North Korea's Missile Resumption and Japan
North Korea's resumption of long-range missile tests in early 2026 is forcing Japan to undertake one of its largest post-war defense posture reviews. This is not merely a military threat, but a signal indicating a structural transformation of the security order in East Asia itself.
── Understand in 3 points ─────────
- • North Korea conducted multiple ballistic missile launch tests from January to March 2026. At least two of these are estimated to be ICBM-class.
- • Following a moratorium on tests at the end of 2025, tests resumed in early 2026. Technical advancements, including improved operational capabilities for solid-fuel ICBMs, have been confirmed.
- • Based on the three security-related documents (安保三文書) formulated in December 2022, the Japanese government has announced a policy to accelerate the deployment of counterstrike capabilities (standoff missiles) within fiscal year 2026.
── NOW PATTERN ─────────
North Korea's missile development and Japan's strengthening of defense capabilities form a "spiral of conflict," entering a self-reinforcing loop where one party's actions justify the other's escalation. This spiral is path-dependently entrenching an arms race across East Asia.
── Probabilities and Responses ──────
• Base case 55% — Official announcement of Tomahawk deployment, progress report on ASEV construction, presentation of a roadmap to achieve 2% of GDP for defense budget in the mid-term review.
• Bull case 15% — Reports of unofficial US-DPRK contact, increased sanctions on North Korea by China, significant decrease in North Korea's missile test frequency.
• Bear case 30% — Signs of activity at North Korea's Punggye-ri nuclear test site, indications of MIRV technology testing, information on military technology transfer from Russia to North Korea, rise in public opinion poll numbers for nuclear armament in South Korea.
📡 THE SIGNAL — What Happened
Why it matters: North Korea's resumption of long-range missile tests in early 2026 is forcing Japan to undertake one of its largest post-war defense posture reviews. This is not merely a military threat, but a signal indicating a structural transformation of the security order in East Asia itself.
- Military — North Korea conducted multiple ballistic missile launch tests from January to March 2026. At least two of these are estimated to be ICBM-class.
- Military — Following a moratorium on tests at the end of 2025, tests resumed in early 2026. Technical advancements, including improved operational capabilities for solid-fuel ICBMs, have been confirmed.
- Defense Policy — Based on the three security-related documents (安保三文書) formulated in December 2022, the Japanese government has announced a policy to accelerate the deployment of counterstrike capabilities (standoff missiles) within fiscal year 2026.
- Budget — Japan's FY2026 defense budget is approximately 8.5 trillion yen, reaching about 1.6% of GDP. It is in an acceleration phase towards the target of 2% of GDP by FY2027.
- Technology — Construction of two Aegis System Equipped Vessels (ASEV) is underway. They are planned to be equipped with SM-3 Block IIA and Block IIB, aiming for commissioning in FY2027.
- Diplomacy — The real-time missile warning information sharing mechanism among Japan, the US, and South Korea began operations in 2024 and transitioned to a steady operational phase by 2026.
- Regional Affairs — China's nuclear warhead buildup (targeting over 1,000 warheads by 2030) is indirectly influencing Japan's defense plans.
- Domestic Politics — Public opinion in Japan regarding the possession of counterstrike capabilities has shifted, with approximately 60% supporting it in a 2025 survey.
- Technology — North Korea's missile technology is diversifying with irregular trajectories (lofted and depressed trajectories), making interception difficult with conventional BMD.
- Alliance — The US Forces Japan's missile defense posture maintains a forward-deployed system, including two TPY-2 radars (X-band), deepening Japan-US integrated air defense.
- Economy — The promotion of domestic production in the defense industry is expanding orders for defense-related companies such as Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, Kawasaki Heavy Industries, and IHI.
- International — UN Security Council resolutions to strengthen sanctions on North Korea are effectively non-functional due to vetoes by China and Russia.
The relationship between North Korea's missile development and Japan's defense posture is a mirror reflecting the fundamental transformation of the East Asian security order since the end of the Cold War. To understand this structural conflict, it is necessary to unravel over three decades of historical context.
In 1993, North Korea conducted a test launch of the Nodong missile, revealing that the Japanese mainland was for the first time within the range of ballistic missiles. This event fundamentally shook Japan's security perceptions. However, at the time, Japan was enjoying the "peace dividend" of the post-Cold War era, and defense spending was continuously suppressed under an implicit ceiling of less than 1% of GDP.
