ensure the political participation of Palestinians themselves is indispensable, but it is lacking in the current framework. Furthermore, the risk of US presidential transitions always exists, and there is no guarantee that a post-Trump administration will maintain the same commitment. History has repeatedly proven that the costs of withdrawal often exceed the costs of intervention.
🔮 Next Scenarios
In the base case scenario, the Peace Council functions partially, but the fundamental issue of legitimacy remains unresolved. The international stabilization force will be formed with a limited number of participating countries (around 10), primarily led by the US, and deployed in major cities in Gaza. Hamas's disarmament will proceed "officially," but weapons concealment and sporadic guerrilla resistance by remnant forces will continue. The security situation will settle into a state of "managed instability," where large-scale combat is avoided, but terrorist attacks and assassinations persist. Reconstruction funds, primarily from Saudi Arabia and the UAE, will be partially contributed but will fall far short of the $50 billion required for full-scale reconstruction. International community support will be limited due to concerns about the Peace Council's legitimacy. Palestinian political participation will be considered incrementally, but the granting of substantive autonomy will be postponed. In the UN Security Council, Russia and China will continue their criticism but will not go as far as to directly block the Peace Council with a veto. A state of "de facto acceptance" coexisting with "principled opposition" will persist. This ambiguous state can be maintained for 2-3 years, but the accumulation of structural contradictions will eventually lead to some crisis acting as a turning point. The expansion of the Abraham Accords will be delayed but not completely derailed, and Saudi-Israel normalization negotiations will continue behind the scenes.
Implications for Investment/Action: The number of participating countries in the stabilization force remains around 10, reconstruction funding contributions stay below $10 billion, sporadic terrorist attacks occur a few times a month, and no new comprehensive resolution is adopted by the Security Council.
In the bull case scenario, the Peace Council gains unexpected international support, accelerating Gaza's stabilization. Key to this development is Saudi Arabia's declaration of full support for the Peace Council, leading to a "grand bargain" linked to the normalization of diplomatic relations with Israel. Saudi participation would encourage active involvement from other Arab nations (UAE, Egypt, Jordan), enabling large-scale mobilization of reconstruction funds. Hamas's disarmament would progress through a "political deal" mediated by Qatar and Turkey, where parts of Hamas as a political organization participate in the interim governance process in exchange for dismantling its military wing. This would be similar to the IRA (Irish Republican Army) disarmament model, bringing substantive, though not complete, progress. The international stabilization force would reach a size of 20,000 personnel with participation from over 20 countries, effectively deployed under NATO or multinational command. Improved security would allow humanitarian aid and reconstruction efforts to fully commence, and the gradual return of displaced persons would begin. The realization of this scenario requires three conditions to be met simultaneously: the Trump administration demonstrating flexibility to accept Palestinian political participation, Israel exercising restraint in settlement expansion, and Iran refraining from obstruction through proxy forces. While the probability is not high given historical precedents, unexpected diplomatic breakthroughs can occur in the Middle East, as demonstrated by the success of the Abraham Accords.
Implications for Investment/Action: Saudi Arabia formally declares support for the Peace Council, reports of secret negotiations with Hamas's political wing, a surge in stabilization force participating countries (15 or more), and an announcement of large-scale contributions to the reconstruction fund.
In the bear case scenario, the Peace Council quickly becomes dysfunctional, and the situation in Gaza deteriorates further. The trigger for this scenario would be a large-scale attack on the international stabilization force by remnant Hamas forces or other armed groups. If there are numerous casualties, participating countries will face domestic pressure to withdraw their troops, leading to the "collapse of the coalition of the willing." This would be a repeat of scenarios like Mogadishu in Somalia (1993) or the multinational force in Lebanon (1983). Furthermore, Iran could actively promote the destabilization of Gaza through Hezbollah and other proxy forces. For Iran, the failure of US-led Gaza governance is a strategic benefit, leading to the strengthening of the "Axis of Resistance." Indirect intervention through weapons smuggling, funding, and training support would significantly complicate the stabilization force's mission. On the domestic political front, if President Trump determines that the Gaza issue becomes a political liability in the 2026 midterm elections, he could rapidly reduce commitment. An "exit without strategy" similar to the withdrawal from Afghanistan would plunge Gaza into further chaos. In this scenario, Gaza would become a "failed state," transitioning into Libya-style long-term chaos with multiple armed factions vying for control. The humanitarian crisis would deepen further, accelerating the outflow of refugees to neighboring countries (especially Egypt). The expansion of the Abraham Accords would completely collapse, and the Middle East security environment would worsen even beyond its state before 2023.
Implications for Investment/Action: A large-scale attack on the stabilization force (50+ casualties), participating countries announce withdrawal, evidence of weapons smuggling into Gaza by Iranian proxy forces, statements indicating a reduction in the Trump administration's commitment, and a deepening refugee crisis at the Egyptian border.
Key Triggers to Watch
- Announcement of specific formation and deployment plans for the international stabilization force: April-June 2026
- Saudi Arabia's official statement on its stance towards the Peace Council: May-August 2026
- Submission and voting on a new Gaza-related resolution in the Security Council: April-September 2026
- 2026 US Midterm Elections and their impact on Gaza policy: November 2026
- First report on the results (or failure) of Hamas's disarmament process: June-December 2026
🔄 Tracking Loop
Next Trigger: UN Security Council deliberation on a Gaza-related resolution (scheduled for April-May 2026) — Whether Russia and China exercise their veto will determine the fate of the Peace Council's international legitimacy.
Continuation of this Pattern: Tracking Theme: Legitimacy of Gaza's Interim Governance and Feasibility of an International Stabilization Force — The next milestone is the announcement of specific formation plans for the stabilization force (around June 2026).
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