The 1998 Taepodong launch marked a decisive turning point. When the missile flew over the Japanese archipelago and landed in the Pacific Ocean, a sense of security crisis was widely shared in Japanese society for the first time. This prompted the full-scale joint development of BMD (Ballistic Missile Defense) between Japan and the US, leading to the decision to introduce SM-3 and PAC-3. However, at this point, changes in the defense posture were limited to strengthening the "shield," while discussions about the "spear," i.e., enemy base attack capabilities (now counterstrike capabilities), were taboo.
From 2006 to 2017, North Korea conducted six nuclear tests and made dramatic advancements in missile technology. In particular, 2017 saw the successful launch of the "Hwasong-15" type ICBM, making the acquisition of US mainland strike capability a realistic prospect. During this period, Japan decided to introduce Aegis Ashore, but the plan was scrapped in 2020 due to booster drop issues. This setback symbolizes how Japan's defense plans have constantly wavered between technical rationality and political constraints.
2022 marked a historic turning point in security policy. As Russia's invasion of Ukraine presented the reality of "unilateral changes to the status quo by force," and amidst China's military rise and tensions in the Taiwan Strait, the Kishida administration revised the three security-related documents (安保三文書). This decision, which explicitly stated the possession of counterstrike capabilities and aimed to raise defense spending to 2% of GDP, was the largest shift in Japan's post-war security policy.
From 2024 to 2025, North Korea temporarily reduced the frequency of missile tests, which is analyzed to have been a period of technological accumulation. The development of solid-fuel ICBMs, testing of hypersonic glide vehicles, and diversification of tactical nuclear delivery methods proceeded covertly, and the resumption of tests in early 2026 was a demonstration of this technological maturity.
What fundamentally distinguishes the current situation from the past is that North Korea's missile threat is positioned not as a "standalone threat" but as an element of a "complex security environment." With China's nuclear force buildup, deepening military cooperation with Russia, and doubts about the US's "two-front war" capability, Japan is being forced to move away from a defense posture solely reliant on its alliance. This presents Japanese society with the most fundamental security question since the rearmament debate of the 1950s.
Furthermore, it is noteworthy that this transformation of the defense posture is synchronized with technological innovation. Conventional BMD was based on the premise of "intercepting missiles flying on a ballistic trajectory in their terminal phase," but with the emergence of irregular trajectory missiles and hypersonic weapons, this premise itself is collapsing. Japan's aim for "Integrated Air and Missile Defense" (IAMD) is a multi-layered defense network encompassing space, cyber, and electromagnetic domains, effectively redefining the traditional concept of "exclusive defense-oriented policy" (専守防衛).
The delta: North Korea's resumption of missile tests is occurring amidst the simultaneous progression of technological maturity (solid-fuel ICBMs, irregular trajectories) and the dysfunction of the international sanctions regime, irreversibly accelerating a paradigm shift in which Japan is, for the first time since the war, seriously developing not only a "shield" but also a "spear."
🔍 BETWEEN THE LINES — What the News Isn't Saying
Officially, "addressing the North Korean threat" is the stated reason for strengthening defense capabilities, but in reality, the primary objective is to build deterrence against China's military rise. North Korea is being used as the politically most convenient "face of the threat." The range and scale of Japan's counterstrike capabilities clearly exceed what is necessary to deal with North Korea, and as deployment plans for the Southwest Islands indicate, the true strategic interest lies in expanding Japan's role in a Taiwan Strait contingency. The promotion of domestic defense industry production is also not merely about cost; it strongly implies an "insurance policy" for the alliance, aiming to build an autonomous defense foundation not dependent on US arms export policies.
NOW PATTERN
Spiral of Conflict × Path Dependency × Alliance Strain
North Korea's missile development and Japan's strengthening of defense capabilities form a "spiral of conflict," entering a self-reinforcing loop where one party's actions justify the other's escalation. This spiral is path-dependently entrenching an arms race across East Asia.
Intersection of Dynamics
The three structural dynamics of "spiral of conflict," "path dependency," and "alliance strain" are mutually reinforcing, irreversibly transforming Japan's security environment. Understanding this intersection is key to deciphering future developments.
Each time North Korea's missile development turns the "spiral of conflict," Japan's strengthening of defense capabilities advances to a new stage. This strengthening of defense capabilities is then irreversibly entrenched by the mechanism of "path dependency." Once introduced, Aegis destroyers operate for over 30 years, and once deployed, Tomahawks become part of the operational doctrine. In other words, with each turn of the spiral of conflict, Japan's defense posture changes permanently.
Concurrently, concerns about "alliance strain" provide motivation for Japan's autonomous defense buildup, which further reinforces "path dependency." The more the credibility of US extended deterrence wavers, the easier it becomes for Japan to justify investment in its own deterrence capabilities (counterstrike capabilities). Once made, these investments are difficult to withdraw, permanently raising the "baseline" of Japan's security policy.
However, Japan's strengthening of defense capabilities could be perceived as a "threat" not only by North Korea but also by China. While Japan's standoff missiles target North Korea, their range also reaches China's coastal areas. This could further accelerate China's military buildup, creating a new "spiral of conflict." The risk of East Asia as a whole falling into a multi-layered security dilemma is an inevitable consequence derived from the intersection of these three dynamics.
Diplomatic negotiation is the only potential "braking mechanism" within this structural lock-in, but as long as the dysfunction of the UN Security Council and the breakdown of US-DPRK dialogue continue, no institutional mechanism exists to halt the spiral. As a result, the security environment in East Asia is moving towards a normalization of "managed tension."
📚 PATTERN HISTORY
1983-1989: The Arms Race Leading to the US-Soviet Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty
Spiral of Conflict → Path Dependency → Diplomatic Resolution
Structural similarities with the present: The deployment race between SS-20 and Pershing II was a classic "spiral of conflict," but it was ultimately resolved by the INF Treaty. However, resolution required a shared fear of nuclear war. This "shared fear" is insufficient in present-day East Asia.
1994: Agreed Framework between the US and DPRK and the North Korean Nuclear Crisis
Crisis Exploitation → Agreement → Agreement Collapse
Structural similarities with the present: The 1994 Agreed Framework temporarily froze nuclear development but collapsed in 2002 due to non-compliance by both sides. Agreements with North Korea have weak implementation mechanisms, and technological accumulation tends to proceed covertly even during agreement periods.
1998-2003: From the Taepodong Shock to Japan's BMD Introduction Decision
External Shock → Policy Shift → Path Dependency
Structural similarities with the present: The 1998 Taepodong launch led to Japan's decision to introduce BMD. Once introduced, the BMD system continuously expanded and strengthened, never being scaled back. Shifts in defense policy due to external shocks are irreversible.
2016-2017: North Korea's Missile Launch Spree and Japan's Aegis Ashore Decision
Spiral of Conflict → Plan Formulation → Plan Setback → Path Dependency to Alternative
Structural similarities with the present: Aegis Ashore, decided in response to the 2017 crisis, was canceled in 2020, but ASEV was decided as an alternative. While defense plans change form, the direction of "strengthening defense capabilities" is maintained and tends to expand.
2022: Russia's Invasion of Ukraine and Japan's Revision of the Three Security-Related Documents
External Shock → Paradigm Shift → Acceleration of Path Dependency
Structural similarities with the present: The war in Ukraine demonstrated that "another country's war" can fundamentally change one's own security policy. Japan's decision to possess counterstrike capabilities would have been politically impossible without the Ukraine war. Drastic changes in the external environment have the power to overturn decades of inertia in an instant.
Patterns Revealed by History
The historical pattern consistently shows a cycle of "external military shock → irreversible shift in defense policy → entrenchment of a new equilibrium." The 1998 Taepodong shock, the 2017 missile crisis, and the 2022 Ukraine war have each created a "ratchet effect," incrementally raising Japan's defense policy. It is noteworthy that this ratchet only moves in one direction. Even if a threat temporarily diminishes, there is no precedent for a once-expanded defense posture being scaled back.
Furthermore, diplomatic agreements with North Korea (such as the 1994 Agreed Framework, Six-Party Talks agreements) have invariably collapsed. This is due not only to North Korea's insincerity but also to the lack of institutional mechanisms to guarantee the implementation of agreements. As of 2026, the possibility of a diplomatic resolution is lower than at any point since 1994, making deterrence through military means virtually the only option. Within this historical context, Japan's defense posture transformation should be understood as a "structural inevitability" rather than a "policy choice."
🔮 WHAT'S NEXT
Japan will establish initial operational capability (IOC) for Tomahawk missiles within FY2026 and gradually proceed with the deployment of standoff missiles, including ground-launched types. However, the establishment of a complete Integrated Air and Missile Defense (IAMD) system will be delayed until FY2027 or later. North Korea will continue missile tests intermittently throughout the year but will not proceed with a new nuclear test. The international community's response will remain at the statement level, and effective additional sanctions in the Security Council will not materialize.
Trilateral cooperation among Japan, the US, and South Korea will be maintained, but the pace of deepening will depend on South Korea's domestic politics. The US will welcome Japan's increased defense spending while maintaining a tone that calls for further contributions. China will criticize Japan's defense buildup as "destabilizing the region," but specific countermeasures will be limited.
In this scenario, Japan will begin "introducing new defense systems" within 2026, but the establishment of a complete operational system will be after 2027. The direction of defense policy will be irreversibly determined, and the baseline for defense buildup over the next decade will be fixed.
Implications for Investment/Action: Official announcement of Tomahawk deployment, progress report on ASEV construction, presentation of a roadmap to achieve 2% of GDP for defense budget in the mid-term review.
Unexpected changes in the diplomatic environment surrounding North Korea could open a window for dialogue. Specifically, this is a scenario where China exercises its influence over North Korea, leading to a moratorium on missile tests. In this case, the pace of Japan's defense buildup might slow down slightly, but equipment procurement that has already begun will continue path-dependently.
Conditions under which a diplomatic breakthrough could occur include a new US administration showing a positive stance towards direct dialogue with North Korea, China re-evaluating North Korea's nuclear and missile development as a risk to its own security, and economic hardship within North Korea creating an incentive for negotiations. However, the probability of these conditions being met simultaneously is low.
Even in this scenario, Japan's development of counterstrike capabilities will continue, but with a weakened sense of "urgency," some deployment schedules may be pushed back. The growth rate of the defense budget might also slow slightly. However, the possibility of the 2% of GDP target itself being withdrawn is extremely low.
Implications for Investment/Action: Reports of unofficial US-DPRK contact, increased sanctions on North Korea by China, significant decrease in North Korea's missile test frequency.
North Korea conducts its 7th nuclear test in 2026, demonstrating the miniaturization and practical application of tactical nuclear warheads. Simultaneously, it conducts an ICBM test suggesting the acquisition of MIRV technology, presenting the possibility of saturating Japan-US interception capabilities. In this case, the East Asian security environment will enter a qualitatively different phase.
In Japan, discussions about "nuclear sharing" and "independent nuclear armament" will surface, breaking a political taboo. Pressure for further increases in the defense budget will grow, potentially accelerating the achievement of the 2% of GDP target. The US will consider regional deployment of tactical nuclear weapons (re-deployment to South Korea) and increased frequency of visits by nuclear-capable vessels to Japan to reinforce the credibility of extended deterrence.
The greatest risk in this scenario is that North Korea's nuclear test accelerates South Korea's independent nuclear armament debate, making a nuclear domino effect in East Asia a realistic possibility. In Japan, discussions about reviewing the Three Non-Nuclear Principles (非核三原則) could reach a politically undeniable level. The entire region would face the most dangerous nuclear proliferation risk since the Cold War. Furthermore, the possibility of Russia transferring advanced military technology to North Korea cannot be ruled out, posing a risk of rapid improvement in North Korea's missile accuracy and survivability.
Implications for Investment/Action: Signs of activity at North Korea's Punggye-ri nuclear test site, indications of MIRV technology testing, information on military technology transfer from Russia to North Korea, rise in public opinion poll numbers for nuclear armament in South Korea.
Key Triggers to Watch
- New ICBM launch test by North Korea (especially a practical, normal trajectory launch): April-June 2026 (spring military provocation pattern)
- Announcement of Japan's Tomahawk missile Initial Operational Capability (IOC) achievement: Second half of FY2026 (October 2026 - March 2027)
- North Korea's 7th nuclear test: Throughout 2026 (dependent on political timing)
- Joint statement reaffirming and strengthening extended deterrence at the Japan-US summit: First half of 2026 (e.g., G7 Summit)
- Launch ceremony for Aegis System Equipped Vessels (ASEV): Second half of 2026 - first half of 2027
🔄 TRACKING LOOP
Next Trigger: North Korea's next ICBM launch test (high probability in April-June 2026) — If a solid-fuel type, normal trajectory live fire is conducted, pressure to accelerate Japan's defense plans will further intensify.
Continuation of this pattern: Tracking Theme: Japan's Defense Paradigm Shift — Next milestones are Tomahawk IOC declaration (second half of FY2026) and ASEV launch (second half of 2026 - first half of 2027).
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